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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
PROTECTION OF ACTIVE DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS AND THEIR CYBER
PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
by
Hany Fawzy Habib
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Osama Mohammed, Major Professor
The Smart Grid constitutes several smaller interconnected microgrids. The integration
of converter-interfaced distributed generation (DG) in microgrids has raised several issues
including the fact that fault currents in these systems in the islanded mode are much less,
than in grid-connected systems. Therefore, microgrid protection schemes require a fast,
reliable and robust communication system, with backup, to automatically adjust relay
settings for the appropriate current levels according to the microgrid’s operation mode. The
risk of communication link failures, cyber security threats and the high cost involved to
avoid them are major challenges for the implementation of an economic adaptive
protection scheme. This dissertation develops an adaptive protection scheme for AC
microgrids, which is capable of surviving communication failures. The idea is the use of
an energy storage system as the main contributor to fault currents in the microgrid’s
islanded mode when the communication link fails to detect the shift to the islanded mode.
The design of an autonomous control algorithm for the energy storage’s AC/DC converter
capable of operating when the microgrid is in both grid-connected and islanded mode.

vii

Utilizing a single mode of operation for the converter will eliminate the reliance on
communicated control command signals to shift the controller between different modes.
Also, the ability of the overall system to keep stable voltage and frequency levels during
extreme cases such as the occurrence of a fault during a peak pulse load period. The results
of the developed protection scheme showed that the energy storage -inverter system is able
to contribute enough fault current for a sufficient duration to cause the system protection
devices to clear the fault in the event of communication loss. The developed method was
investigated under different fault types and showed excellent results of the developed
protection scheme. In addition, it was demonstrated in a case study that, whenever possible,
the temporary disconnection of the pulse load during the fault period will allow the
utilization of smaller energy storage device capacity to feed fault currents and thus reduce
the overall expenditures.
Furthermore, in this dissertation we utilized a hybrid framework to verify our
protection

algorithm.

We

simulated

the

microgrid

on

MATLAB/Simulink

SimPowerSystems to model the physical system dynamics, whereas all control logic was
implemented on embedded microcontrollers communicating over a real network. This
work suggested a protection methodology utilizing contemporary communication
technologies between multi-agents to protect the microgrid.
.
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Literature Review
1.1 Introduction
Distributed energy resources connected to a microgrid and their integration with the
main grid are the targets in achieving optimum operation of electric power system networks
[1]. Reducing greenhouse gases generated by conventional energy resources while
increasing the reliability and power quality for consumers who require uninterruptible
power supplies are some of its main advantages [2], [3]. However, along with these
benefits, microgrids introduce some major technical challenges in terms of protection
schemes. Microgrids are dynamic entities where Distributed Generators (DG), loads, and
Energy Storage Devices (ESDs) are constantly connected and disconnected [4], [5].
Operating conditions vary rapidly, since the inertia of the system is much less than that of
conventional networks. Weather conditions, resource availability and consumption affect
the operating conditions of the equipment. In order to ensure safe operation, all elements
must be monitored and necessary changes must be made to their settings as the operating
conditions of the microgrid change. Since conventional protection schemes that rely on
large inertia and long transient periods are insufficient, new schemes are necessary [6].
Communication with relays is necessary in order to update operating currents of the
relays and detect the direction of fault currents to properly isolate the faults. DGs, on the
other hand, are monitored to follow their status and include or disregard their fault
contribution if they are on or off [7], [8]. It is therefore evident that incorporation of
communication technologies into microgrids has become inevitable to provide
contemporary adaptive protection schemes.
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However, the complex interdependencies between the cyber and physical components
of such systems increase the difficulty of devising control algorithms for them. The
challenge is in the fact that in a closely interconnected cyber-physical system, such as in a
microgrid with adaptive protection, minor malfunctions in the cyber domain can have
catastrophic impacts in the physical domain [9].
In order to address this, extensive efforts have been placed to devise data
communication standards for power transmission. Acknowledging their criticality in power
transmission, communication requirements for protection algorithms are viewed in
extensive detail in the IEC 61850 international standard. The IEC 61850 standard was
developed by the IEC Technical Committee Number 57 Working Group 10 and IEEE for
Ethernet (IEEE 802.3)-based communication in electrical substations and is currently
being extended for use tele protection (IEC 61850-90-1) [10]. IEC 61850 is also mentioned
in recent literature for microgrid applications [11]. The IEC 61850 poses stringent
restrictions on messages that communicate fault-related signals, such as the 4 ms time
limitation imposed on SMV and GOOSE messages. Consequently, designing control
algorithms for a protection system is a delicate and complex procedure.
This complexity is further leveraged when dealing with an adaptive protection
algorithm design in which the collaboration between multiple agents, namely Intelligent
Electronic Devices (IEDs), for detecting and isolating faults is time-critical. Clearly, the
robustness and availability of the communication infrastructure is an important prerequisite
for the success of contemporary adaptive protection algorithms [12]. Therefore,
communication failures in such applications is a high priced risk with serious
consequences.
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The goal of a resilient adaptive protection algorithm is to ride through communication
failures without causing serious damage to hardware assets, financial reparations, or
productivity costs. Considering the above factors, in this work, an adaptive protection
scheme for AC microgrids, which is capable of surviving communication failures by the
aid of Energy Storage Devices (ESDs), was developed as shown in Figure 1.1.

R1

TL1

DG1
TL2

R2

ESD

DG2
Fault

Attack
DG3
R3

TL3

Figure 1.1 The configuration of microgrid during islanded mode of operation.
1.2 Main Protection Challenges in Microgrids
There are several challenges that should be taken into consideration in designing a proper
protection scheme for a microgrid. The following subsections discuss some of the major
issues one may face in the proper operation of a microgrid protection scheme.
1.2.1

Selectivity and Sensitivity Issues

Two main characteristics that should be found in microgrid system protection devices are
selectivity and sensitivity features. First, selectivity refers to the ability of the protection
system to locate and classify a fault correctly. Over Current (OC) relays should determine
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whether the fault is internal or external to its zone. The protection algorithm should be able
to distinguish between the main grid and local microgrid faults [14]. During main grid
faults, the microgrid needs to be capable of islanding to protect equipment in the system
[15], [16]. During microgrid faults, the function of the protection scheme becomes more
complicated as it is required to disconnect the smallest part of the faulty section from the
system [17], [18]. It should be noted that the importance of the selectivity feature of the
relays is to operate under various faults while isolating the faulty part.
Secondly, sensitivity refers to the fact that OC relays should be able to detect the fault
conditions in the system. The fault should be cleared as quickly as possible to maximize
safety while minimizing system instability and damage to equipment [19]. The OC relay
should quickly arrive at a decision and CBs must function rapidly [20]. The sensitivity of
the relays must be adjusted such that a high redundancy can be achieved without affecting
selectivity of the protection system [21]-[23].
1.2.2

The Direction of Power Flow

Distribution systems become active systems due to the integration of DERs in the system
[24]. The microgrid feeds local loads and can also support power to the grid in the case of
excess generation. This operation changes the flow of the power from unidirectional to
bidirectional. Bi-directional power flow has effects on the amplitude and direction of the
fault current thereby affecting coordination of the protective relays [25], [26]. In this case,
the protection system in a typical distribution system is designed according to a time or
current coordination principle, in which the relay closest to the fault operates first and in
the event of a failure, a backup protective relay operates after a delay time.
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However, the effectiveness of this protection requires a radial grid connection, which is
no longer the case when DGs are connected to the network. This results in either changing
or completely losing coordination between protective devices [27], [28]. The different
adverse effects of DG connections on the distribution network protection include false
tripping of feeders, blinding of protection, increase or decrease in the fault level with the
connection or interruption of DERs affecting the reach of the OC relay settings [29], [30].
1.2.3

Dynamic Changes in the Microgrid Architecture

Dynamic changes of the microgrid configuration should be taken into consideration
when designing the protection scheme. Some changes include the disconnection of
generation units, shutting down some loads during peak hours, or exporting of power to
the main grid during excess generation periods for optimum and economic operations [24].
Adaptive protection is required to change the relay settings according to the current
microgrid configuration. Prior knowledge of every state in the microgrid as well as online
monitoring and calculation of the short circuit fault current is needed for proper operation.
As previously discussed, this requires the application of a fast, reliable, and robust
communication system [31], [32].
1.2.4

Faults in Grid-Connected Mode.

For a fault on the main grid during normal operation, the response of the protection
devices of individual DERs should not trip before the protection device at the Point of
Common Coupling (PCC) trips, while DERs should continue operation during sensing and
switching of the PCC device. To allow this, all DERs should have a Fault Ride Through
(FRT) capability [33]. For a fault within the microgrid during normal operation, the
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response of line and feeder protection must be to disconnect the faulty portion from the rest
of the system as quickly as possible and how it is done depends on the features and
complexity of the microgrid and the protection strategy used. There may be some non-fault
cases resulting in low voltage at the PCC such as voltage unbalances and non-fault open
phases that are difficult to detect and may potentially create hazards for sensitive loads,
micro sources, etc. Therefore, some protection mechanisms are needed to avoid such
situations [34].
1.2.5

Faults in Islanded Mode.

The high penetration of DERs based on power electronic inverters interfaced with the
microgrid as shown in Figure 1.2 has a great impact on the protection scheme. These
systems limit the short circuit current during islanded mode of operation, as they are
equipped with a Fault Current Limiter (FCL) that prevents high OC levels to flow during
the fault period [25], [35], [36]. A significant difference exists in the amount of short circuit
current that occurs when in grid connected and islanded modes of operation. In grid
connected, fault currents of a much higher magnitude (5-10 times the full load current) are
available to help conventional OC relays to activate under abnormal operations. However,
in islanded mode, the fault current reduces to only about 3 times the full load current [17].
Furthermore, a large integration of connected converter-based DERs further reduces the
fault current to only 1.2-1.5 times the full load current [37], [38]. Usually, conventional
OC relays are set to operate at 1.2-8 times full load current. Accordingly, the time-current
coordination of OC relays and OC devices with extremely inverse characteristics are
disturbed.
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1.3 Existing Techniques for Protection of Microgrids
One can conclude from the previous section that protection of a microgrid is complex
and desires a reliable, smart technique to reduce impacts from the previous problems that
mentioned in section 1.2. Adaptive protection, with the aid of a communication link, can
offer a solution for a protection scheme in the microgrid to handle its multiple modes of
operation.

Figure 1.2 The configuration of a typical microgrid.
Adaptive protection refers to an online process which modifies the preferred protective
responses and correlates them to a change in system conditions or requirements in a timely
manner through control or signaling [13]. Adaptive protection consists of a smart control
unit that monitors the grid parameters including a smart fault diagnostic system to detect
7

the fault, the fault type, identify the faulted zone, and a smart relaying system which
protects the system against faults. Adaptive protection of the microgrid can be realized with
the use of microprocessor-based Directional Overcurrent Relays (DOCR). DOCR have the
possibility to choose different tripping curves to suit a particular system. An adaptive
protection scheme can be implemented with centralized or decentralized control
approaches, but each requires a different communication architecture [39].
The centralized control architecture communicates with each IED and adjusts their
settings accordance with the configuration of the present microgrid as shown in Figure 1.2.
Centralized communication architecture is supported by various communication protocols
including Modbus, DNP3, IEC 60870-5-101/104, IEC 61850 and can be implemented with
a serial/bus communication over a PLC or via an Ethernet network [40].
The decentralized control architecture depends on sending and receiving data between
IEDs. Each IED can change its settings according to the data that it receives from other
IEDs. Presently, the industry is focused on the IEC 61850 standard as the protocol for
decentralized communication [41], [42]. The microgrid protection scheme requires an
adaptive, smart, and upgradable protection algorithm. A survey of existing key adaptive
protection schemes are presented in this section.
In [21], a novel adaptive protection technique is developed using extensive
communication and digital relays. Settings of the relays are changed according to the
microgrid configuration. The technique is further extended by using numerical directional
relays with a directional interlock capability for selective operation. Additional adaptive
protection schemes were introduced in [43], [44] with advanced communication
technologies for updating the relay settings in accordance with the microgrid configuration.
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The authors developed a central protection unit to be equipped with the microgrid to change
the tripping characteristics of the relays with every interruption call for the connection and
disconnection of DGs. The author in [22] studied the fault current of an inverter-based
microgrid and developed an adaptive protection algorithm for the fault current. This
technique depended on comparing the impedance of the grid and microgrid using the
voltage and current fault components in a real time manner. In this way, the relay updated
its settings by observing the changing impedance of the utility and microgrid. Reference
[34] suggested a system with a high penetration of DGs that loosened the coordination of
the protective relays due to bidirectional power flow in the system. A centralized control
center communicated online with modern CBs in the system to send a trip signal under the
fault condition. Fault contribution from the sources was obtained online through a
Thevenin equivalent impedance. Under abnormal conditions, a change in the Thevenin
impedance of the adjoining fault bus source was detected. Thus, the relay determined the
fault and tripped the appropriate CBs. In [45], the authors used numerical relays to detect
the fault current under grid connected and islanded modes. Different trip characteristics
settings were calculated in both modes and saved in the relays.
When the microgrid switched into islanded mode, the relay automatically changed a
group of settings that matched this mode.
Previously in [9], a supercapacitor with a DC-DC converter was added to each DER with
the same rated power that would add to the cost of the protection system, especially given
supercapacitors were not originally used during normal operation. In [28], a technique is
presented to protect the microgrid based on a voltage measurement of the fault detection
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modules, but it may not be accurate to determine the faulty part of the system and may also
require time.
This would have direct impacts on selective protection of the microgrid. Authors in [46]
introduces communication failures as a critical issue which is now being widely presented
in literature.
The operation of the relay depends on the voltage drop during the fault that may require
many loads to disconnect from the system. Finally, in [47] different techniques that could
be used to protect the microgrid are reviewed. In [47], a direction relation to our work is
identified as it highlights the importance of communication in protection schemes which
cannot be carried out in a cyber-attack and identifies the need for a solution to solve the
problems of communication failures.
1.4

Energy Storage as a Contingency

The previous section revealed the need for the communication networks to implement a
suitable protection scheme for the microgrid. However, the communication outage as it
will be discussed in chapter 3 may be effect on the operation of the protective devices. The
loss of adequate communication to a relay can be catastrophic to a microgrid protection
scheme, where the most difficult aspect is handling a dramatically increased fault current
magnitude when moving from grid to islanded mode.
In the event of a cyber-physical attack or loss of communication, a protection scheme
would be paralyzed, where relays would no longer be capable in adjusting OC limits.
Assuming a cyber-physical attack or communication loss has taken place, relays will
now require 5-10 times the full load current to trip in islanded mode. In this case, ESDs
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already present in the system for other purposes could now also be tasked in assisting to
increase the fault current magnitude.
First, four types of common grid ESDs are reviewed, compared, and discussed for their
suitability to inject the required fault current as well as the concept of a HESS.
Next, a summary of grid applications and capabilities that installed ESDs can serve on
the network is presented. Finally, some potential single ES and HESS solutions are
developed to aid in supplying the fault current as well as considerations and trade-offs in
deploying them in the system.
In this case, it is assumed that the microgrid under study already has one or multiple
ES devices connected to the network due to their strength in filling one of the previous
applications, hence no cost is intended to be added to the system.
Their participation in supporting the required fault current would be classified as
another capability
Table 1.1 Comparison of Four Prominent Energy Storage Resources
Energy
Storage
Type

Energy
Power
Density (Wh/L) Density (W/kg)

Lead Acid Battery

85

180

Lithium Ion Battery

463

295

Supercapacitor

10

3,500

Flywheel

8

5,000

Energy
Self
Response
Cost
Discharge
Time
($/kWh)
Rate
8.50

Slow

Lifespan
Max. Service
Cycles (years)

3-20%/mo

1,500

3-12

250.00 Medium 6-8%/mo

4,200

5-20

1,000.00 Very Fast 1-2%/day 1,000,000 10-35

500.00
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Fast

3-40%/hr 10,000,000 20-35

1.4.1

Common Grid Energy Storage Types

The following subsections will review the operation of four common grid ES types’
devices: LA batteries, LI batteries, Supercapacitors, and Flywheel ES. Table 1.1 depicts a
comparison of each ES type as well as the categories considered, while Figure 1.3 provides
a 6-point performance snapshot for each. The operation of each type, their strengths and
weaknesses, and examples of previous grid applications are discussed.
1) Lead Acid Batteries
The LA battery has maintained a strong hold in the market as a result of its simplicity in
design and inexpensive materials [48]. Despite the fact that emerging EVs have moved
onto LI types, the LA market remains strong as it is still the most common starter battery
and battery in UPS [49]. Furthermore, some of the drawbacks in deploying them in EVs
are relieved when placing them in a stationary grid application. While real estate may still
remain a premium, concerns with weight can be alleviated. The LA battery has been
demonstrated as a dependable resource in stationary grid applications to smoothen the
energy harvested by renewables, but has been more universally accepted in restoring
system frequency and voltage following an outage [50]-[52]. This is covered in more detail
later. Despite its strengths in reliability and low cost, LA has a relatively low energy and
power density and suffers from a number of drawbacks. LA are not ideal in sourcing high
frequency pulsed loads as a result of their large double layer capacitance, a weakness which
would also reduce their suitability to solely supply a fault current [53].
Pulsed loads are defined as a load that requires a high instantaneous power demand for a
relatively short period of time and are discussed in detail in the following section.
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Its operation utilizes a sulfuric acid electrolyte as a fuel primarily governed by changes
in the concentration, an inefficient process that leads to a number of lifespan concerns.
First, their operational current is severely limited, as an increase from a conservative 20hour discharge rate (C/20) would result in reduced usable capacity and increased ageing.
Ergo, in order to fill a fault current, the size of the LA array should be sufficiently large to
limit the peak array current. Finally, their shelf and cycle life are highly limited.
2) Lithium Ion Batteries
LI battery usage has surged in recent years not only in portable electronics, but also in
large scale EVs and even grid storage [54]. Advanced LI battery management systems have
been demonstrated in microgrid applications for both islanded and grid-connected modes
to provide voltage and frequency support [55], [56].
Since LI battery management is more complex than that of LA, studies have looked at
the best method to control these schemes [57], [58].
LI operation is significantly different from that of LA, where energy is stored inside its
electrodes utilizing the electrolyte as simply a transfer layer [59]. This combined with a
smaller cell construction allow them to respond faster to a pulsed load that in turn, would
also make them suitable in feeding a fault current [60].
LI batteries offer a significant improvement in their capability to source high current
without the same trade-offs in lifespan as seen with the LA battery.
Their lifespans are much longer, but similar to the LA battery, are still limited by
excessive operational currents and particularly temperature [61]. Battery management
system cost for LI batteries is increased as a result of required crucial cell balancing and
thermal control for safety.
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Finally, a number of companies have been working to reduce the cost of grid-scale LI
battery arrays, as their cost is still at a premium as compared to LA.
3) Supercapacitors
The SC provides a significant increase in the speed of response versus any
electrochemical battery. Although their construction is chemical in nature, no reaction
takes place. This enables them to respond extremely fast to a demand, while even under
heavy current, their lifetime is virtually unaffected [62]. Composed of two porous
electrodes divided by a separator soaked in a solvent electrolyte, their construction enables
a much higher charge density versus the traditional capacitor as a result of an increased
surface area [63]. Their usage has been studied in mobile shipboard applications where
weight is a concern, but also in some grid applications with multiple renewable energy
resources where they provide short term storage to supply the deficiency power [64], [65].
Unfortunately, their low energy density can require an enormous capacitance, which may
not prove to be practical as a sole ES device.
Although their response time in feeding the required power would be superb, sourcing
the total energy to fill a fault current would come at a massive cost [66]. Its energy density
is only around 10% of that of the LA battery and 2% of a LI battery while their selfdischarge rate is relatively high.
4) Flywheel Energy Storage
Like the LA battery, FW ES has been synonymous with industrial UPS systems, but for a
very different purpose. FW ES provides some of the highest power density in our study
and are primarily purposed to support to pulsed loads which would initially make them
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appear to be a great candidate to inject a fault current [67]. Analogous to an
electromechanical battery, the FW stores kinetic energy in a high inertia rotating mass,
where an electric machine operates simultaneously as a motor during charging and
generator during discharging. The power output is a function of a square of the speed,
allowing them to provide extremely high power density. This has made them an excellent
solution for maintaining power quality [68], [69]. They have also been tested for their usage
in both wind and solar applications as a mechanism to quickly store and expend energy
[70]. FW also carry a unique capability unlike other ES: the ability to supply inertia to the
system [71]. Unfortunately, the FW has a very high self-discharge rate as a result of friction
losses and like the SC, have a very low energy density [72]. Although their cost is half that
of the SC, their response time is still very fast, limited only by the initial inertia required to
start moving the rotating mass. However, their energy density is very low, some 20% below
the SC, which would further reduce their capability in solely injecting the fault current.
5) Hybrid Energy Storage Systems
Although some ES devices, such as the LI or LA battery, can provide a rather balanced
contribution of energy versus power density, cost and lifetime aspects could jeopardize
their sole integration with the grid. Similarly, the integration of a SC or FW alone could
provide excellent voltage and frequency support for a small outage, but would fail to fill
energy demands over longer periods without a huge array. For this reason, HESS could
provide a more balanced solution in terms of not only power and energy density, but also
cost, lifespan, and self-discharge. HESS have emerged in an effort to utilize the strengths
of multiple ES devices in a way that is not only more efficient, but potentially cost and
lifetime effective.
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Figure 1.3. Energy Storage and Hybrid Energy Storage Performance Snapshot [32]
Recent HESS for microgrid applications have focused on the collaboration of batteries
with SCs, evaluating their combination with both LA and LI [73], [74]. Minimizing losses
while ensuring an optimum power split between the two sources has spawned research in
this topic [75]. A great deal of work has focused specifically on pulsed load management
through the deployment of HESS systems [76], [77].
Unfortunately, reaching the required level of power and filling the energy demand over
such a short period of time can be challenging. Examples can be found in a number of
Naval platforms, the starter current for a vehicle, and the case addressed in this paper: a
fault current.
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1.4.2

Grid Applications for Energy Storage Devices.

ESDs can be utilized for a variety of major applications on the utility grid. In this
section, these purposes are categorized into network applications, supplying critical loads,
and feeding pulsed loads.
The importance level of these storage devices to improve the performance of these
different applications are shown in Figure 1.4. According to different characteristics
including but not limited to power density, energy density, cycle life, cost and selfdischarge, an optimal selection of ESDs can be identified to increase the efficiency for each
application .
Figure 1.4 (a) shows the main requirements of the ESDs for network services and the
overall importance of each requirement. As can be seen, since there are less space and
weight limitations for an ESD plant, a low cost per unit power and energy plays a more
important role for the selection of the storage technology.
Having a long lifespan and life cycle as well as high efficiency are other important factors
that need to be considered. Thus, based on the characteristics of the storage technologies
discussed before and presented in Table 1.1, the FW and SC can be more optimally used
for the high-power grid services. Moreover, the capability of this technology to provide
very high-power makes them distinctive for power grid applications. In the case of the LI
battery, although it has a relatively low cost per unit energy and long discharge capability,
its high cost per unit power is its main limitation for high-power grid services.
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1. Network Applications
Utility grid network applications are commonly broken into three categories: frequency
regulation, voltage control, and voltage ride-through.
A) Frequency Regulation: As a result of their faster response time versus DGs, ESDs
are considered a suitable technique to improve frequency regulation in the system.
Reference [78], shows commercial uses of ESDs to sustain frequency regulation on the
grid. Some other studies were performed, with a particular focus on the FW in conjunction
with the assistance of power monitoring software, to demonstrate its effectiveness [79][81]. In addition, some research has demonstrated that most batteries and SCs are suitable
for frequency control applications as well [82]-[87].
B) Voltage Control: ESDs can be utilized to maintain the voltage level of the
transmission system within an acceptable range [88]-[93]. Bidirectional converters are
connected with ESDs to inject or reject reactive power for voltage stability purpose.
Batteries beside other ESDs technologies are a suitable alternative, as they can respond
instantaneously to changes in the voltage [94], [95].
C) Voltage Ride Through: The voltage level decreases during major faults in the AC grid
at the PCC between the plant and the grid [96]. Thus, the power that can be transferred
from the DC to the AC side is reduced. As a result, trapped energy on the DC side can
cause severe overvoltage on the converter. ESDs, such as the FW and SC, can be used to
maintain the voltage level at the DC-link and ride through the fault by injecting reactive
power to grid [97]-[103].
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Figure 1.4 Importance Level (changing from level (1) less important to level (5) very
important) of the energy storage characteristics for various applications
2. Critical Loads
Short-duration ESDs can be utilized to provide a bridge to startup and synchronize
standby generators. The main requirements of ESDs for critical loads with a short-time
failure are depicted in Figure 1.4 (b). The overall importance of the storage requirements
and the characteristics of FW ES showed that they can be effectively used for an immediate
power availability to a critical load during a power disturbance, such as power outage dips,
or surges in the voltage and/or current.
Compared to batteries, FW are excellent to deliver short-time, high-power to UPS,
offering a lower cost per unit power with lower operating cost due to lower maintenance
and replacement costs. Also, the SC has a high-power density and low cost per unit power.
As a result, it is well-suited for a system that suffers from short-time failures. Typical SC
UPS sizes can range from mill watts to tens of kilowatts with modular solution systems. In
addition to being very compact, SC UPS also offers very low maintenance and standby
power costs [104]-[107].
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3. Pulsed Loads
Figure 1.4(c) shows the requirements of ESDs for pulsed load applications and the overall
importance of each requirement. The high instantaneous power demand of a pulsed load
can produce power disturbances and thermal issues in the system [108], [109]. Using a SC
or FW as a power density storage device with a low cost per unit power would improve the
performance of the system.
In this case, the system will have several advantages, including less weight and volume
as well as mitigation of thermal issues, frequency disturbances, and voltage variations
[110].
1.4.3

Potential Solutions to Source the Fault Current

As previously discussed, each ES device has its own respective strengths and weaknesses
and few would be suitable to solely source a fault current. A general example of a fault
current is shown in Figure 1.5, where a high in-rush current is needed for approximately
80 ms to reach 5 to 10 times the base load current (𝐼𝑝𝑢).
A multitude of solutions could assist in injecting the required fault current, however, they
are limited by both the available infrastructure as well as the proximity of each ES device
from the CB. A multitude of solutions can assist in injecting the required fault current,
however, are limited by the available infrastructure.
For this reason, in this section 3 scenarios are presented representing microgrids with the
capability to select: 1) a single ES element, 2) a HESS with 2 devices, or 3) the availability
of all sources in Table 1.1.
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1) Single Source Solutions
For a microgrid with only one type of ES, tasking it to assist in feeding the fault is more
complicated. First, a system which only contains a LA or LI would be limited to their
lifespans. In addition, these batteries are limited by excessive operational currents and
particularly temperature. The two most suitable devices, if adequately sized, are the SC
and FW, as they provide the greatest balance which can be visualized in Figure 1.5. The
FW ES provides the highest power density in our study and are used to feed the pulsed
loads, but has a very high self-discharge rate as a result of friction losses and low energy
density. The response time is very fast, limited only by the initial inertia required to start
moving the rotating mass.
The SC has the best response time of the ES types and their construction is chemical in
nature, no reaction takes place. This helps to respond extremely fast to a demand heavy
current [111].
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I pu
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LI

LA
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Tripped
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Figure 1.5 Controlled Hybrid Energy Storage to Feed the Fault [60]
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2) Multiple Source Solutions
With the inclusion of a secondary ES source, a basic HESS can be designed. In this
case, a combination of an ES type with high energy density and battery ES can help to
provide a more balanced system. This leaves the selection of either the SC or FW and a
battery. The FW features the highest power density in our study while at the same time, the
lowest energy density.
As a result of this deficit, the LI battery would find itself most suitable for a FW HESS
combination. Though the cost would be exceedingly higher for the LI array, the cost of the
FW is half of that of the SC providing a strong balance for the FW-LI HESS. Its
performance distribution is depicted in Figure 1.5, revealing only weaknesses in terms of
cost and response time.
3) Availability of all Energy Storage Devices
In the event that all resources in Table 1.1 are available on the network, a combination
of the strengths from all ES devices could be used to feed the fault current in a dynamically
switched SC-FW-LI-LA HESS. Figure 1.5 breaks down the initial concept, which involves
contribution from each ES to the surge pulse broken into four switching steps. An ES type
is first connected at the start of the fault (𝑡0 ), where each of the remaining three devices are
sequentially added in parallel until the final required fault current level has been reached
at 𝑡4 , tripping the breaker (𝑡𝑓 ).
The developed sequence begins with the deployment of the SC at 𝑡0 as it responds
quickest to the demand initially injecting high power until reaching 𝑡1 , where the FW
assists in increasing the power even faster to get within the range of the fault current level,
while concurrently contributing inertia to the system.
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Since the SC and FW have a low susceptibility to lifespan issues, the selection of 𝑡1
would primarily rely upon the availability of each to provide the energy to reach 𝑡2 . Since
the energy stored in both is relatively small, the LI battery would be added at 𝑡2 to assist in
maintaining the energy required to fill the pulse. Since the LI battery provides a good
balance of both power and energy, it can assist in feeding the required energy, while
simultaneously increasing the power until the LA battery is added at 𝑡4 to reach the fault
current level. A trade-off can once again be made between the availability of LA and LI
capacities, but now involving lifespan as well. The cost of a LI array may force the operator
to require more support from LA, shifting the location of 𝑡3 . However, the severe
consequences in overusing LA should be considered, as their lifespans would take the
highest toll.

1.5 Problem Statement
The future power network will feature many microgrids especially at the electric
distribution level, and deliver clean renewable energy close to the end user [120]. Along
with these benefits, microgrids introduce many challenges for power system operations and
protection strategies. Legacy protection schemes designed for passive distribution
networks are not suitable for use in microgrids [112].
This is because, besides feeding local load, a microgrid is also expected to export
power to the main grid and other microgrids, thus requiring a bi-directional power flow.
The bi-directional power flow affects the amplitude of the fault currents [113]. Also, the
short circuit fault current capacity of the system may get affected by any change in the
microgrid configuration either due to the integration or the interruption of DGs in the
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existing grid. In grid connected mode, the main grid will provide enough high fault current
to activate fault protection devices (typically 3-6 times normal rated current is required).
However, an islanded microgrid is dominated by power electronic interfaces and these
inverters will have a maximum current rating of perhaps 1.5-2 times normal rated current
[114]. At the very least, a system that is designed to protect a microgrid should take the
following into account; (a) bidirectional power flow in feeders; (b) reduced fault levels in
islanded operation [115]. In order to protect AC microgrids in both grid-connected and
islanded modes of operation, an adaptive protection scheme is required [116].
A major issue related to the smooth operation of adaptive microgrid protection scheme
in a smart grid scenario is the prior knowledge of every state of the grid and the online
monitoring and calculation of the short circuit fault current level for every small change in
the grid configuration.
This requires application of a communication system with a backup and fast data
acquisition system between generators, the protective devices and loads etc., so that
shifting between high and low relay settings can be done automatically. In [117]-[118],
central protection approaches were developed to calculate the fault current of the
distributed energy resources (DERs). This system can be used to monitor a microgrid over
communication lines and react to dynamic changes of the system.
Authors in [119] calculate both the system’s and the microgrid’s impedances by
measuring the voltage and current fault in a real-time manner, the protection device will
send a trip signal to circuit breakers according to the value of impedance that changes
simultaneously with the system topology. The authors in [120] change the time-current
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characteristics for short circuit and overload conditions by observing the difference in
voltage drops during these two events, respectively.
Most of the developed adaptive protection methods are completely dependent on
exchange or transfer of data/information in the shape of measured system parameters and
direction and interlocking signals between different protection devices via some kind of
communication link [121]. The existing adaptive protection schemes are improved at
different modes of operation with the help of the communication networks [122]. On the
other hand, by using supercapacitor bank in the system when the communication is not
available, the supercapacitor can inject current immediately and help the relay that should
work to isolate the fault from the system without disconnecting large parts in the system.
Standards addressing protection applications realize their criticality and thus pose stringent
restrictions on messages that communicate fault-related signals such as the 4 ms time
limitation imposed on Sampled Measurement Values (SMV) and Generic Object Oriented
Substation Event (GOOSE) messages by IEC 61850. Therefore, designing control
algorithms for a protection system is a delicate and complex procedure. This complexity is
further leveraged when dealing with adaptive protection algorithm design in which the
collaboration between multiple agents, namely Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), for
detecting and isolating faults is time-critical.
Here again, the robustness and availability of the communication infrastructure is an
important prerequisite for the success of contemporary adaptive protection algorithms.
Therefore, communication failure in such applications is a high priced risk with serious
consequences.
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Therefore, the goal of a resilient adaptive protection algorithm is to ride through
communication failures without serious damage to hardware assets (transmission lines in
this case), financial, or productivity costs. Considering the above factors, in this work, an
adaptive protection scheme for AC microgrids, which is capable of surviving
communication failures by the aid of energy storage systems, is developed. The microgrid
under study comprises an AC side feeding various resistive loads with different ratings and
a DC side having a supercapacitor supplying a pulse. The power flow between the two
sides is achieved by using three-phase AC/DC voltage source converter (VSC). A fuel cell
is also used as a DC source in the system studied to assist the AC generators in supplying
their loads. The microgrid operates in a grid connected and in an islanded mode of
operation and thus the developed protection scheme adjusts the protection relays’ settings
in order to detect and isolate faults in both modes of operation. That is, as long as the
microgrid is connected to the main grid, the relays’ settings are adjusted to their High
Settings since the main grid will have the main contribution for the fault current in order
for the relays to detect it.
However, in the islanded mode, there won’t be enough resources to contribute to the
fault current and thus the relays’ settings must be reduced to the Lower Settings. The shift
between the two settings comes from a command signal issued by the point of common
coupling (PCC) to all relays according to the current mode of operation. In the event of
communication failure during the islanded operation, relays’ settings will not be adjusted
to the lower setting and thus faults will not be detected. This above sections reviewed the
various different challenges in microgrid protection schemes and the need for adaptive
protection to deal with these problems. An analysis of various protection schemes, based
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on an adaptive protection technique deployed with communication links between IEDs is
presented. Different types of attacks that may impact the communication network are
described and the need to solve the issue of the Denial of Service attack that was not
covered by the literature works, This dissertation introduces a solution of this issue by
discussing how various ES and HESS could be used as a secondary measure to assist the
system in filling the required fault current in the event of a communication failure. The
developed solution does not intend to incur additional costs to the system studied, as the
ESDs are already utilized for different applications in the system, as will be explained later.

1.6 Research Objective
Microgrids will play a major role in enhancing the resiliency and robustness of
power delivery to end users. The protection of microgrids’ assets is of utmost importance
to ensure continuous operation of the grid. Microgrids are dynamic in nature, therefore, to
account for that, new protection schemes need to be established for microgrid
infrastructures.
The aim of this doctoral research is to; 1) develop a new protection infrastructure
for decentralized active distribution networks that can be implemented in a practical way
manner, taking into account the different various challenges that arises from the dynamic
nature of the microgrid, which is different than the classical protection techniques used in
the current bulk grid infrastructure.
2) The developed selectivity schemes must avoid disconnection of different large
sources in the system. For instance, power flow is bidirectional in modern microgrids,
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therefore, when dealing with selectivity issues one should take into account the operation
of distributed energy resources in the microgrid.
3) Another important factor to account for is the different modes of operation of
modern microgrids. This research develops the utilization of energy storage devices to
compensate for low short circuit currents in microgrids’ during the different modes of
operation.
4) Another objective of this dissertation is to ensure the maximum utilization of
these resources, an optimal value of the capacity of the energy resources and the cost of
these devices will be developed. Finally, the communication link between IEDs can be
used to account for the dynamic changes in the microgrid and changing relays’ settings
according to the present architecture of the microgrid.
The Research Problem has the following focus areas:
1.

Developed a solution to the denial-of-service cyber-attack on adaptive

Microgrid protective schemes.
2.

Tested a new controller with only one autonomous mode of operation for

both grid-connected and islanded modes of operation to inject current from supercapacitors
and other energy storage schemes without the need for needing communication
infrastructure.
3.

Verified the impact of energy flow on the stability and protection of the

distribution architectures during normal, pulsed and resource outage conditions. Varying
optimized distribution architectures will need to be achieved based on prevailing
conditions.
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4.

Created a proper sizing of the energy storage devices which is important in

order to maintain a stable system operation and also to regulate the protection scheme’s
cost. A complete study on the effects of developed solutions on size and cost.
5.

Developed, designed and experimentally verified a protection schemes for

the active distribution of networks in response to different operational scenarios and the
developed practical solutions.
6. Techniques and algorithms developed during this research were verified
experimentally through practical operation of a descriptive system implemented in a
laboratory scale power system test-bed with hardware in the loop in the Energy Systems
Research Laboratory, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Florida
International University (FIU).

1.7 Original Contributions and significance of the dissertation
One main challenge in the practical implementation of a microgrid is the design of
an adequate protection scheme in both grid connected and islanded modes. Conventional
overcurrent protection schemes face selectivity and sensitivity issues during grid and
microgrid faults since the fault current level is different in both cases for the same relay.
Various approaches have been implemented in the past to deal with this problem, yet the
most promising ones are the implementation of adaptive protection techniques abiding by
the IEC 61850 communication standard. However, the risk of communication link failures
and cyber security threats still remain a challenge in implementing a reliable adaptive
protection scheme. A contingency is needed where a communication issue prevents the
relay from adjusting to a lower current level during islanded mode. An adaptive protection
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scheme is developed that utilizes energy storage (ES) already available in the network as a
mechanism to source the higher fault current.
1- Developed a new controller of the energy storage device to inject high current
at the islanded mode operation.
2- Tested the developed protection technique in the Energy Systems Research
Laboratory at FIU.
3- Improved the sizing and the cost of the supercapacitor to avoid add cost to the
protection scheme.
4- Created several protection schemes based on MAS to integrate between the
cyber and physical parts for active distribution systems.
5- Verified the system stability in terms of frequency and voltages at AC and DC
sides to ensure that the system performance became healthy after isolating the
fault

1.8 Dissertation organization
This dissertation is organized in eleven chapters, including the current chapter,
which presents the introduction of this dissertation following by the problem statement and
the significant contribution. Chapter 2 discusses the Hybrid AC/CD microgrid that is used
to verify the developed protection schemes. The main components that are used in the
system including the different sources at AC/DC sides such as the synchronous generator,
programming loads, distributed energy resources, energy storage devices, pulsed, steady
state loads and the power converters. Also, this chapter introduces several industrial
equipment’s such as PMUs, IEDs and PLC.

30

Chapter 3 describes the structure of GOOSE and SV messages and discuss the
different types of physical attacks that may impact the adaptive protection scheme and
prevent communication networks from dealing with the dynamic changes of microgrid.
Security attacks in microgrid communication networks are intended to interrupt messages
that are exchanged between IEDs. The attacks can be implemented using common network
security attacks or by exploiting GOOSE and SV messages.
Chapter 4 develops an adaptive protection scheme which utilize super capacitive
energy storage to enhance resiliency against communication outages. This chapter also
introduces an autonomous control algorithm developed for the super-capacitor’s AC/DC
converter. The developed control is capable of deciding upon charging, discharging of the
super-capacitor, and whether or not to feed fault currents on the AC side, based on direct
voltage and frequency measurements from its connection point with the microgrid. This
eliminates the need for a control command to be sent from the point of common coupling
of the microgrid with the main grid to adjust the controller’s mode of operation and thus
reduce the risk of controller failure due to cyber-attacks or other communication issues.
Simulation tests of the developed protection scheme are presented at different modes of
operation.
Chapter 5 presents two solutions to reduce the size of the supercapacitor that used
to feed the fault and the pulsed load simultaneously when the communication is not
available in the system during islanded mode operation. The first method presents twolevel optimization scheme for minimizing the supercapacitor size along with optimizing its
controllers’ parameters. The second method will lead to a reduction of the supercapacitor
fault current contribution and an increase in that of other AC resources in the microgrid in
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the extreme case of having a fault occurring simultaneously with a pulsed load. It was also
shown that the size of the supercapacitor can be reduced if the pulsed load is temporary
disconnected during the transient fault period. Simulation results showed that the resulting
supercapacitor size and the optimized controller parameters were feeding enough fault
currents for several types of faults in different locations and minimizing the cost of the
protection scheme.
Chapter 6 presents a co-simulation platform for microgrid based on MAS when the
communication is available in the system. IEC 61850 was used to emulate the developed
protection scheme. DDS middleware is used to link between the hardware and software
environments. During islanded mode, the system is capable of riding-through
communication failures by the aid of a lithium ion battery. When the communication is
attacked, the battery plays an important role and contribute to the fault current for helping
the circuit breaker to trip during islanded mode. The design of the control algorithm for
the battery’s AC/DC converter is developed with single mode operation to eliminate the
reliance on communicated control command signals to shift the controller between
different modes. Simulation and experimental results were investigated to test the
developed technique.
Chapter 7 develops a communication-assisted fault localization, isolation and
restoration method for microgrids based on MAS. The developed system comprises
distributed agents, located in the middle and at the two ends of a protection section, which
will detect a fault through phase angle comparison of current signals at both sides of a
given distribution line. The agents then send a trip signal to the corresponding circuit
breakers accordingly. The importance of the developed protection technique is twofold:
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first, it eliminates the use of voltage transformers and thus reduces costs. Second, it does
not require transfer of data along long distances which decreases the delay time for fault
isolation. Power restoration processes following the fault clearance considering voltage,
frequency and power flow constraints in the microgrid under study was also performed.
The simulation of the developed protection methodology was presented,
Chapter 8 presents a co-simulation platform for a microgrid based on MAS utilizing
a supercapacitor bank to enhance the resiliency of the protection scheme. The simulation
software, embedded microcontrollers, and a real communication architecture collectively
perform the protection scheme platform. The DDS middleware is used to link the hardware
and software environments. This method does not need to change the relay settings at
different configurations of the microgrid. The developed solution does not incur additional
costs to the system studied, as the supercapacitor is already used to feed a pulsed load. The
chapter also develops a coordination process between the relays with the help of the
supercapacitor. Primary and back-up protection were studied according to IEEE Std
C37.112 to isolate the fault properly. This chapter details the fault current that supplied by
any DG to any point inside the network. The results showed that the co-simulation
infrastructure introduces a high dependability design, analysis, and testing environment for
cyber and physical data flow in the system.
Chapter 9 presents the hardware setup that used to test the control and protection
operations for the microgrid system. The hybrid AC/DC microgrid, used for experimental
verification, consists of several types of sources that supply loads with different
characteristics, including: AC load, a normal steady-state load, and a heavy pulsed load at
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DC side. The experimental results showed excellent agreement with the simulated
protection scheme
Chapter 10 presents a centralized control approach to monitor the modes of the
microgrid and helping the relays to define the fault location and clear it from the system.
The developed technique helps to identify the shortest path from the source to the fault
location. The MCU is responsible for adjusting the relays settings based on the current
topology and the shortest path to the fault point. This technique is investigated on IEEE 14
bus microgrid system for all the possible fault paths. The developed scheme is able to clear
the fault by isolating the minimum part of the system and certifying the endurance of the
power to supply the different loads in the system.
Chapter 11 provides conclusion the discussing the test results of the dissertation.
Besides that, some recommendations are provided for the future work to improve the
protection schemes for the microgrids.
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Chapter 2 Configuration of The Microgrid to Investigate the Protection Schemes

2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the construction of the developed hybrid AC/DC microgrid.
The microgrid is implemented to investigate the developed techniques for protection,
control and energy management operations of the microgrid at the Energy Systems
Research Laboratory, Florida International University. The main construction of the
microgrid includes synchronous generator, inverter-based energy resources and
programming control loads, energy storage devices such as supercapacitor bank and
batteries. Other equipment’s are used to help in monitoring and measurements processes
such as PMU, PLC, IEDs and PDC. The next section will present the components of the
microgrid that contains the generation units and the different load types.
In order to increase the resiliency of the system, cyber physical architecture is
required to facilitate the operation of sending and receiving the information between the
devices. The data should be send via communication links to perform the protection and
control operations. One of the main devices used to measure frequency and voltage and
current vector quantity is PMU device. Standard IEEE std. c37.118 is used to formulate
the data from PMU to other devices.
The main challenge of the Hybrid AC/DC microgrid architecture is to design the
system at different modes of operation. During the grid connected mode, the system is
stable and the frequency is not changed above or below the accepted limits due to the large
support from the utility. At islanded mode operation, the frequency fluctuates and needs to

35

be adjusted using the distributed energy resources that are connected based on inverter
interface.
The developed improvements in microgrid architecture provide a synchronous
generator and several renewable resources that are connected through AC/DC and DC/DC
converters to provide the regulation of the voltage at both sides, improve the stability of
the system and increase the efficiency by achieving MPPT for the solar stations.
One of the issues involved in designing a suitable architecture for the microgrid is
the protection scheme against the communication outages. Different types of attacks can
be effect on the communication signals that used to trip the circuit breakers at AC side of
the microgrid system. One of the contribution of this dissertation is to use the energy
storage devices at DC side to help the relays to reach its settings at the AC side and isolate
the fault from the system. Also, there are different challenges that should be taken into our
consideration to adjust the settings of the relays at different modes of operation as it will
be discussed in the following sections.
2.2

Main Components of the Microgrid
The microgrid contains different components that are used to test the different protection

schemes that developed for the microgrid configuration
2.2.1

Synchronous Generator
A 13.8-kVA, 60-Hz, 208-V, and 1800 Rpm AC are representing the specification

of the synchronous generator generation unit. The generator is equipped with a half-wave
phase-controlled thyristor-type automatic voltage regulator. The generating station has 5
different types of motor drives acting as 5 different prime movers to enable the
implementation of various generation control strategies. The frequency drive part follows
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“vector speed control” that serves to maintain the frequency stable. In order to keep the
power-voltage buses, the prime mover of the generator is operated by a torque-controlled
frequency drive, which adjusts the active power of the generation station to keep the
voltage signal within the accepted value. The speed reference and the torque of the
frequency machine is controlled by a PLC. The specifications of the synchronous generator
are shown in Table 2.1. Figure 2.1 indicates the synchronous generator set for the frequency
machine and the voltage regulator.
Table 2.1 Synchronous generator parameters.
Component

Synchronous
Generator

Parameter

Specification

SN

3 kVA

VN
FN

208 V
60 Hz

XL, RS

6.87 mH, 1.45 Ω

Figure 2.1 Synchronous generator at the ESRL Smart Grid Testbed
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2.2.2

Distribution Lines and Load Models
The transmission line models are composed of series inductors and parallel

capacitors and arranged in medium length π-type. The load module is consists of ten steps
changes between 0-3 KW in step of 300 W at normal voltage. These resistances can be
controlled by PLC which represented [2 x 72 Ω + 4 x 144 Ω]. In order to maintain the
frequency within the accepted range, the inductance loads are implemented based on
constant inductance to avoid the derivation in the frequency signal. A solid state relays are
used with the ratings of 530 V and 25 Amps. The operation of On/Off status can be
controlled by PLC with 3-32 DC voltage. Figure 2.2 shows the transmission line resistive
and inductive loads models.

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 2.2 Line and load models: (a) medium length line; (b) resistive load; (c) inductive
load.
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2.2.3 Bus Models

The test-bed setup has 14 bus model emulator to control the switching action and
emulate real power system dynamics. These modules can switch up to 15 amps per phase.
The hardware implementation of the bus model is shown in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3 Bus Model Hardware Implementation.
2.2.4 Bi-Directional AC/DC and DC/DC Converters
This converter can be controlled from AC/DC sides. The frequency and the voltage
signals are fed the control circuits of the converter. For the DC side, the voltage is
controlled by adjusting the charging and discharging periods of the energy storage devices
such as supercapacitor. The voltage of these devices can be controlled through DC/DC
converter. The PWM circuit of the inverter can be adjusted through different types of
dSpace such as 1103 and 1104 based on the measured and the control signals as shown in
Figure 2.4. Matlab/Simulink software is used to program the active/reactive power
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generation of the IGBT circuit. RS232 serial port is used for the communication and the
PLC control purpose.

Figure 2.4 dSpace system for developing embedded controller

2.2.5 Bi-Directional DC/DC Converter
This converter is used to regulate the DC voltage of the supercapacitor bank. During
the grid connected mode operation, the main function of the converter is to regulate the
charging rate of the supercapacitor. At the islanded mode of operation, this converter plays
an important role to charge/discharge the supercapitor bank based on the suggested control
to maintain the voltage within the accepted limits of the standard.

2.2.6 Bi-Directional AC/DC Converter
The bi-directional AC/DC converter can take control of the AC side frequency and
voltage amplitude. The DC bus voltage is regulated by controlling the charging and
discharging of the battery banks, which also means controlling the current flow through
the bidirectional DC/DC converter. The DSP-based embedded dSpace control platform is
used to control the inverter-based DER model. The internal active/reactive power
generation of the IGBT-based inverter is programmed using the Matlab/Simulink platform
as shown in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5 Converter Systems Hardware Setup.
2.3 Energy Storage
A wide variety of energy storage technologies and ratings are used in the testbed.
There is a lead acid battery bank that can store energy up to 12 kWh. Also, there are other
lead-acid batteries with different ratings to be used as distributed energy storage. There are
5x1000 Wh Lithium-ion batteries. In addition, there is a 40 module super-capacitor bank
and a flywheel system implemented with its driving converter.
2.3.1

Battery storage system
The lead acid battery bank storage, shown in Figure 2.6, has a 10-110 Ah capacity

(approximately 13.2 KW) and is equipped with a unique BMS which individually manages,
balances and conducts diagnostics on each battery module using hall-effect sensors of
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voltage and current. The BMS not only monitors the batteries, but also extracts the
defective battery and compensate its loss through the distribution of the load on other
resources using power electronic converters (e.g. buck/boost converter). This system is
expandable to any chemistry and quantity of batteries based on its modular characteristics.
This system is capable of data logging and advanced protection to limit the current and
voltage of each battery. The system also controls the charging profile with independent
frequency, duty cycle, and magnitude.

Figure 2.6 Battery Bank Stored Safely in a Closed Cabinet.
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2.3.2 Super Capacitor bank
An energy management system improves the performance and efficiency of
unpredictable renewable energy resources through integration of super capacitor energy
storage systems in the testbed with two 2.9 F super capacitors in series or parallel
architecture rated at 1.45F-650V or 5.8F-320V. A super capacitor at the DC bus will
stabilize all the converters to work in current control mode, and one will be used to stabilize
the voltage and power quality indices on the DC bus, especially in the presence of pulse
loads.
The supercapacitor bank, is built using 350 F, 2.7 V cells of Maxwell Technologies
supercapacitors cells connected in series to form a 58 F, 16.2 V module. Twenty
supercapacitor modules were connected in series to configure a 2.9 F, 320 V supercapacitor
bank. Figure 2.7 shows the supercapacitor bank implemented in the test setup.

Figure 2.7 Supercapacitor Hardware Setup.
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2.3.3

Flywheel storage system

A large rotating mass coupled to a DC machine constitutes a Flywheel Energy Storage
System which works under 3 operating modes: charging mode, stand-by mode, and
discharging mode. This setup is used to perform several studies. To name some: the power
failures and outages, mitigation of pulse loads, power quality improvements, and design
and performance of flywheel systems.
2.4 Phasor Measurement Units
The testbed includes 2 Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) from SEL, shown in Figure
2.8, with a total input of 5 voltage and current measurements, which are time-stamped with
a real-time GPS clock. PMU measurements are published and available in PDC through
c37.118 Synchrophasors protocol. A real-time automation controller from SEL integrated
to exchange information in DNP3, Modbus, IEC 61850 GOOSE, IEC 60870-5-101/104,
LG 8979, SES-92, IEEE C37.118 protocols.

Figure 2.8 SEL Phasor Measurement Units.
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2.5 Vector Processing Unit and GPS Clock
As mentioned earlier, the deployed PMUs in the system send their acquired data with
time-stamp information to the Vector Processing Unit shown in Figure 2.9. The collected
data from several PMUs are sorted and correlated per the time-stamp value. This enables
comparable real-time monitoring of the system with high precision sampling. The collected
data is also stored in a large database system for accurate post mortem applications such as
fault event monitoring, loss-of-mains and blackout analysis. Synchro phasor measurement
and time-referenced critical applications, such as fault event analysis and protection relays,
require highly reliable satellite clocks. Inaccurate time-stamps can cause misdiagnosing of
the network and degrade the controllability of distribution network. The IRIG-B time code
is widely accepted for time distribution in substations. We use a GPS clock with IRIG-B,
shown in Figure 2.10, outputs in our test bed to perform time stamping.

Figure 2.9 The Phasor Data Concentrator.

Figure 2.10 The GPS Clock.
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2.6 Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs)

Figure 2.11 ABB IEDs Hardware Setup.
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Intelligent Electronic Devices constituting 5 ABB 615 Relion series protection
relays with IEC 61850 capability are integrated into the system to form a distribution or
substation network, as shown in Figure 2.11. The setup also covers Modbus protocol to
provide industrial communication and control features. The above-mentioned protocols are
merged through an OPC server as a middleware and the gateway for interconnection within
the protocols to interface measured data and issued commands with external organizations,
such as computational intelligence, HMI, SCADA, etc.
The IEDs are located on system buses to enable monitoring, control and protection.
The agent platform controlling these IEDs was implemented on a single personal computer,
however, since the information is accessible through the network, the computation can be
easily distributed. An off-the-shelf OPC UA server was implemented to acquire IEC 61850
logical node measurements. An OPC UA client was embedded in the Java platform to
enable JADE to access mapped IEC 61850 measurements, and c37.118 Synchrophasors
protocol.
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Chapter 3 Cyber Physical Threats on Microgrid Operation
3.1

Introduction
This chapter explains the structure of the messages that can be transmitted between

the different IEDs in the system to protect the active distribution system. The main
messages that can be used to determine the statues of the system are GOOSE and SMV
messages. One of the main features of these messages is the critical time that should not be
exceed a certain period to trip and control the circuit breaker. The main function of the
GOOSE message is to trip the circuit breaker and isolate the fault from the system. While,
the main purpose of SMV messages is to measure the voltages and currents signals from
the measurement devices.
Also, this chapter introduces the different types of attacks that can be threaten the network
and prevent the authorized devices to perform their functions. We can divided the attacks
into two main types, the first one is the attack on the networks, which can be categorized
into Denial of service, Password cracking, and Eavesdropping attacks. Secondly, the
attacks on the GOOSE and SV messages.
The main study in this dissertation is the Denial of service attack which collapse the whole
communication signals that can be transmitted between the relays in the system. We
introduced different solutions as it will be explained later in the next chapters of how to
overcome this famous type of attacks.
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3.2

Goose Message structure
GOOSE and SMV messages are sent directly to multicast MAC address on layer 2.

Since the layer 2 message doesn’t use The IP protocol for message routing, it’s not prone
to ARP poisoning attack. However, the attacker can still perform some types of attack
based on the message anatomy and transmission method. Figure 3.1 shows the structure of
the GOOSE message.
Table 3.1 Structure of GOOSE Message.

Destination
MAC address

Source MAC
Address

Priority Tagging/ VLAN ID

Ethertype
(88B8)

APPID

Length

Reserved 1

Reserved 2

Tag

Length

goosePDU

Tag

Length

gocbRef

Tag

Length

timeAllowedtoLive

Tag

Length

datSet

Tag

Length

goID

Tag

Length

T

Tag

Length

stNum

Tag

Length

sqNum

Tag

Length

test

Tag

Length

confRev

Tag

Length

ndsCom

Tag

Length

numDatSetEntries

Tag

Length

allData

Tag

Length

Data 1(Boolean)

Tag

Length

Data 2 (Float)

Tag

Length

Data N

••••• •••••

49

All GOOSE messages start with the destination’s MAC address, followed by source MAC
address, Priority Tagging/VLAN ID, Ethernet type, APP ID, Length and two reserved
fields. These fields are described as the following:
• Destination MAC address: GOOSE messages use multicast MAC address as the
destination address. The GOOSE multicast address must start with 01-0C CD-01-xx-xx.
The first three octets are (01-0C-CD) reserved for IEC 61850 protocol. The fourth octet is
set to (01) for GOOSE messages.
• Source MAC address: this field contains the MAC address for the publisher IED.
• Priority Tagging/VLAN ID: GOOSE messages contain IEEE 802.1Q VLAN ID. The
IEEE 802.1Q standard supports virtual LANs on an Ethernet network. The IEEE 802.1Q
VLAN ID consists of Tag Protocol Identifier (TPID) and Tag control Identifier (TID). The
TID is divided to Priority code point (PCP), 1-bit Drop eligible indicator (DEI). This
indicator specifies if the message can be dropped in the case of congestion and 12-bit
VLAN identifier field.
• Ether type: all GOOSE messages have a unique ether type field equal to 88B8.
• APPID: this field is used by the subscriber IEDs to identify the messages they are
subscribing to.
• Length field: The Length field represents the length of the datagram minus eight bytes.
• Two reserved fields: these fields are reserved by the standard for future use.
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A GOOSE message also has an IEEE 802.1Q VLAN ID, a unique Ethernet type, and an
APPID field which subscribing IEDs use to identify the messages they are subscribing to.
The Length field represents the length of the datagram minus eight bytes; the length field
is followed by two reserved fields, which the standard leaves for future use.
• gocbRef: GOOSE control block reference
• timeAllowedtoLive: The time a receiver waits before receiving a re-transmitted message
• datSet: Name of the dataset.
• goID: ID of publishing IED.
• t: Timestamp indicating a new GOOSE event.
• stNum: Counter that increments with every GOOSE event.
• sqNum: Counter that increments with every repeated GOOSE message.
• test: Specifies if a message is intended for testing or not.
• confRev: Number of times the data set has changed.
• ndsCom: Needs commissioning field.
• numDataEntires: Number of data elements in allData.
• allData: Actual data being sent (bool, integer, float, etc.).
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3.3

Samples Measured Values Message structure
Table 3.2Structue of SV Message
Destination Address

Source MAC Address

Priority Tagging/
VLAN ID

Ethertype (88BA)

APPID

Length

Reserved 1

Reserved 2

APDU

Tag

Length

noASDU

Tag

Length

svID

Tag

Length

SmpCnt

Tag

Length

ConfRev

Tag
Tag

Length
SmpSynch
Length
Sample 2
••••• •••••

Tag
Tag
Tag

Length
Length
Length

Sample 1
Sample 2
Sample N

SMV datagram follows a modified Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) Basic
Encoding Rules (BER) Tag/Length pair encoding scheme. An SMV datagram is composed
of two distinct fields: the packet header and the packet data. In the header, the SMV packet
is constructed first with a destination MAC address followed by the source MAC address,
as well as several fields related to the IEC 61850 protocol that will determine which
multicast messages to accept and reject based on the subscriptions of the individual
subscribing devices.
In the SMV datagram data field as shown in Figure 3.2, there can be several application
protocol data units (ASDU), which are objects that contain relevant information for an
individual node. Using several ASDUs allows a single device to send or receive physical
sensor data from several nodes in the same datagram.
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3.4

Cyber Physical Attacks

This chapter describes the different types of physical attacks that may impact the adaptive
protection scheme and prevent communication networks from dealing with the dynamic
changes of microgrid. Security attacks in microgrid communication networks are intended
to interrupt messages that are exchanged between IEDs. The attacks can be implemented
using common network security attacks or by exploiting GOOSE and SV messages as
shown in Figure 3.1.
3.4.1

Network Security Attacks

This attack is performed through the communication network to damage, change, or
access user data without permission [123]. The following are several types of network
security attacks:
1) Denial of Service
DoS is the process of preventing the authorized user of a service to access that service
[123]. Main types of DoS that may affect the communication between protective devices
include SYN (synchronization) floods and buffer overflow. For the first type, the attacker
sends a continuously spoofed SYN request to the target IED to distort the connection
between the authorized user and IEDs [124]. This type of attack can be orchestrated by
running several protocol services like FTP, HTTP and Telnet on the IED at the same time
[125], [126]. For the second type, the attacker may transmit malicious code to an IED and
write oversized data to cause a buffer overflow. This attack is possible as a result of the
vulnerability of IEDs and the unavailability of security measures for IEDs to detect the
malicious code [124].
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2) Password Cracking Attempts
This type of attack is defined as an attempt to gain access to an IED, another device, or a
system by guessing the password [127]. Attackers who are able to access an IED can send
a false tripping signal to the CB that can cause it to disconnect a healthy part in the system.
This can be accomplished in two ways: a brute force attack and a dictionary attack. A brute
force is performed by arranging all possible combinations of passwords and trying these
combinations one-by-one to achieve the correct password but may take a long time. In a
dictionary attack, the password is simply guessed.

Cyber Attacks

Network
Security Attacks
Denial of
Service

SYN
Flood

Goose & SMV
Messages
Modification
Attack

Password
Cracking

DoS
Attack

Buffer
Overflow

Replay
Attack

Eavesdropping
Brute
Force

Dictionary

ARP

Switch Port
Stealing

CAM

Figure 3.1 Types of Cyber Attacks.
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This type may take less time than the latter. In [125] and [126], hackers were able to
utilize FTP, HTTP and Telnet services already running on the IED to crack the password.
3) Eavesdropping Attacks
Eavesdropping attack is an attempt to steal packets that are being transmitted through
the system. This type of attack is launched from within the LAN and can target FTP, HTTP
and Telnet services because messages for these protocols are not encrypted [125]. There
are three types of this attack.
The first is known as ARP cache poisoning. ARP is a communication protocol that converts
an IP address into incorrect MAC address (i.e. the MAC address of the attacker), the switch
will end up forwarding all packets addressed to the attacker and enables the attacker to
capture those packets.
The second type is to cause CAM table flooding. This is done by filling in the CAM table
of the switch with fake entries. When it is full, packets addressed to a MAC address that
are not in the CAM table will be broadcasted to the whole network allowing attackers to
capture them.
Finally, the third type is switch port stealing where fake frames are sent to the switch that
contain the target host MAC address causing the switch to modify the CAM table. This
allows the MAC address to connect to the interface that leads to the attacker [127].
3.4.2

Attacks on GOOSE and SV Messages

There are two multicast message protocols used in IEC 61850 which include GOOSE
and SMV messages. The main function of the GOOSE message is to send a trip signal to

55

the CB to isolate the faulty part from the system. SV messages are used to send voltage
and current values from merging units to the protective devices. Both messages use a
switched Ethernet network for communication purposes. These messages must be
transmitted within 4 ms. The following section discusses several attacks that exploit
GOOSE and SMV messages.
1) GOOSE and SV Modification Attacks
In this type, the attacker changes the message that is exchanged between the protective
devices without allowing the publisher (the sender of GOOSE messages) or subscriber (the
receiver of GOOSE messages) to notice.
Two types can be found in this attack. For the first type, the attacker captures the GOOSE
message and modifies it with another message that enables the attacker to control a CB.
For a SV packet, an attacker sends a fabricated analog value to a control center in the
system that leads to gain control of IEDs and cause a power outage [116]. The second type
of attack is performed using a malware script [128].
The malware can capture the message that is exchanged between IEDs altering and reinjecting GOOSE message packets into the IEC 61850 network. In order to enable the
malware to perform its job, it must be installed on a computer inside the network. Attackers
exploit the weakness in GOOSE where encryption and digital signatures cannot be applied
due an IEC 61850 requirement that any operation, which is communicated using a GOOSE
message, must take effect within 4 ms. Without encryption and digital signatures, a
transmitted packet can be easily captured, modified, and retransmitted into the network.
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Figure 3.2 GOOSE Poisoning Attack.
2) GOOSE and SV Denial of Service Attacks
These attacks prevent IEDs to respond to legitimate messages made by other IEDs. This
can be done by sending a large number of messages to the target IED, where it becomes
overwhelmed and is unable to respond to a legitimate request. GOOSE poisoning attacks
are another way to perform DoS as shown in Figure 3.2.
The aim of these attacks is to get the subscriber to accept GOOSE messages with a higher
sequence number than those sent by the publisher. As a result, all GOOSE messages from
the publisher will be considered invalid by the subscribers leaving the subscribers to only
accept GOOSE messages from the attacker.
There are three variables of GOOSE poisoning attacks including high status number
attacks, high rate flooding attacks, and semantic attacks. For the high status number attack,
the attacker sends a single spoofed GOOSE frame with a very high status number to a
GOOSE subscriber by the attacker.
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Secondly, in a high rate flooding attack, the attacker multicasts a range of spoofed GOOSE
messages with higher status numbers. The spoofed GOOSE frames employ a status number
higher than the expected status number of a GOOSE subscriber.
In a semantic attack, the attacker will fix the status number in the GOOSE message and
determine the rate of status change. Then, the attacker will spoof GOOSE messages that
are higher than the detected rate of status change [129].
3) GOOSE and SV Replay Attacks
In this attack, GOOSE messages are captured and kept by the attacker. Then, the
attacker sends a message to trip the CB under normal operation which may result in an
undesirable action.
For a SV message replay attack, the attacker can also capture a SV packet containing
certain values of power and current and send it to another protective device in the substation
several times. SV packets with the same power and voltage values circulating inside the
system can lead to an unplanned outage [130].
3.5

Summary
Most adaptive protection methods depend on exchanging information amongst

intelligent electronic devices by way of a communication link. Therefore, protection
against cyber-attacks is crucial to ensure a safe message exchange. Different types of
cyber-attacks were introduced that may impact the communication network, keeping in
mind these as well as a total loss of communication could be catastrophic to a microgrid
protection scheme. In this chapter we introduced the main messages that can be used to
protect the electric power system.
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The main challenge to perform the protection scheme is to publish and subscribe these
message with 4 ms and isolate the fault from the system. Another contribution of this
chapter was presented the different types of attacks that can be effect on the communication
system and prevent the authorized devices to send a GOOSE message to trip the circuit
breaker.
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Chapter 4 Utilizing Supercapacitors for Resiliency Enhancements and Adaptive
Microgrid Protection against Communication Failures

4.1

Introduction

Islanded microgrids do not have sufficient resources to contribute enough fault current
to legacy protection devices to continue operation. Therefore, when a fault occurs in an
islanded microgrid, relays with high fault current setting will fail to detect and clear the
fault due to the limited sources in the system at this mode of operation. Contemporary
adaptive protection schemes rely on communication technologies to adjust the relay
settings to adapt to the microgrids’ modes of operation; grid-connected or islanded.
However, the risk of communication link failures and cyber security threats such as denialof-service represent major challenges in implementing a reliable adaptive protection
scheme. In order to address this issue, this chapter develops an adaptive protection scheme,
which utilize super capacitive energy storage to enhance resiliency against communication
outages. This chapter also introduces an autonomous control algorithm developed for the
super-capacitor’s AC/DC converter to allow the supercapacitor to inject current at islanded
mode operation. The developed control is capable of deciding upon charging, discharging
of the super-capacitor, and whether or not to feed fault currents on the AC side, based on
direct voltage and frequency measurements from its connection point with the microgrid.
This eliminates the need for a control command to be sent from the point of common
coupling of the microgrid with the main grid to adjust the controller’s mode of operation
and thus reduce the risk of controller failure due to cyber-attacks or other communication
issues. Additionally, the chapter develops a solution to avoid installing a larger super-
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capacitor by temporarily disconnecting the uncritical pulsed load during the fault instant.
The developed protection scheme was investigated through simulation for various fault
types and showed successful results, using the developed scheme, in eliminating the
aforementioned faults when the communication was available or attacked.
The developed solution takes benefit from the installed supercapacitor in the system with
the bidirectional VSC to contribute for the fault current and raise this current value to level
which is sensed by the High relay settings. The developed solution does not incur additional
costs to the system studied as the supercapacitor is already used to feed the pulse load.
It is also worth noting here that the design of the developed controller for the
supercapacitor’s AC/DC converter is capable of operating when the microgrid is in both
grid-connected and islanded mode.
Utilizing a single mode of operation for the converter will eliminate the reliance on
communication control command signals to shift the controller between different modes.
The system, as will be detailed later in the chapter, is also designed to maintain stable
voltage and frequency levels even during extreme cases such as the occurrence of a fault
during a peak pulse load period.
4.2

Hybrid DC/AC Microgrid Description

Figure 4.1 shows the topology of the hybrid AC/DC microgrid under study with grid
connection capabilities. The system contains three types of sources: two distributed
generators in the AC part of the microgrid, a super capacitor bank to supply a DC pulse
load, and a fuel cell. A three phase transformer is implemented to feed the AC microgrid
with the required rated voltage.
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The system has a filter located between the transformer and the AC microgrid to filter out
the harmonics of the AC grid. Another AC filter is added between the AC and DC parts of
the microgrid to improve the performance of the bidirectional and unidirectional converters
and reduce the harmonics of the AC microgrid as well. The bidirectional converter that is
connected between the supercapacitor and the AC side is used for charging the
supercapacitor in the normal operation. During islanded operation, and when there is a
communication failure, the bidirectional converter allows the supercapacitor to contribute
to the fault current during the occurrence of a fault in AC side. The unidirectional converter
is present to allow DC sources to support AC sources in feeding various loads in the
microgrid. A relay and a circuit breaker is connected to each end of all transmission lines.
CB11 and CB12 are connected at the terminals of the DC sources and provide the ability to
connect and disconnect these sources.
F1 is applied to the system in order to isolate the microgrid from the grid, then another
fault, F2, is applied on the islanded microgrid to investigate its performance with and
without communication.
The super capacitor in Figure 4.1, which is connected through a bidirectional VSC to the
AC microgrid, is of paramount importance for the role it plays in contributing to the fault
current when the communication medium fails as will be explained in details later in this
chapter. The super capacitor is of 2.9 F capacitance and it delivers high instantaneous power
to the pulse load during the normal operation.
The AC side also feeds the pulse load in normal operation when the super capacitor bank
is out of service. Finally, a fuel cell supplies different loads in the AC side using a
unidirectional AC/DC converter in cases where the grid is disconnected from the system
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and a fault is applied at the AC microgrid resulting in the disconnection of one or more
generation units. Specifications of the system components are summarized in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 System Component Parameters
Component

Parameter

Specification

SN

7.5 KVA

VN

208 V

FN

60 Hz

XL(pu)

1.305

Connection

Δ/Yg

SN

7.5 KVA

VN

208 V

R eq, X eq

0.72 Ω, 2.29 mH

Number of cells

20

Rated voltage

320

Rated capacity

2.9 F

Surge voltage

340

Leakage current

5.2 mA

AC filter 1

LAF

4 mH

AC filter 2

LAF

3 mH

AC filter 3

LAF

0.4 mH

r1, r0

0.0015 Ω/Km, 0.03 Ω/Km

l1, l0

0.03 mH/Km, 0.1 mH/Km

c1, c0

3 nF/Km, 2nF/Km

Generator

Transformer

Supercapacitor bank

Transmission Line
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Figure 4.1 Microgrid under Study
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4.3

Developed Protection Algorithm

This section describes the logic algorithm of the relays during the different modes of
operation under study namely grid connected mode, islanded mode with communication,
and islanded mode with loss of communication. As can be seen in Figure 4.2, the logic
embedded into the relays in order to sense several of types of faults contains two settings of
operation one corresponding to the Higher Setting and another corresponding to the Lower
Setting. The higher setting operates at grid and islanded mode with loss of communication,
while the lower setting is activated during the islanded mode with communication. Shifting
between these two settings occurs as a result of a command signal coming from the point of
common coupling (PCC) of the microgrid with the main grid through communication link
which is referred to as “Islanded” in Figure 4.2. In the Higher Setting, the relay is configured
to trip the circuit breaker at a high group of measured currents, whereas in the Lower Setting
the relay is configured to trip the circuit breaker at a lower group of input currents.
For a viable practical implementation of the developed protection scheme, the commonly
accepted IEC 61850 communication framework could be applied. This emerging
international standard provides an efficient and reliable interoperability framework between
different field devices in protection applications.
For that, the Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) messaging protocol will
be utilized to send control messages from the PCC to the system’s IEDs in order to shift
their settings accordingly. IEC 61850 GOOSE messages are broadcast layer 2 messages of
the OSI model that enable fast publish/subscribe message exchange between end devices
within a quarter cycle. It is also important to realize the presence of Merging Units (MUs)
at both ends of a transmission lines. These merging units will digitize current measurements
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at the source and broadcast them over the designated network in the form of IEC 61850
Sampled Measured Values (SMV) messages. In this study, we are assuming that all IEDs
and MUs are on the same local area network (LAN), however, special router configuration
can be applied to exchange messages over wide area networks (WANs) [131].
The mathematical equations that can describe the developed protection technique is
explained in the following part. Equation (4.1) gives the operation of the logic circuit of the
relay at trigger high (ITH) that represented higher settings, when the system operates at grid
connected or at islanded mode when the communication fails.
𝐼𝑇𝐻 = {

1
0

(𝐼𝑓 ≥ 𝐼𝐺 + 𝐼𝑚 ) + (𝐼𝑓 ≥ 𝐼𝑆𝐶 + 𝐼𝑚 )
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

Grid & Islanded Mode with Loss of
Communication
Relay Adjusted at Higher Settings
If
IG

ITH

Isc

If
Fault Current
IG
Grid Current
Supercapacitor Current
Isc
Im
Microgrid Current
Islanded Communication Signal
ITH
Trigger High
ITL
Trigger Low
Trip Signal

Im
ITL
Islanded
Islanded Mode with Communication
Relay Adjusted at Lower Settings
Figure 4.2 Logic Diagram of the High and Low Relay Settings
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(4.1)

Equation (4.2) describes the logic of the relay at islanded mode of operation when the
communication is available in the system. At this case, the relay will produce (ITL) and
adjusted at lower settings.
𝐼𝑇𝐿 = {

1
0

(𝐼𝑓 ≥ 𝐼𝑚 ) . 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

(4.2)

The relay will send a trip signal to the circuit breaker whether (ITH) or (ITL) achieved as
indicated in equation (4.3):Trip signal = 𝐼𝑇𝐻 + 𝐼𝑇𝐿

(4.3)

Figure 4.3 shows the flowchart of the developed protection algorithm. At grid connected
mode, the current at each terminal of the transmission lines is measured. When the fault
takes place at the microgrid, the fault can be cleared whether the relay settings is adjusted
at high or low settings since the fault will be fed mainly from grid. If the fault occurred at
the point of common coupling (PCC) with microgrid, the relay will a trip signal to the
circuit breaker when (If ≥ IG +Im) and isolate the fault zone. After that, the mode of
operation changes to islanded, and the communication plays an important role to determine
the relay settings level. When the communication is available, the relay can update its
settings to lower settings and at fault clearing condition (If ≥ Im), the circuit breaker isolates
the faulted part from the system. When the communication is lost, due to a cyber-attack for
example, the relay remains at high settings and the previous condition is not satisfied. For
this case and when the fault occurs, according to the type of fault, the current can be fed
and relay reach to the setting value. If the applied fault was single line to ground fault, the
microgrid can contribute to the fault current and the faulted zone is isolated from the system
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In order to detect three or double phase to ground fault, the supercapacitor can compensate
the required current to the relay and isolate the fault. Whether the supercapacitor’s state is
charging or discharging, it can feed the relay with the current and trip circuit breaker when
(If ≥ Im+Isc). The stability of the overall system is checked to ensure that the frequency and
voltages at AC and DC sides are stable especially when the fault happened and pulsed load
is turned on.
Start
Grid Mode
Measure Current
at branches
Microgrid
Trip Circuit
Breaker

Fault Location
PCC
No

If >= IG
Yes

Isolate Microgrid

No
Relay remains
at High Settings

Fault
No

If >= Im

Yes
Single phase to ground
fault
Type of
fault

No
Communication
Available

Yes
Update Relay to
Lower Settings

Double&Three phase to
groud fault

Yes

Fault
Trip Circuit
Breaker

Supercapacitor
inject current

Yes

If >= Im

Check
Stability

Isolate Fault
Zone

Yes

If >= Im+Isc

No

No

Yes

No

Isolate Fault

Figure 4.3 Flowchart of the Developed Protection Algorithm
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Isolate Fault
Zone

4.3.1

Grid Connected Mode of Operation

The microgrid in this case is assumed to be operating in the grid connected mode.
When a fault occurs in any of the transmission lines within the AC microgrid, high shortcircuit currents are expected to flow in the place of the fault reaching values between 6-7
times of the rated current value. In this case, the relays are adjusted to the Higher Setting.
4.3.2

Islanded Mode of Operation

It is assumed here that the microgrid has been disconnected from the main grid due to a
fault F1 shown in Figure 4.1. The microgrid is thus operating in islanded mode. The relay
at the PCC senses this shift and issues a control signal to all relays to shift to the Lower
Setting. The setting of the relays are therefore adjusted to be between 1.5-2 times of the
rated current at this mode.
This is due to the fact that the microgrid cannot feed the fault with the same capacity as
the main grid. Also the power electronic devices that are used for the fuel cell reduce the
amount of the short circuit current.
Changing from the grid setting to the microgrid setting can be performed using the
Islanded signal shown in Figure 4.2. Reliable communication between the PCC and the
relays in the microgrid is therefore critical for shifting between relay settings for proper
location and isolation of the fault.
4.3.3

Islanded Mode of Operation with Loss of Communication

The system configuration here is the same as that in B, however, it is assumed that
communication is lost between the PCC and the microgrid’s relays. Therefore, the settings
of the relays will not shift to the proper setting (Lower Setting) and will render them unable
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of sensing faults. In this event, energy storage devices can be added to solve the problem
of communication failure.
Loss of communication in a system is when a system’s components that act control
commands stop responding to commands or behave in unconventional ways due to a
system malfunction or a malicious cyber-attack [132].
In fact, as explained in [132], loss of communication may be due to several reasons like
failure of communication equipment, such as a network switch, or noise on a
communication channel causing transmission errors or data unavailability. Communication
might also be lost due to a failure in of central systems (e.g. servers) at substations and
microgrids control centers causing unreliable sending and reception of control signals.
Last but not least, loss of communication might be due to malicious efforts such as cyberattacks. A denial of service (DoS) attack is when the attacker attempts to prevent authorized
users or machines from accessing a service. One way of doing this is to disrupt or exploit
the services of the relay.
In adaptive protection operations, a DoS attack might disrupt the operation of IEDs by
transmitting malicious code to the targeted IED or IEDs that writes over-sized data to cause
a buffer overflow [133]-[134].
The attacker can choose to exploit common services on a relay. They can do this by
opening multiple sessions on either the File Transfer Protocol (FTP), or Telnet services
and keeping them idle all the time preventing the relay from responding to critical grid
events such as protection. It is also explained in [134] that DoS could be the result of a
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flooding attack to delay message delivery past the critical flooding rate by congesting the
channel and exhausting the computation resources of the communicating nodes.
When the communication fails in the islanded mode of operation, the setting of the relay
is not adjusted to the lower setting and the relay is adjusted to trip at higher setting. The
capability of the islanded microgrid is not enough to reach to this setting.
A supercapacitor bank is used to solve this problem. This supercapacitor bank can
compensate for the difference between the grid and islanded mode and will contribute to
the fault current raising it to a value which is sensed by the high relay setting detect and
isolate the fault. Therefore, the developed protection algorithm will be able to survive
communication failures.
4.4
4.4.1

Control of Supercapacitor-Based Microgrid
Supercapacitor-Pulse Load Microgrid

A supercapacitor is a storage device which is capable of storing electrical energy directly
between two conducting electrodes. The capacitance and energy density of a
supercapacitor are thousands of times larger than a conventional electrolytic capacitor. A
supercapacitor is also known as a double-layer capacitor since it can store energy across
the double layers formed at the interface between an electronically conducting carbon and
the electrolyte. A supercapacitor is known to have high power density, low internal
resistance, and high life cycle [135]-[137]. In order to increase the energy density of a
supercapacitor, high surface-area materials such as activated carbon are used. High power
energy storage is commonly used in many systems such as telecommunications, shipboard
and spacecraft power systems. In these applications, there are various types of loads that
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show high instantaneous power requirement but require a relatively low average power.
These types of loads are referred to as pulse loads. The duration of such loads ranges
typically from hundreds of milliseconds to seconds with different power levels. In
microgrid applications, the high instantaneous power of a pulse load can cause considerable
power disturbances and thermal problems. Introducing a fast response high power storage
system, such as a supercapacitor bank, with the appropriate power electronic and control,
will improve the performance of the system drastically [138]-[141].
Besides the function of the supercapacitor in the normal operation for supplying the
pulse load, it has been used in this chapter to enhance the protection system resiliency to
communication failures. The control scheme of the microgrid has been modified to allow
the supercapacitor to contribute the fault current while there are no enough resources to
feed the fault current, which is the case of the microgrid’s islanded mode of operation. This
is useful in case the protection algorithm is unable update relays’ setting due to
communication failure as discussed earlier.
4.4.2

Autonomous Control of Supercapacitor AC/DC Converter

The supercapacitor is typically designed to supply a periodic pulse load in a system. This
supercapacitor is coupled with the AC side through a bidirectional AC-DC voltage source
converter (VSC) as indicated in Figure 4.4 An improved control algorithm with only one
mode of operation has been developed in this chapter to allow the microgrid to work
properly during the normal and faulty operations whether in grid-connected on islanded
mode of operation. Thus the controller needs not to rely on any communication signal to
detect the mode of operation of the microgrid as it is autonomous in nature. In the normal
operation, the supercapacitor will charge from the AC side during the off-time pulse load,
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and then discharge during the on-time pulse load to supply the load demand. Moreover, the
controller is designed to allow the DC microgrid to regulate the AC side frequency and
voltage during the islanded mode of operation.
During the faulty operation, the controller will direct the microgrid to enhance the system
stability and will help the system restore after isolating the fault. This is the controller’s
role if either the system has enough resources to supply the fault current such as gridconnected operation, or the protection relays were able to update their settings based on
data communication. In case of the system does not have enough resources and the
communication was unavailable, the controller will force the microgrid to compensate the
fault current and achieve fault isolation. This function will enhance the protection system
resiliency against communication failures.
The details of the control scheme are indicated in Figure 4.4 Two control loops are
implemented for active and reactive power flow control to achieve both frequency and
voltage regulation. The supercapacitor reactive power is controlled, based on Iq_r, to keep
the AC side voltage at a specified value using a PI controller. The active power reference
component (Id_r) is generated using two PI controllers. The first is responsible for
regulating the AC side frequency to be within the acceptable limit, whereas the second is
used to keep the supercapacitor DC voltage within the specified level. Using the AC side
frequency as a signature to the active power flow allows the supercapacitor to supply large
currents during the fault and contribute to the fault current during loss of communication
situations.

73

Based on the inverse Park transformation the reference three phase currents (Ia_r, Ib_r, and
Ic_r) are estimated from the dq0 rotating reference frame currents. The angle between the
two reference frames and the system frequency are estimated from three-phase Phase
Locked Loop block (PLL). The abc reference currents are compared with the actual
measured currents and applied to the pulse width modulation (PWM) scheme to generate
the switching signals of the inverter. The hysteresis band current control is considered in
this work because of its simplicity of implementation and fast response current loop. It also
doesn’t need any knowledge of the load parameters [142]-[143].
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Figure 4.4 Autonomous AC/DC Converter Controller
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Mathematical formulation of the suggested control to achieve the protection scheme
can be explained in the following formulas:Frequency error (𝑓𝑒𝑟 ) is the difference between the reference (𝑓𝑟 ) and measured
frequency (𝑓𝑚 ):𝑓𝑒𝑟 = 𝑓𝑟 − 𝑓𝑚

(4.4)

Equations (5), (6) described the AC and DC voltage errors.
𝑉𝑑𝑐_𝑒𝑟 = 𝑉𝑑𝑐𝑟 − 𝑉𝑑𝑐𝑚

(4.5)

𝑉𝑎𝑐_𝑒𝑟 = 𝑉𝑎𝑐_𝑟 − 𝑉𝑎𝑐_𝑚

(4.6)

The frequency error introduced to PI controller with 𝑘𝑝_𝑓 and 𝑘𝑖_𝑓 parameters and produced
direct current component for regulating the system frequency.
(4.7)
𝑘𝑝_𝑓 𝑠 + 𝑘𝑖_𝑓
𝐼𝑑_𝑓 = 𝑓𝑒𝑟 ×
𝑠
The error in DC and AC voltages controlled by PI controller and produced the required
direct current component to regulate them as shown in equations (4.8), (4.9):𝑘𝑝_𝑉𝑑𝑐 𝑠 + 𝑘𝑖_𝑉𝑑𝑐
(4.8)
𝑠
𝑘𝑝_𝑉𝑎𝑐 𝑠 + 𝑘𝑖_𝑉𝑎𝑐
(4.9)
𝐼𝑞_𝑟 = 𝑉𝑎𝑐_𝑒𝑟 ×
𝑠
The output of the controller of frequency and DC voltage are combined together and
𝐼𝑑_𝑉𝑑𝑐 = 𝑉𝑑𝑐𝑒𝑟 ×

produce the reference of direct current (𝐼𝑑_𝑟 ):𝐼𝑑_𝑟 = 𝐼𝑑_𝑓 + 𝐼𝑑_𝑉𝑑𝑐

(4.10)

Equation (4.11) described the transformation from dq to abc frames:𝐼𝑎_𝑟
cos 𝜃
sin 𝜃
1 𝐼𝑞_𝑟
[𝐼𝑏_𝑟 ] = [cos(𝜃 − 120) sin(𝜃 − 120) 1] [𝐼𝑑_𝑟 ]
cos(𝜃 + 120) sin(𝜃 + 120) 1 𝐼0
𝐼𝑐_𝑟
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(4.11)

The error of the current signals in three phase current (𝐼𝑎𝑏𝑐_𝑒𝑟 )is the difference between
the reference (𝐼𝑎𝑏𝑐_𝑟 ) and the measured values (𝐼𝑎𝑏𝑐_𝑚 ).
𝐼𝑎𝑏𝑐_𝑒𝑟 = 𝐼𝑎𝑏𝑐_𝑟 − 𝐼𝑎𝑏𝑐_𝑚

(4.12)

𝐼𝑎𝑏𝑐_𝑒𝑟 is feed to Hysterises current controler to track the current reference 𝐼𝑎𝑏𝑐_𝑟
4.5

Results and Discussion
This part introduces the results of the developed protection technique at grid connected

mode when the communication is available in the system. Also, several cases at the
islanded mode operation is disuses when the communication is healthy or attacked in the
system.
4.5.1

Simulated Cases

Case 1:- Grid Connected Mode of Operation
In this case a three-phase to ground fault (F2 in Figure 4.1) has been applied in the
transmission line between busses 3 and 4 while the microgrid was in grid connected mode
of operation. The system performance during this fault is indicated in Figure 4.5.
As it can be noticed, the fault occurred at t = 6 seconds and cleared instantaneously. In
this case, the utility helped to maintain the system’s frequency stable during and after the
fault, as shown in Figure 4.5(a).
Figure 4.5(b) shows the pulse load (Ipl), supercapacitor (Ic), and inverter (Iinv1) currents.
During the off-time pulse load, the capacitor will be charging from the AC side, whereas
during the on-time pulse load the supercapacitor will be the major feeder to the pulse load,
as indicated in Figure 4.5(c).
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The AC side will still be present to feed the pulse load in case the supercapacitor went
out of service. Figure 4.5(d) and (e) show the high fault current values of 32 Amps which
is mainly being contributed to by the grid.
As anticipated for the grid connected mode, the fault current is almost more than 6 times
the rated AC current and thus the protection devices where able to detect and isolate the
faults successfully.
Case 2:- Islanded Mode of Operation with Communication
In this situation, a three-phase-to-ground fault (fault F1 in Figure 4.1) occurred at time t
= 1.5 seconds, in the transmission line connecting the main grid to the microgrid under
study. As a result, relay R1 will send a trip signal to circuit breaker CB1 to isolate the
microgrid.
The microgrid successfully shifted to a stable islanded mode by adjusting its overall
frequency back to the normal condition after fault, as shown in Figure 4.6(a).
A small disturbance, within acceptable limits, in the output voltages of the sources (VG,
Vg1, Vg2, Vinv1 and Vinv2 representing the voltages at busses 1, 4, 6, 3 and 5, respectively),
is noticed in Figure 4.6(b).
Figure 4.6(c) shows a spike in IG due to the fault and this current drops to zero after
clearing the fault by disconnecting the microgrid. An increase in the generator’s currents
(Ig1 and Ig2) is noticed in order to compensate for the current which was previously supplied
mainly by the grid.
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Figure 4.6(d) and (e) show the supercapacitor-pulse load microgrid performance
parameters which exhibit stable performance during the islanding instant.
Finally, Figure 4.6(f) and (g) indicate the minor change in the AC current at transmission
line connecting busses 3 and 4 after the fault.
During the islanded operation, another three-phase-to-ground fault occurred at t = 6
seconds, in the middle of transmission line connecting buses 3 and 4.
Based on the available communication infrastructure in the system, relay R5 settings is
adjusted to the lower setting and thus was capable of detecting the fault and tripping CB5
accordingly. Figure 4.6(a) shows the microgrid frequency recovery after the fault incident.
As can be noticed the system is showing stable performance during and after the fault
with disturbances within the specified limits of microgrids operation.
The sources voltages Vg2, Vinv1 and Vinv2 dropped at the fault incident and recovered after
clearing the fault, as shown in Figure 4.6(b).
After the fault was cleared, Figure 4.6(c) shows that Ig1 dropped to zero since generator
G1 was isolated from the system. Current Ig2 increased to feed the loads accordingly.
It can be noticed in Figure 4.6(d) and (e) that the supercapacitor was not used to feed the
fault current due to the adaptation process for R5 setting to its lower setting.
Figure 4.6(f) and (g) show that the AC current in transmission line where fault F2
occurred increased significantly from 5 to 12 A during the fault instance.
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It can be noticed also, that the fault current level is less than that appeared in the grid
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Case 3:- Islanded Mode of Operation without Communication during Supercapacitor
Charging
In this case, fault F2 occurred during the off-time of the pulse load (i.e. charging of the
supercapacitor). Due to the assumption of the communication failure, relay R5 will not be
able to switch to the lower settings. In this case, as shown in Figure 4.7(b), the
supercapacitor compensate the fault current until it reach to the higher setting of the relay
(32 A) as indicated in Figure 4.7(c). This resulted in relay R5 sensing the fault and thus
isolating it accordingly. After clearing the faulted region the system restored and shows
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stable performance.
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Figure 4.7 System performance during fault at microgrid operation without
communication (a) frequency, (b) supercapacitor current, and (c) RMS current in the
faulted transmission line
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Case 4:- Islanded Mode of Operation without Communication during Supercapacitor
Discharging
4.1 Oversized Supercapacitor to Feed the Fault and Pulse Load Currents
This solution is recommended in case of critical pulse loads that cannot accept any
instantaneous supply interruption. In this case, the supercapacitor needs to be designed to
supply both the pulse load and the fault current requirements. The system performance
during a fault F2 at this circumstances is described in Figure 4.8. As indicated in Figure
4.8(b), the fault occurred during the discharging of the supercapacitor phase of the pulse
load period. It is noted that due to communication failure, relay R5 will not switch to the
lower settings and the supercapacitor quickly contributed to the fault current while still
covering the pulse load as reflected on the pulse load current in Figure 4.8(c). The
maximum current drawn from the supercapacitor in this case is 45 Amps which is required
to feed the fault and the pulse load simultaneously. Figure 4.8(d) shows that the fault
current drastically increased from 5 Amps to 32 Amps. This resulted in relay R5 sensing
the fault and thus isolating it accordingly as explained in the normal condition.
4.2 Disconnecting the Pulse load during the Fault
This section presents the cheap solution of this problem which is useful in case of the
pulse load can accept the instantaneous power interruption. Similar to the previous case,
fault F2 occurred during the on-time period of the pulse load. It is noticed in Figure 4.9(b)
that, due to communication failure relay R5 will not switch to the lower settings and the
supercapacitor quickly contributed to the fault current. However, in this case, the pulse
load
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was disconnected for a short period of time during the fault in order to reduce the amount
of current drawn from the supercapacitor which reached a maximum of 27 Amps in this
case. To disconnect the pulse load, the rate of change of the supercapacitor’s voltage was
monitored to detect a small notch in the DC voltage indicating the fault as shown in Figure
4.9(c). This in fact does not depend on any communication command or any conventional
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change in frequency or AC voltage signature. The pulse load interruption is described in
Figure 4.9(d). Figure 4.9 (e) shows that the fault current drastically increased from 5 Amps
to 32 Amps. It is worth to mention that this solution is applicable to some types of uncritical
loads. However, critical pulse loads, that cannot be disconnected and thus will fall into the
category explained in section D.1.
These pulsed loads could be present on ship power systems, which can be electrically
treated as islanded microgrids as indicated in [144]. Additionally, pulsed loads do exist in
regular power system microgrids (other than ships).
These pulsed loads could be large cranes, radar systems, welding machines or an electric
vehicle park with simultaneous fast charging of large number of vehicles [145].
4.5.2

Performance Evaluation of the Developed Protection Schemes under Different
Types and Magnitudes of Fault Currents.

The numerical figures in the first row of Table 4.2 represent the results of different case
studies discussed earlier at three phase to ground fault (ABCG) with 2 Ω fault resistance.
The results of the various modes of operation of the microgrid with and without
communication discussed above for different types of faults with varying fault resistances
at the transmission line that connecting between buses 3 and 4 (F2) are then shown in the
subsequent rows.
For the case of a three- phase-to-ground fault, a significant decrease in the current drawn
from the supercapacitor was observed when the pulse load was disconnected during the
fault period (from 95.65% to 17.39% in the 2Ω fault resistance case and from 43.47% to
8.69% in the 4Ω fault resistance case).
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Figure 4.9 System performance during fault at microgrid operation without
communication (a) frequency, (b) supercapacitor current, (c) supercapacitor DC voltage,
(d) pulse load current, and (e) RMS current in the faulted transmission line
Similarly, in the case of a double-line-to-ground fault (BCG), a decrease in the current
drawn from the supercapacitor was observed when the pulse load was disconnected during
the fault period (from 78.26% to 13.04% in the 2Ω fault resistance case and from 56.52%
to 4.3% in the 3Ω fault resistance case). Therefore, the temporary disconnection of the
pulse load, whenever possible, during fault period. That is, when the pulse load is
disconnected, the supercapacitor will only be feeding the load. This will not incur any
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additional costs on the system to install bigger capacitors than the ones already present to
protect the system. It is noted that in the formal two faults, the resources in the microgrid
without the supercapacitor were incapable of feeding enough current to the fault for the
relays to detect it in case of communication failure. This shows that the developed solution
of utilizing a supercapacitor does indeed enhance the reliability of the protection scheme
in case of loss of communication. Finally, the AC microgrid generating units were capable
of feeding sufficient fault current for fault detection in the case of a single-line-to-ground
fault (AG) without assistance from the supercapacitor. This is because the currents
produced from this type of faults are usually smaller than the previous fault types. We can
see from the table 4.2 that the current drawn from the supercapacitor did not increase in
this case.
Table 4.2 Performance of the protection scheme under different types of faults

Fault
Type

Case 4

Case 3

RS Csae
RS Case 2
𝑓 (Ω)
1

Case 4.1
𝐼𝑐(A)

𝐼𝑐
𝐼𝑐
Case 4.1 Case 4.2
𝐼 𝐿(A)
(%) *
(%) *

Case 4.2

𝐼𝑚 (A) RS (A) 𝐼𝑐 (A) 𝐼𝑚 (A) RS (A) 𝐼𝑐(A) 𝐼𝑚 (A) RS (A)

2

32

12

20

12

32

45

12

32

27

12

32

23

95.65

17.39

4

22

10

10

12

22

33

12

22

25

12

22

23

43.47

8.69

1.8

30

10

15

15

30
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15

30
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15
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78.26
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3
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11

21
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4.5.3

Analysis on Sizing and Cost of the Supercapacitor

In order to accommodate for a worst case scenario of having the supercapacitor feed the
pulse load (Ppl =Vdc*Ipl =320*23=7.3Kw), as well as the fault current when the pulsed load
is turned on, the following criteria was taken into account when sizing the supercapacitor:
The energy supplied by supercapacitor is calculated using the following equation:
𝐸 = 𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑚 ∗ 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥

(4.13)

Where 𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑚 is the nominal power that can be injected from the supercapacitor at the worst
case when the generators and fell cell are not operated and when the pulse load is turned
on during the fault at the point that is far from the supercapacitor between buses 5 and 6 in
Fig. 1, (𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑚 = 40𝐾𝑤). 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the time that the supercapacitor feeds the pulsed load
(𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 0.8 𝑆𝑒𝑐. ).
𝐸 = (40 𝑘𝑤 ∗ 0.8)/(60 ∗ 60) = 8.8 𝑊ℎ

(4.14)

According to reference [146], the capacitance of the supercapacitor is determined using
equation (14):
1
𝐸 = 𝐶 (𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑉min )2
2

(4.15)

Where Vmax is the maximum voltage of a supercapacitor bank during a pulse load and
Vmin is its minimum voltage.
1
8.8 = 𝐶 (314 − 311.5)2
2

(4.16)

𝐶 = 2.9𝐹

(4.17)

It can be noted that this capacitance can feed the fault when the pulsed load is turned on.
In order to give more analyses on the cost of the developed algorithm, the cost of the
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supercapacitor of this case is added and compared with the case of turning on the pulsed
load at the event of a fault.
The commercial price of the supercapacitor Model BMOD0058-E016-B02 manufactured
by Maxwell [147], is $122.25. The number of modules that are used are 20 modules. The
storage energy per module is 2.1 WH.
The cost of the supercapacitor is 122.25$ * 8.8/2.1=512.28$
When the pulsed load is turned off and a fault happens, the required power that can be
injected by the supercapacitor will decrease thus reducing its size and cost consequently.
𝐸 = (32.7 𝑘𝑤 ∗ 0.8)/(60 ∗ 60) = 7.3 𝑊ℎ

(4.18)

1
7.3 = 𝐶 (314 − 311.5)2
2

(4.19)

𝐶 = 2.3𝐹

(4.20)

The cost of the supercapacitor in this case is 122.25$ * 7.3/2.1=$424.96
Thus, the cost will be reduced by 17.04% and the capacitance of the supercapacitor will
also be reduced by 20.68% when the pulse load is turned off during the fault.
4.6

Summary
This chapter gave details on an adaptive protection scheme for AC microgrid

systems, which was capable of surviving communication failures by utilizing energy
storage devices. This was done using a supercapacitor bank in particular, to contribute
enough fault current when the protection relays fail to switch to lower settings. This chapter
also give a new design of an autonomous control algorithm for a supercapacitor’s AC/DC
converter capable of operating when the microgrid is in both grid-connected and islanded
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mode. It was shown that the converter’s single mode of operation eliminates the reliance
on the communicated control command signals to shift the controller between the
microgrid’s grid-connected and islanded modes of operation. In all simulated cases, the
system was able to maintain stable voltage and frequency levels even during extreme cases,
such as the occurrence of a fault during a peak pulse load period. Several types of faults
were simulated, and the results demonstrated the resiliency of the developed protection
algorithms against communication outages. It was also shown that, whenever possible, if
the pulse load is disconnected temporarily during the fault period, the supercapacitor will
feed only the fault current. Therefore, in these practical situations, no additional costs are
incurred in the system, as there will be no need to install larger supercapacitor banks than
those already present in the microgrid.
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Chapter 5 Utilization of Supercapacitors in Protection Schemes for Resiliency
against Communication Outages: A Case Study on Size and Cost Optimization
5.1

Introduction

Microgrids are gaining increasing attention as an important part of the smart grid due to
their numerous benefits and their ability to operate both in islanded and in grid-connected
modes [148]-[149]. While such a diverse deployment of microgrids provides some
important advantages, they introduce key challenges in terms of protection. Microgrids are
dynamic entities, where distributed generation, loads, and Energy Storage Devices are
constantly connected and disconnected [150]-[151].
For instance, adaptive protection techniques used for a microgrid rely on a stable
communication link to and from protective devices, at the PCC, to adjust the settings within
these corresponding devices for either a grid-connected or islanded mode of operation.
However, during communication outages or in the event of a cyberattack, relays’ settings
are not changed. Thus adaptive protection schemes are rendered unsuccessful. Due to their
fast response, supercapacitors, which are present in the microgrid to feed pulsed loads,
could also be utilized to enhance the resiliency of adaptive protection schemes against
communication outages. Proper sizing of the supercapacitors is therefore important in order
to maintain a stable system operation and the cost of the protection scheme.
This chapter presents a two-level optimization scheme for minimizing the supercapacitor
size along with optimizing its controllers’ parameters. The latter will lead to a reduction of
the supercapacitor fault current contribution and an increase in that of other AC resources
in the microgrid in the extreme case of having a fault occurring simultaneously with a
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pulsed load. It was also shown that the size of the supercapacitor can be reduced if the
pulsed load is temporary disconnected during the transient fault period. Simulation results
showed that the resulting supercapacitor size and the optimized controller parameters were
feeding enough fault currents for several types of faults in different locations and
minimizing the cost of the protection scheme.
In this chapter, an adaptive protection scheme for AC microgrids, which is capable of
surviving communication failures by the aid of supercapacitor is developed for enhancing
the resiliency of adaptive protection to communication outages. In the normal case, the
PCC senses a microgrid’s shift to the islanded mode and thus issues a control command to
the corresponding relays to shift their settings from high (which is between 6-7 times the
rated current value) to low (which is between 1.5-2.5 times the rated current value).
However, during communication outages, this process is not possible and thus relay
settings remain high in the islanded mode of operation [152].
Therefore in such situations, due to their fast responses, supercapacitor can be utilized to
contribute to the fault current and raise this current value to a level, which is sensed by the
high relay settings. However, attention must be paid as not to oversize the utilized
supercapacitor and therefore incur additional costs on the overall system. As such, this
chapter extends our previous chapter by proposing a two-level optimization scheme for
minimizing the supercapacitor size along with optimizing its controllers’ parameters to
reduce its fault current contribution and increase that of other AC resources in the
microgrid. In order to ensure that the optimization process will converge to a sufficient
supercapacitor size, this chapter addresses the extreme case where a three-phase-to-ground
fault occurs during the turn-on period of a pulsed load. The work in this chapter also shows,
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in a case study, that the size of the supercapacitor can be reduced if the pulsed load is
temporarily disconnected during the transient fault period. All investigated cases, in
simulation, showed that the optimization process did indeed reduce both the size and the
cost of the supercapacitor bank, as well as maintain stable system operation.
5.2

Hybrid AC/DC microgrid description
Figure 5.1 shows the topology of the hybrid AC/DC microgrid under study. The

system has grid connection capabilities and contains two ac generators of 7.5 KVA, 60 HZ,
208 V and 1800 RPM synchronous machines coupled to individual induction motors as
prime movers. A three-phase 7.5 KVA Δ/Yg transformer was implemented to feed the AC
microgrid with the required rated voltage. The system has a filter located between the
transformer and the AC microgrid to filter out the harmonics of the AC grid with the
inductance of 4 mH.
Another AC filter was added between the AC and DC parts of the microgrid to improve
the performance of converters 1 and 2 and reduce the harmonics of the AC microgrid as
well. The supercapacitor bank is 2.9 F with rated voltage of 320 V to feed a 12-Ω DC
resistive pulsed load. A DER is also used to inject current to the AC side and helps the
generators feed different loads that are connected with circuit breakers at this side.
Converter 1 that is connected between the supercapacitor and the AC side is used for
charging the supercapacitor in the normal operation. Also, the supercapacitor injects
current to the AC side during fault condition in the islanded mode of operation when the
communication is not available. Converter 2 is present to allow the DER to support the AC
sources in feeding various loads in the microgrid. A relay and circuit breaker is connected
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at each end of all transmission lines. CB_11 and CB_12 are connected at the terminals of
the DC sources and provide the ability to connect and disconnect these sources.
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Figure 5.1 Configuration of the microgrid under study.
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5.3

Developed Protection Algorithm
The logic algorithm of the relays during the different modes of operation under study,

namely grid connected mode, islanded mode with communication, and islanded mode with
loss of communication, is shown in Figure 5.2, and can be described in the following
equations.
Equation (5.1) gives the operation of the logic circuit of the relay at trigger high (I_TH)
that represents high settings, when the system operates at grid connected or at islanded
mode with communication failure.
𝐼𝑇𝐻 = {

1
0

(𝐼𝑓 ≥ 𝐼𝐺 + 𝐼𝑀 ) + (𝐼𝑓 ≥ 𝐼𝑆𝐶 + 𝐼𝑀 )
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

(5.1)

Where (𝐼𝑓 is the fault current, 𝐼𝐺 , 𝐼𝑀 and 𝐼𝑆𝐶 are the current contributions from the grid,
microgrid, and supercapacitor, respectively.
Equation (5.2) describes the logic of the relay at the islanded mode of operation when the
communication is available in the system.
In this case, the relay will produce (I_TL) and will be adjusted to low settings.
𝐼𝑇𝐿 = {

(𝐼𝑓 ≥ 𝐼𝑚 ) . 𝐼𝑐
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

1
0

(5.2)

where I_C is the communication signal issued from the PCC to the relay to adjust its
settings. As indicated in equation (5.3), the relay will send a trip signal to the circuit breaker
when either (I_TH) or (I_TL) is activated:

Trip signal = 𝐼𝑇𝐻 + 𝐼𝑇𝐿
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(5.3)
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Figure 5.2 The logic diagram of the relay.
5.4
5.4.1

Supercapacitors for Resiliency Enhancement
Supercapacitor Energy Storage

For a microgrid with only one type of energy storage, tasking it to assist in feeding the fault
is more complicated. First, a system which only contains a lead acid or lithium ion batteries
would be limited to their lifespans. In addition, these batteries are limited by excessive
operational currents and particularly temperature. The two most suitable devices, if
adequately sized, are the supercapacitor and flywheel, as they provide the greatest balance.
The flywheel energy storage provides the highest power density, but has a very high selfdischarge rate as a result of friction losses and low energy density. The response time is
very fast, limited only by the initial inertia required to start moving the rotating mass. For
the maintenance issue that is represented a big problem for the microgrid system,
supercapacitor and flywheel are the primarily devices and do not need periodic maintained.
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They offer a significant improvement in their capability to source high current as their
lifespans are much longer and they have low susceptibility to lifespan issues [153].
LA Battery

LI Battery

Energy

Energy

Power

Power

FW

SC

Energy

Energy

Power

Power

Figure 5.3 Energy Storage Performance Snapshot.
However, the supercapacitor has the best response time of the energy storage types and
their construction is chemical in nature, no reaction takes place. This helps to respond
extremely fast to a demand heavy current. The capacitance and energy density of a
supercapacitor are thousands of times larger than a conventional electrolytic capacitor. A
supercapacitor is known to have high power density, low internal resistance, and high life
cycle [153]. High power energy storage is commonly used in many systems such as
telecommunications, shipboard and spacecraft power systems. In these applications, there
are various types of loads that show high instantaneous power requirement but require a
relatively low average power. These types of loads are referred to as pulsed loads. The
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duration of such loads ranges typically from hundreds of milliseconds to seconds with
different power levels. These pulsed loads could be present on ship power systems, which
can be electrically treated as islanded microgrids as indicated in [154].
5.4.2

The Supercapacitor’s Sizing Process

A two-level optimization process for proper sizing of the supercapacitor in the system
under study is developed, as shown in Figure 5.4. In Level 1, the main objective is to reduce
the cost of the developed protection scheme by selecting the value of the supercapacitor.
In level 2, the main of objective of the optimization process is to minimize the
supercapacitor’s fault current contribution and maximize that of the distributed generators.
This is achieved by optimizing the associated frequency, AC voltage, and DC voltage
controllers. Figure 5.4 shows the block diagram of the three PI controllers regulating the
frequency, DC voltage and AC voltage of the system. As can be seen in Figure 5.4, the
error signals for the frequency and DC voltages (𝑓𝑒𝑟 and 𝑉𝑑𝑐_𝑒𝑟 )) are fed into the first and
second PI controllers with parameters 𝑘𝑝𝑓 , 𝑘𝑖𝑓 and 𝑘𝑝_𝑣𝑑𝑐 , 𝑘𝑖_𝑣𝑑𝑐 respectively.
These parameters are used to regulate the direct current component of the system (𝐼𝑑_𝑟 ),
which in its turn regulates the frequency and DC voltage of the supercapacitor bank. Using
the AC side frequency as a signature to the active power flow allows the supercapacitor to
supply large currents during the fault and contribute to the fault current during loss of
communication situations. The AC voltage error signal (𝑉𝑎𝑐_𝑒𝑟 )) is given as input to the
third PI controller with 𝑘𝑝_𝑣𝑎𝑐 and 𝑘𝑖_𝑣𝑎𝑐 parameters that used to regulate the quadratic
current component of the system 𝐼𝑞_𝑟 , and regulates the AC voltage.
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Based on the inverse Park transformation the reference three phase currents (𝐼𝑎_𝑟 ), 𝐼𝑏_𝑟 , and
𝐼𝑐_𝑟 ) are estimated from the dq0 rotating reference frame currents. The angle between the
two reference frames and the system frequency are estimated from three-phase Phase
Locked Loop block.
The abc reference currents are compared with the actual measured currents and applied to
the pulsed width modulation scheme to generate the switching signals of the inverter. The
hysteresis band current control is considered in this work because of its simplicity of
implementation and fast response current loop. It also doesn’t need any knowledge of the
load parameters.
The developed algorithm is an iterative one, which is also combined with PSO routine. On
the first level, the process first starts by selecting a set of possible values of capacitances,
Ci’s, such that 𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝐶𝑖 < 𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 , based on physical constraints of the microgrid under
study. A predefined 𝛥𝐶 = 0.2 𝐹 was selected in our analysis.
It’s worth noting that selecting ΔC requires a tradeoff between the optimizations accuracy
and the processing time. It was found that 𝛥𝐶 = 0.2 𝐹 was an adequate value that preserves
the optimization’s accuracy and does not incur excessive processing time. On the second
level, for every capacitance value, 𝐶𝑖 the PSO routine is started in order to optimize the
associated frequency, AC, and DC voltage controllers.
As mentioned earlier, the controllers in this work are PI controllers, and thus, the
parameters to be optimized are the 𝐾𝑝 ′𝑠 and 𝐾𝑖 ′𝑠 for each controller. For the PSO routine,
a search space is randomly generated by defining a population of varying combinations of
candidate 𝐾𝑝 ′𝑠 and 𝐾𝑖 ′𝑠 for the aforementioned controllers.
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In order to evaluate the fitness function, the PSO routine was interfaced with a Simulink
model of the power microgrid with its controllers to evaluate their response to the different
particles in the generated swarm and thus retrieve the capacitor’s current fault contribution.
The population generation process is bounded by a vector of LB and UB for each
controller. Proper definition of the lower and upper bounds is imperative for the success of
the optimization process. Table 5.1, shows the limits of the search space for the parameters
to be optimized. During the entire simulation, the solution of the optimization processes is
bounded by constraints on the system frequency, AC voltage, and DC voltage in order to
ensure stable operation of the microgrid. In fact, two set of constraints were imposed: one
during steady state (ss) operation and the other during the pulsed load and fault condition,
since the acceptable limits for these constraints are not the same at normal and abnormal
conditions as indicated in equations (5.4 to 5.9).
𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛1 < 𝑓𝑠𝑠 < 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥1

(5.4)

𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛2 < 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 < 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥12

(5.5)

𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑛1 < 𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑠𝑠 < 𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥1

(5.6)

𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑛2 < 𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 < 𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥2

(5.7)

𝑉𝑑𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑛1 < 𝑉𝑑𝑐𝑠𝑠 < 𝑉𝑑𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥1

(5.8)

𝑉𝑑𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑛2 < 𝑉𝑑𝑐𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 < 𝑉𝑑𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥2

(5.9)
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Table 5.1 Lower and Upper Bounds of Optimization Variables
Parameter

Lower Limit

Upper Limit

𝐶

1.5

2.7

Frequency 𝐾𝑝

10

80

Frequency 𝐾𝑖

80

140

AC Voltage 𝐾𝑝

10

50

AC Voltage 𝐾𝑖

100

150

DC Voltage 𝐾𝑝

10

40

DC Voltage 𝐾𝑖

80

160

[Cmin C2

Ci

Cmax]

1. Define Lower (LB) and Upper (UB) Bounds for Kp s and Ki s
2. Set constraints on system frequency, AC, and DC voltages to
ensure stable operation
3. Generate random swarm
4. Evaluate value of Ic for entire population
4.1 If (minimum Ic is reached & constraints are satisfied)||
max iterations reached, then exit
4.2 Else, update swarm velocities and positions and go to
step 4
5. Save Kp s and Ki s

Repeat the process for every value of C and select minimum
value of C from the predefined interval

Figure 5.4 The Combined iterative optimization process for supercapacitor sizing
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Figure 5.5 Converter control logic block diagram
5.5

Results and Discussion

In this section, multiple case studies were performed in order to investigate the
performance of the identified supercapacitor sizing algorithm. The system was first
simulated in islanded mode without communication during the extreme case of having a
three phase to ground fault and a pulsed load peak period. Next, the system was simulated
under the same conditions but using the optimized controller parameters that limits the
supercapacitors fault current contribution and the obtained supercapacitor size.
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Finally, the case where the pulsed load was temporarily disconnected from the system
during the transient fault period was investigated. The supercapacitor’s fault current
contribution along with the overall system stability was recorded and analyzed in what
follows.
5.5.1 Case I: Islanded Mode of Operation without Communication and During
Supercapacitor Discharging Period without optimization
A three-phase to ground fault (𝐹1 in Figure 5.1) has been applied in the transmission
line (𝑇𝐿1 ) at time t = 1.5 seconds, while the microgrid was in grid connected mode of
operation. As a result relay

1

will send a trip signal to circuit breaker 𝐶𝐵1 to isolate the

microgrid. The microgrid successfully shifted to a stable islanded mode by adjusting its
overall frequency back to the normal condition after the fault, as shown in Figure 5.6(a). A
small disturbance, within acceptable limits, in the output voltages of the sources (𝑉𝐺 , 𝑉𝑔1 ,
𝑉𝑔2 , 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑣1 and 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑣2 representing the voltages at busses 1, 4, 6, 3 and 5, respectively), is
noticed in Figure 5.6(b). Figure 5.6(c) and (d) show the supercapacitor-pulsed load
microgrid performance which exhibit stable performance during the islanding instant.
It can be seen from Figure 5.6(d) that during the charging of the supercapacitor, the
converter 1 allowed 4 Amps of current for the AC side to support the pulsed load.
Finally, Figure 5.6(e) and (f) indicate the minor change in the AC current at both sides of
transmission line 𝑇𝐿4 after fault F1. During the islanded operation, another three-phase-toground fault (F2) occurred at t = 4.5 seconds during the on-time of the pulsed load (i.e.
discharging of the supercapacitor) in the middle of transmission line 𝑇𝐿4 .
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Figure 5.6 System performance during fault at microgrid operation without
communication (a) frequency, (b) output voltage of each source, (c) supercapacitor DC
voltage, (d) supercapacitor current, and pulsed load current, and inverter1 current (e)
RMS current for R7, (f) RMS current for R8.
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Due to the assumption of the communication failure, relay

7

will not be able to switch

to the lower settings and the supercapacitor quickly contributed to the fault current while
still covering the pulsed load.
Figure 5.6(a) shows the microgrid frequency recovery after the fault incident. As it can
be noticed, the system is showing stable performance during and after the fault with
disturbances within the specified limits of microgrids operation. The sources voltages 𝑉𝑔2 ,
𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑣1 and 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑣2 dropped at the fault incident and recovered after clearing the fault, as shown
in Figure 5.6(b). As indicated in Figure 5.6(d), the maximum current drawn from the
supercapacitor in this case is 43 Amps which is required to feed the fault and the pulsed
load simultaneously. As shown in Figure 5.6(d), the current passing through the converter
1 during the normal operation was 4 Apms. However, this current increased to 20 Amps
during the fault period. Figure 5.6(e) shows that the fault current drastically increased from
5 Amps to 32 Amps. This resulted in relay

7

sensing the fault and sending trip signal to

𝐶𝐵7 to isolate the fault. Figure 5.6(f) shows the setting of

8

that tripped with the help of

𝐺1 to isolate the fault completely.
5.5.2 Case II: System Performance with Optimized Supercapacitor Size
In this case, the optimized frequency, AC, and DC voltages controllers were utilized
along with the obtained supercapacitor size of 2.5F (compared with the original 2.9F).
Figure 5.7(a) shows a stable system performance, with the new parameters, in terms of its
frequency during the first fault (𝐹1 ) to isolate the microgrid as well as during the second
fault (𝐹2 ). It can be noted that the drop of frequency during the second fault is less than the
drop without optimized parameters.
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Figure 5.7 System performance during fault at microgrid operation without
communication with optimized supercapacitor size (a) frequency, (b) output voltage of
each source, (c) supercapacitor DC voltage, (d) supercapacitor current, and pulsed load
current, (e) RMS current for R7. (f) RMS current for R8.
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Figure 5.7(b) shows that the drop in the sources’ voltages (𝑉𝐺 , 𝑉𝑔1 , 𝑉𝑔2 , 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑣1 and 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑣2 )
is within accepted limits during both faults. Figure 5.7(d) shows that the amount of current
that was injected by the supercapacitor is reduced to 38 Amps compared to 43 Amps in the
previous case. This plays a major role in reducing the size of the supercapacitor and thus
it’s cost as it will be shown in the next section.
Figure 5.7(e) shows that

7

reached its high setting value as a result of increasing the

amount of current from the AC side even during communication outages. It can be noted
that

8

was tripped to isolate the fault from the other terminal of 𝑇𝐿4 and removed the fault

completely from the system.
5.5.3 Case III: Disconnecting the pulsed load during the faulted period
Similar to the previous case, fault 𝐹2 occurred during the on-time period of the pulsed
load. It is noticed in Figure 5.8(a) that, due to communication failure, relay

7

will not

switch to the lower settings and the supercapacitor quickly contributed to the fault current.
However, in this case, the pulsed load was disconnected for a short period of time during
the fault in order to reduce the amount of current drawn from the supercapacitor which
reached a maximum of 27 Amps in this case.
To disconnect the pulsed load, the rate of change of the supercapacitor’s voltage was
monitored to detect a small notch in the DC voltage indicating the fault as shown in Figure
5.8(b) and (c).
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Figure 5.8 System performance during fault at microgrid operation without
communication (a) supercapacitor current, (b) supercapacitor DC voltage, (c) pulsed

Table 5.2 shows the operation of the system under several types of faults, applied on
different locations (𝑇𝐿4 and 𝑇𝐿5 ), for the initial supercapacitor value of 2.9F and the
optimized value 2.5F. For a three phase to ground fault (𝐹2 ) applied on 𝑇𝐿4 with fault
resistance 2Ω, it can be noted that at grid connected mode, the fault current reached 32
Amps that is more than 6 times the rated current which is 5 Amps. For islanded mode of
operation, when the communication is available and the relays can adjust its settings from
grid mode (6-7 times rated current) to the islanded mode (1.5-2.5 times rated current), the
relay

7

can send a trip signal to the circuit breaker and isolate the fault. During islanded
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mode without communication case, the maximum current drawn from the supercapacitor
for the initial case with rating 2.9F is 43 Amps which is required to feed the fault and the
pulsed load simultaneously. In this case, for complete isolation of the fault, G1 helped

8

to reach its setting which is 10 Amps. The length of the transmission lines are shown in
Table 5.3 and selected such that the sources in the microgrid are enough to help the relays
to isolate the fault taking into consideration the current losses due to the voltage drop.
However, under the same fault condition, the optimized supercapacitor value (2.5F) and
optimized controller parameters, the supercapacitor fault current contribution was 38
Amps. This current is less than the initial supercapacitor case (43 Amps) by 5 Amps, while
the contribution from AC microgrid increased to 19 Amps instead of 14 Amps in order to
reach to the settings of relay R7 and eventually clear the fault. Thus, the optimized
supercapacitor and controller’s values can compensate the amount of current that is
required to reach to the setting of the relay during discharging the supercapacitor and feed
the pulsed load. Similarly, in the case of a double-line-to-ground fault (BCG), the initial
supercapacitor and the optimized supercapacitor and controller’s values can be sufficient
to compensate the amount of current that is needed in islanded mode without
communication mode. The AC microgrid generating units were capable of feeing sufficient
fault current for fault detection in the case of a single-line-to-ground fault without the need
of the supercapacitor.
In this case, the supercapacitor can be used to feed only pulsed load. Also Table 5.2
shows the same fault conditions (𝐹3 ) that occurred on 𝑇𝐿5 to investigate the ability of the
supercapacitor of feeding the fault current for faults which occur distant from the location
of the supercapacitor.
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During the grid connected and islanded mode with communication, the fault current
setting of relays

9

and

10

were met without interference from the supercapacitor. For the

islanded mode without communication, the initial supercapacitor and the optimized one
were able to feed the fault current and the pulsed load simultaneously for the three phase
to ground and the double line to ground faults. The microgrid resources were enough to
feed the single line to ground faults.
Finally, the maximum contribution from the supercapacitor to feed the pulsed load
during a three-phase-to-ground fault is 45A in 𝑇𝐿5 . It can be noted that the pulsed load at
the DC side is supported by little contribution from AC side equivalent to 4 Amps, and
from supercapacitor by 23A. The output of supercapacitor which is injected to the AC side
is 22A. Therefore, 𝐶𝐵11 is adjusted at 24A.
Table 5.2 Several types of faults at different locations with the rating of supercapacitor
with and without optimization load current.
Relay
Islanded mode without Communication
Setting
Islanded mode
During Discharging Supercapacitor
During
with
Fault
Rf
RS
Grid
Communication
Type
(Ω)
Ic
Im
Mode
(A)
Ipl
TL4
TL5
(A)
R7 R9
R7
R9
R7 R9 R7 R9
R7 R8 R9 R10
ABCG 2
32 31
12
11
43 45 14 15 23 32 10 31 11
BCG 1.8 30 25
10
9
41 42 15 13 23 30 9 25 10
AG
0.1 18 16
8
7
23 23 19 17 23 18 7 16
8
Table 5.3 Lines parameters
TL
Line 1
Line 2
Line 3
Line 4

Length
10 km
8 km
8 km
6 km

R (Ω/km)
2.24
1.41
1.41
2.24

L (mH/km)
0.430
0.357
0.357
0.430

Line 5

6 km

2.24

0.430
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5.6

Impact of Reduced Sizing of the Cost of the Supercapacitor Bank

During energy utilization of a supercapacitor bank, its terminal voltage will vary with
time. So, the total energy (𝐸1 ) that can be delivered by the supercapacitor can be expressed
by:
𝐸1 = 1⁄2 𝐶 (𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 )2

(5.10)

Where 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum voltage of a supercapacitor bank during the pulsed load and
𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 is its minimum voltage. In the developed hybrid DC microgrid, the maximum
acceptable variation of the DC bus voltage is limited to ±5%.
In order to evaluate the economic benefits of the developed optimization method, a
financial estimation of the supercapacitor cost is performed. The commercial price of the
supercapacitor Model BMOD0058-E016-B02 manufactured by Maxwell, is 122.25$.
Table 5.4 shows the optimization results of the cost of the supercapacitor bank, where (𝐸2 )
is the stored energy per module, (𝐸1 /𝐸2 ) represents the approximate number of required
modules.
For the case of the fault on 𝑇𝐿4 , it can be noted from the table that the sizing and cost of
supercapacitor bank is reduced from 2.9F to 2.5F and the total cost is reduced from
$12.155k to $10.47k as a result of the optimization process. Also, in the case where pulsed
load was temporarily disconnected during the fault, the supercapacitor’s cost was reduced
from $12.155k to $6.339k. However, a slightly larger supercapacitor bank was needed for
the case of a fault on 𝑇𝐿5 . The initial cost was $13.8k and was reduced after the
optimization process to $11.5k. For the case of the temporary disconnection of the
supercapacitor, the price increase was negligible.
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Table 5.4 Cost estimation of the supercapacitor bank
E1

E2

TL

E1/E2

Price (k$)

TL

TL

C

4

5

---

4

5

4

5

2.9

208.8

237.5

2.1

99.42

113.1

12.1

13.8

2.5

180

198.4

2.1

85.71

94.5

10.4

11.5

1.8

108.9

110.8

2.1

51.85

52.8

6.3

6.4

Henceforth, the developed sizing algorithm along with optimizing the corresponding
controller parameters is suitable feasible and produced excellent results. It is shown that
the size and cost of the supercapacitor were minimized, while the system is still meeting
the protection and safe operation requirements. This is very beneficial when the system has
pulsed loads as these types of loads do not tolerate any interruption during their turned on
period. It is important to mention here, that the other identified solution of temporarily
disconnecting the pulsed load is suitable for noncritical pulsed loads.
5.7

Summary

This chapter develops two solutions for reducing the size and cost of supercapacitors that
are used to compensate for the low-islanded microgrid fault currents during communication
outages in adaptive protection schemes. First, for critical pulsed loads, a two-level
optimization scheme is presented. In the first level, the goal is to reduce the developed
protection scheme’s cost by selecting the minimal value of the supercapacitor that
maintains the system’s stable operation. In level 2, the main of objective is to minimize the
supercapacitor’s fault current contribution and maximize that of the distributed generators.
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The optimized size of the supercapacitor and the associated controllers parameters were
investigated under several types of faults in different location in simulation. The results
show the ability of the optimized supercapacitor rating to feed different types of faults in
order to raise the fault current to the high relay settings and maintain stable system
operation during communication outages. Also, the supercapacitor proved effective for
faults occurring in distant locations in the microgrid. Finally, temporary disconnection of
pulsed loads during the transient fault period proved effective for non-critical pulsed loads
as a solution to avoid utilization of oversized supercapacitors.
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Chapter 6 Investigation of Protection Strategy for Microgrid System using Lithium-Ion
Battery during Islanding
Microgrid protection schemes require a fast, reliable and robust communication
system, to adjust relay settings for the appropriate current levels according to the
microgrid’s operation mode. However, risks of communication link failures and cyber
security threats are major challenges for the implementation of protection scheme. This
chapter presents a co-simulation platform for microgrid based on MAS when the
communication is available in the system. IEC 61850 is used to emulate the developed
protection scheme. The DDS middleware is used to link between the hardware and
software environments. During islanded mode, the system is capable of riding-through
communication failures by the aid of a lithium ion battery. When the communication is
attacked, the battery plays an important role and contribute to the fault current for helping
the circuit breaker to trip during islanded mode. The design of the control algorithm for
the battery’s AC/DC converter is developed with single mode operation to eliminate the
reliance on communicated control command signals to shift the controller between
different modes.
6.1

Introduction

The microgrid is represents a new method of generation and delivery power that contains
converter interfaced DERs and loads, energy storage devices, along with traditional
rotating machines and DGs. Microgrids can operate in islanded mode or grid-connected
mode. One of the main advantages of the microgrids is that it could be fed the loads during
islanded mode of operation as shown in Figure 6.1. The main challenge of microgrid
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systems is to design an appropriate scheme for protection in different modes of operation.
Another problem for the protection of the microgrid is the dynamic change of the
configurations in the system [155].
Several research works have addressed adaptive protection scheme using extensive
communication to deal with these problems. However the fault current may be significantly
smaller in islanded mode of operation as the contribution of the different DERs is limited.
As a result, the protection scheme of the system should be designed to be adaptive to shift
between the different levels of the short circuit current for both modes of operation. The
protection techniques for microgrids are using the communication network, local
measurements, or external devices [156].
The communication networks are used to update the relay settings according to the
configuration of the system based on the status of DERs (on/off) during the operation. One
of the main challenges in designing an adequate protection scheme for microgrids is the
ability to integrate cyber and physical systems to update the configuration of the system.
Several co-simulation platforms have been discussed to address this concept. In [157], the
author used Simulink and Om-net++ to integrate between the dynamic behavior of the
physical system and their communication signals. In [158], the authors introduced cosimulation module that linked between OpenDDS and Network Simulator NS2.
MATLAB’s SimPowerSystems and SimEvents toolboxes were used to represent the cosimulation platform of a low voltage grid based on IEC 61850 in [159].
It can be noted that the previous work presented a vision of how to integrate the physical
and cyber components together in power system. However, these works were not
implemented the simulation packages over a real communication network.
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This chapter introduces a protection scheme for microgrid to isolate the fault at different
modes of operation when the communication is available or attacked. A co-simulation
platform was installed to validate the concept of using MAS to isolate the fault properly,
in case of availability of the real communication architecture. In the event of a physical
cyber-attack or loss of communication, a protection scheme would be paralyzed where
relays will no longer be capable in adjusting OC limits.
Assuming a physical cyber-attack or communication loss has taken place, relays will now
require a much larger full load current setting (high setting) to trip in islanded mode. The
developed technique used the installed ion batteries with the help of converter to inject
current and raise the fault current to the high relay settings.
The battery is used to feed the pulsed load, which means that the developed method does
not add cost to the protection algorithm. It is also worth noting here that the design of the
developed controller for the battery’s AC/DC converter is capable of operating when the
microgrid is in both grid-connected and islanded mode. Utilizing a single mode of
operation for the converter will eliminate the reliance on communicated control command
signals to shift the controller between different modes. The system, as will be detailed later
in the chapter, is also designed to maintain stable voltage and frequency levels.
8.9

System Description

The microgrid under study can be shown in Figure 6.2. It consists of two generators, the
primary source of the DER is represented a renewable energy (e.g., photovoltaic source).
The battery is connected at DC side to feed the pulsed load. A transformer is used to supply
the AC microgrid with the required rated voltage. Two AC filters are used to connect
between the AC and DC sides and reduce the harmonics of the AC microgrid.
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Grid

Load 1
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DG1
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Figure 6.1 Distributed network system.
A bidirectional converter with the battery to allow it to inject current when the
communication is not available in the system. F_1 is applied to the system in order to
isolate the microgrid from the grid, then another fault F_2, is applied on the islanded
microgrid to investigate its performance with and without communication. The AC side
also feeds the pulsed load in normal operation when the battery is out of service. DER
supplies different loads in the AC side using a unidirectional AC/DC converter in cases
where the grid is disconnected from the system and a fault is applied at the AC microgrid.
This results in the disconnection of one or more generation units. Specifications of the
system components are summarized in Table 6.1. A MAS is defined as a collection of
autonomous computational entities (agents), which can be effective in broad applications
performing tasks based on goals in an environment that can be difficult to define
analytically. Agents are high-level autonomous software abstractions. MAS are distributed
and coupled networks of intelligent software agents working in coordination for a global
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goal. The focus of this chapter will be on protection of transmission lines in the system
using a multi-agent framework.

Figure 6.2 Configuration of microgrid.
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Table 6.1 System component parameters
Component

Generators 1,2

Transformer

Parameter

Specification

𝑆𝑁

7.5 KVA

𝑉𝑁

208 V

𝐹𝑁

60 Hz

XL(pu)

1.305

Connection

Δ/Yg

𝑆𝑁

7.5 KVA

𝑉𝑁

208 V

𝑒𝑞,

Lithium Ion Battery

AC filters 1,2

Transmission Line

Converters 1,2

8.9

𝑋𝑒𝑞

0.72 Ω, 2.29 mH

Number of cells

12

Nominal voltage

320

Rated capacity

110 Ah

𝐿𝐴𝐹

12 mH

𝑟1, 𝑟0

0.0015 Ω/Km, 0.03 Ω/Km

𝑙1, 𝑙0

0.03 mH/Km, 0.1 mH/Km

𝑐1, 𝑐0

3 nF/Km, 2nF/Km

𝑠

1e5 Ω

𝑜𝑛

1e-3 Ω

Suggested Multi Agent Information System

Three agents can be used in this chapter for that application as shown in Figure 6.3. A
description of the communication between the agents of the system can be shown as
follow:-
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Central Agent (CA): Operates as a manager of the system and located at PCC. This agent
communicates with the different sources in the system (Utility, Generastor1, Generator2,
DER) to determine the contribution of each source to the fault current at grid connected
mode of operation and islanded mode when the communication is available.

TL2

CB3

TL4

TL3

CB5

CB4

ZA11

CB6

CB7

ZA12

TL5

CB9

CB8

ZA21

SA1

CB10

ZA22

SA2

CA

Utility

Generator 1

Generator 2

Figure 6.3 Multi Agent Platform.
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DER

Section Agent (SA): It can communicate with the central agent to determine the value of
the short circuit current to the fault location. During grid connected mode, the fault will be
fed by high short circuit current. For the islanded mode of operation and the communication
is not attacked, the fault will be fed by low current.
Zone Agent (ZA): This agent receives the signal of the current value from the SA to adjust
the relay settings according to the configuration of the system.
It can be noted here that the associate zone will send a trip signal to the circuit breakers
at both sides of the unhealthy transmission line to isolate the fault from the system.
8.9

Developed Mutli-Agent Platform

This section explains the integration of the cyber and physical layers of the developed
protection scheme.
8.7.3

DDS

In this work, DDS is a protocol for data centric communication middleware from OMG
[160]. The DDS is selected by SGIP [161] and for OpenFMB implementation [162] to help
the smart grid to perform the interoperability that is defined as the capability of two or
more networks, systems, devices, applications, or components to share and readily use
information securely and effectively with little or no inconvenience to the user.
The DDS utilizes RTPS mechanism without a message broker scheme which simplifies
the communication between different nodes [163]. The DDS is data centric middleware
which helps to maintain the focus on the algorithm and control development rather than
being concerning with communication and data delivery issues.
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The utilization of RTPS as a wire transfer protocol insures the interoperability between
different vendors.
For flexible integration with different application DDS provides a standard
application programming interface API for support C, C++, Java and .NET. DDS provide
reliable peer to peer communication for control agents by avoiding message broker.
The DDS sets the quality of service profiles which enable full control and
predictable communication performance for each data type. Unlike other communication
schemes which apply QoS policy on the all stream, DDS apply QoS for each individual
data type. This feature helps to achieve a predictable network behavior and meets different
communication requirements. The QoS policy defines a different set of rules that controls
how the data is sent and handled.
8.7.3

Modeling the data in the system

Data Availability: This rule controls the availability of the data for a lately joined
subscriber and can be set to a volatile or non-volatile option. It sets to volatile, when any
publisher publishes or updates any data.
Then, all current subscribers receive the updated data at the instance of update. Any
subscriber who joins the network after the update instance will not be able to receive the
last update.
The non-volatile data option forces the DDS infrastructure to make the data available for a
lately joined subscriber by storing a local copy of the data. The volatile data option is
suitable for periodic data stream, such as voltage measurement.
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On the other hand, nonvolatile data is suitable for tracking system statues such as circuit
breaker and topology configuration.
Life Span: This rule defines how long the old data will be valid. The infrastructure
automatically removes the old non-volatile data which exceeds the defined life span. This
QoS rule ensures that the control application does not interact based on old invalid data.
Latency Budget: This rule allows defining the priority for the latency sensitive data. The
data with a low latency budget is sent ahead of the data with a higher latency budget.
8.7.3

The Developed Software-Hardware Infrastructure

To validate the developed technique, a co-simulation platform was implemented for
an IEC 61850 protocol based protection scheme for microgrid. The microgrid
configuration that is shown in Figure 6.2, was modeled on Simulink MATLAB and the
suggested protection algorithm was installed on physical IED’s. DDS is used to link
between the hardware and software environments.
In order to link between the physical merging units and IED’s and the simulated model,
DDS gateways were implemented at each transmission line. The merging units received
the three phase current signals from each terminal of the transmission line and transform
them into IEC 61850 SMV messages over Ethernet network.
According to the protection algorithm. ZA sends a GOOSE message to each circuit breaker
that is located at each end of the transmission line.
This would isolate the fault from the system at abnormal conditions as shown in Figure
6.4. The merging between DDS and IEC 61850 GOOSE and SMV messages was coded
in C with the help of the open source library of IEC 61850 and DDS API from RTI. IDL
file is created that contained the measured values and passing through the
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publisher/subscriber code generator from RTI. The generated code is then interfaced with
routines available from libIEC61850.
The developed codes were downloaded on Odroid C2 SBCs running a real-time Linux
kernel. In addition, the automatic code generation for publishers/subscribers based on the
data models defined by XML file (to identify the QoS for each application) and/or IDL
files simplifies the integration with different data types for other protocols utilized by
different IED and remote units’ vendors.

G
Generation
/Load node

IG
CB

G

Generation
/Load node

IG
R

IG

TL
Fault

MU

R

CB

CB

IG
MU
SMV

SMV
ZA
GOOSE

GOOSE

.Figure 6.4 IEC 61850 Messages to Perform the Protection Scheme.

8.9

Protection Scheme Description

The flow chart of the developed protection scheme is shown in Figure 6.5. At grid
connected mode and during the normal operation, the battery and AC loads can be fed from
the grid, while the pulsed load is supplied mainly from the battery (I_b) with little
contribution from grid (I_G). When the fault takes place at microgrid, the relay will send
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a trip signal to the circuit breaker when (I_f ≥ I_G +I_m) and clear the fault from the
system. If the fault occurred at PCC, the relay will isolate the fault and the mode of
operation changes to be islanded.
The communication network between the main control which located at PCC and the relays
plays an important role to identify the relay setting level. When the communication is not
available, due to denial of service for example, the relay remains at high settings. In this
case and when the fault occurs, the battery can inject high current to the relay and isolate
the fault when (I_f ≥ I_m+I_b).
The stability of the system is tested to ensure the frequency and the voltages at AC and DC
sides are changed within accepted values. When the communication is available, the relay
can update its settings to lower settings and the fault is cleared at (I_f ≥I_m). In this case,
the battery can be charged from DERs and the pulsed load can be fed from battery and the
generators.
The frequency is measured to check the status of microgrid (grid/islanded) to change the
relay settings accordingly.
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Figure 6.5 Flowchart of the Developed Protection Algorithm

125

8.9
8.7.3

Control of Battery-Based Microgrid
Lithium Ion Batteries

Lithium ion battery usage has surged in recent years not only in portable electronics, but
also in large scale electric vehicles and even grid storage. Advanced lithium ion battery
management systems have been demonstrated in microgrid applications for both islanded
and grid-connected modes to provide voltage and frequency support. Lithium ion energy
storage has been utilized in a wide range of applications, ranging from a few kilowatt hours
in residential applications such as rooftop photovoltaic arrays to multi megawatts for grid
ancillary services such as frequency regulation and spinning reserve. The anode in lithium
ion batteries is made of graphitic carbon while different lithiated metal oxides such as
LiCoO2 and LiMO2 can be used as a cathode. When the battery is charged, the cathode is
turned into lithium ions and move through the lithium salts electrolyte toward the anode
where they combine with external electrons.
This combined with a smaller cell construction allow them to respond faster to a pulsed
load which in turn, would also make them suitable in feeding a fault current. Lithium ion
batteries have a very high energy density, fast response, and long cyclic life. These
advantages led lithium ion batteries to be widely used in portable electronic devices and
considered as promising devices in electric and hybrid vehicles. However, the main
challenges for their large scale utilization are the high cost due to the requirements of
special packaging and internal overcharge protection circuits. These needs are essential to
ensure the chemical and mechanical long term reliabilities of lithium ion battery
technologies.

126

8.7.3

AC/DC Converter for Battery

During islanded operation mode, the frequency and AC voltage and DC voltage are
changed. The bidirectional AC/DC inverter is used to regulate the active and reactive
power by controlling the I𝑑 and I𝑞 , respectively.
The control scheme for the bidirectional AC/DC inverter is shown in Figure 6.6. Twoloop controllers are applied for frequency and DC voltage.
These parameters are used to regulate the direct current component of the system (I𝑑 ),
which in its turn regulates the frequency and DC voltage of the battery.
Using the AC side frequency as a signature to the active power flow allows the battery
to supply large currents during the fault and contribute to the fault current.
To control the voltage amplitude, the error between the measured voltage amplitude and
the reference voltage amplitude is sent to a PI controller to generate (I𝑞 ) reference.
Equations (6.1) and (6.2) shows the AC side voltage equations of the bidirectional
AC/DC inverter in 𝑎𝑏𝑐 and 𝑑𝑞 coordinates, respectively, where (𝑉𝑎 , 𝑉𝑏 , 𝑉𝑐 ) are the ac-side
voltages of the inverter, and (𝐸𝑎 , 𝐸𝑏 , 𝐸𝑐 ) are the voltages of the ac bus. (Δ𝑎 , Δ𝑏 , Δ𝑐 ) are the
adjusting signals after the Proportional-integral controller (PI) controller in the currentcontrol loop.
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Figure 6.6 Autonomous AC/DC Converter Controller

8.9
8.7.3

Case Studies
Case 1:- Grid Connected Mode of Operation

In this case a three-phase to ground fault (𝐹2 in Figure 6.2) has been applied in the
transmission line between busses 3 and 4 while the microgrid was in grid connected mode
of operation. The system performance during this fault is indicated in Figure 6.7 and the
fault occurred at t = 6 seconds. Linking modules at both ends of the transmission line 3
reads the current measurements and publishes them as DDS messages. Two physical
merging units are subscribing to the published currents from each end of the transmission
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line. From this point, the actual IEC 61850 process bus is implemented. These merging
units publish the measured current values as SMV packets at a 4,800 Hz publishing rate as
set by IEC 61850 for 60 Hz systems. ZA12, which has the protection logic implemented
within it, will then subscribe to these SMV message and issue a GOOSE message when
the fault current is more than 6 times the rated AC current (drastically increased from 5
Amps to 32 Amps) to control the status of CB5 and CB6 in the simulated microgrid model
as shown in Figure 6.7(h). The system frequency was restored to be within the accepted
limit after the circuit breakers (CB5 and CB6) opened in response to a GOOSE trip message
sent by ZA12. As can be appreciated from the results, the microcontrollers were able to
sense, locate, and send trip commands to isolate the fault in the simulated model in a timely
manner based on feedback measurements sent to the controllers through the linking
modules. Similarly, the simulation model received the correct trip commands from the
controllers through the linking modules and opened the appropriate circuit breakers to clear
the fault. The cyber part of the system, which was exchanging SMV and GOOSE messages
over an Ethernet network, was successfully integrated with the simulation software, in real
time. This was recording the dynamics of the system in response to the control actions.
This also verifies the ability of the developed framework to accurately capture the relation
between the cyber information flow and the physical information flow in power systems.
In this case, the utility helped to maintain the system’s frequency stable during and after
the fault, as shown in Figure 6.7(a). A small disturbance, within acceptable limits, in the
output voltages of the sources (𝑉𝐺 , 𝑉𝑔1 , 𝑉𝑔2 , 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑣1 and 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑣2 representing the voltages at
busses 1, 4, 6, 3 and 5, respectively).
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Figure 6.7 System performance during fault at grid connected mode of operation (a)
frequency, (b) output voltage of each source, (c) output current of each source, (d) battery
current, inverter1 current, and pulsed load current, (e) battery DC voltage, (f) three-phase
current in the faulted transmission line, (g) RMS current in the faulted transmission line,
and (h) Tripping signal of CBs 5, 6.
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Figure 6.7(c) shows a spike in 𝐼𝐺 (grid current) due to the fault with a small contribution
from other sources (𝐼𝑔1 , 𝐼𝑔2 , 𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑣1 and 𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑣2 ) representing the currents of generators 1, 2 and
output currents of inverters 1, 2 respectively.
Figure 6.7(d) shows the pulsed load (𝐼 𝐿 ), battery (𝐼𝑏 ), and inverter (𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑣1 ) currents. During
the off-time pulsed load, the battery will be charging from the AC side, whereas during the
on-time pulsed load the battery will be the major feeder to the pulsed load, as indicated in
Figure 6.7(d). The AC side will still be present to feed the pulsed load in case the battery
went out of service. Figure 6.7 (e) shows the DC voltage of the battery changes within
accepted range ±5% of the rated voltage (320V). Figure 6.7(f) and (g) show the high fault
current values of 32 Amps which is mainly being contributed to by the grid.
8.7.3

Case 2:- Islanded Mode of Operation with Communication

In this situation, a three-phase-to-ground fault (fault F_1 in Figure 6.2) occurred at time t
= 1.5 seconds, in the transmission line connecting the main grid to the microgrid under
study. As a result, relay R_1 will send a trip signal to circuit breaker CB_1 to isolate the
microgrid. The microgrid successfully shifted to a stable islanded mode by adjusting its
overall frequency back to the normal condition after fault, as shown in Figure 6.8(a). A
small disturbance, within acceptable limits, in the output voltages of the sources (V_G,
V_g1, V_g2, V_inv1 and V_inv2), is noticed in Figure 6.8(b). Figure 6.8(c) shows a spike
in I_G due to the fault and this current drops to zero after clearing the fault by disconnecting
the microgrid.
An increase in the generator’s currents (I_g1 and I_g2) is noticed in order to compensate
for the current which was previously supplied mainly by the grid.
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Figure 6.8(d) and (e) show the battery-pulsed load microgrid performance parameters
which the exhibit stable performance during the islanding instant. Finally, Figure 6.8(f)
and (g) indicate the minor change in the AC current at transmission line connecting busses
3 and 4 after the fault. During the islanded operation, another three-phase-to-ground fault
occurred at t = 6 seconds, at zone12. Based on the available communication infrastructure
in the system that send the currents of the sources to CA which forward this value to SA12
as the fault is located at the upper section of the system. Then ZA12 sent a GOOSE message
to CBs 5 and 6 to trip them, relay R_5 settings is adjusted to the lower setting and thus was
capable of detecting the fault and tripping CB_5 accordingly. Figure 6.8(a) shows the
microgrid frequency recovery after the fault incident. As it can be noticed, the system is
showing stable performance during and after the fault with disturbances within the
specified limits of microgrids operation. The sources voltages V_g2, V_inv1 and V_inv2
dropped at the fault incident and recovered after clearing the fault, as shown in Figure
6.8(b).
After the fault was cleared, Figure 6.8(c) shows that I_g1 dropped to zero since generator
G_1 was isolated from the system. Current I_g2 increased to feed the loads accordingly. It
can be noticed in Figure 6.8(d) and (e) that the battery was not used to feed the fault current
due to the adaptation process for R_5 setting to its lower setting. Figure 6.8(f) and (g) show
that the AC current in transmission line where fault F_2 occurred increased significantly
from 5 to 12 A during the fault instance.
It can be noticed also, that fault current level is less than that appeared in the grid connected
mode (32 A) as was discussed earlier.
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Figure 6.8 System performance during fault at microgrid operation with communication
(a) frequency, (b) output voltage of each source, (c) output current of each source, (d)
battery current, inverter1 current, and pulsed load current, (e) battery DC voltage, (f)
three-phase current in the faulted transmission line, and (g) RMS current in the faulted
transmission line
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Figure 6.9 System performance during fault at microgrid operation without
communication (a) frequency, (b) output voltage of each source, (c) output current of
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Here the communication infrastructure between the agents was attacked due to DoS. In this
case, fault 𝐹2 occurred during the off-time of the pulsed load. Due to the assumption of the
communication failure, relay

5

will not be able to switch to the lower settings. In this

case, as shown in Figure 6.9(d), the battery compensate the fault current until it reach to
the higher setting of the relay (32 A) as indicated in Figure 6.9(f) and (g).
It can be found a small notch in the DC voltage indicating the fault at AC side as shown
in Figure 6.9(e). This resulted in relay R_5 sensing the fault and thus isolating it
accordingly. After clearing the faulted region the system restored and shows stable
performance as indicated in Figure 6.9 (a), (b) and (c).
8.9

Summary
This chapter presented the developed a co-simulation platform to integrate between

the physical-cyber components of a hybrid AC/DC microgrid. The simulated model was
interfaced with merging units and microcontrollers over an IEC 61850-based protection
scheme. DDS was utilized as a link between the different protocols, hardware, software
parts and facilitating the interoperability in the system. The suggested infrastructure used
a lithium ion battery to contribute enough fault current for the protection relays to reach
it’s settings during the islanded mode operation when the communication was not available
due to DoS attack. Design of an autonomous control algorithm for the battery’s AC/DC
converter, which is capable of operating using a single mode for the dynamic operation of
the microgrid. It was shown that the converter’s single mode of operation eliminates the
reliance on communicated command signals requesting a shift by the controller between
the microgrid’s grid-connected and islanded modes of operation. In all study cases, the
system was able to maintain stable voltage and frequency levels.
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Chapter 7 A Multi-Agent Based Technique for Fault Location, Isolation and Service
Restoration
This chapter gives details on the development of a communication-assisted fault
localization, isolation and restoration method for microgrids based on MAS. The developed
system comprises distributed agents, located in the middle and at the two ends of a
protection section, which will detect a fault through phase angle comparison of current
signals at both sides of a given distribution line. The agents then send a trip signal to the
corresponding circuit breakers accordingly. The importance of the developed protection
technique is twofold: first, it eliminates the use of voltage transformers and thus reduces
costs. Second, it does not require transfer of data along long distances which decreases the
delay time for fault isolation. Power restoration processes following the fault clearance
considering voltage, frequency and power flow constraints in the microgrid under study
was also performed.
7.1

Introduction
Communication-assisted microgrid protection schemes are becoming an important

research area due to the complex and changing architecture of the contemporary microgrid
resulting from dynamically connecting and disconnecting different types of DGs and loads.
Thus, it is important to find a suitable communication-assisted protection method between
transducers and agents in order to obtain updated fault current values and increase the
reliability of the system.
In [164] the authors introduced modeling of a relay and different types of DGs that can
be used in a microgrid network. This system can be used to monitor a microgrid over
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communication lines and react to dynamic changes of the grid. While such a diverse
deployment of microgrids provide important advantages, it possesses key challenges as
well. Such systems depend on a MCPU that features complex communication unit due to
the different signals from many components in the network, in order to determine the relay
that must operate to isolate the fault section from the network.
The authors in [165] developes a protection technique to improve the coordination
process of the relay. The relay communicates with DGs and equipment agents in order to
obtain a successful coordination. The system was tested by applying it to an agent-based
JADE platform.
Multi-agent technology is a powerful new technique for use in many distributed
protection systems due to its autonomous, cooperative, and proactive nature. One is based
on the use of regional central control; the second uses a regional decentralized peer-to-peer
negotiating model in which there are no control centers [166].This work advocates the
regional decentralized negotiation approach implemented using agent groups in the
microgrid.
The conventional schemes that are used to protect the transmission line face a lot of
challenges. The traditional protection techniques use the phasor components of voltage and
current to trip circuit breakers. However, these techniques can be affected by the problems
of fault resistance and short circuit lines [167].
Current differential line protection schemes have been widely used for detecting and
isolating fault sections. However, the operation of these algorithms is based on identifying
the vector difference value between the measured currents at both sides of a transmission
line. This requires high communication channels bandwidth and thus increases the cost of
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communication channels [168]. Also, with the high penetration of distributed generations
that are connected through power converters, the short circuit current at different nodes of
the microgrid will be close to the nominal current. This leads to a significant source of error
for conventional overcurrent protection.
Therefore, a malfunction of these algorithms based on current magnitude measurements is
expected to happen due to the difficult task of detecting the branch under fault [169].
The literature shows that the phase differential protection method serves as a better
option for transmission line protection due to its simplicity, sensitivity, selectivity and
comprehensibility [170]. The work in [166] developes a pilot protection scheme based on
the phase jump measured in the current waveform during fault conditions. At each node,
the phase jump is registered and used locally to detect changes in the current direction. The
change in current direction is determined by the difference between the pre-fault and fault
current phase angles. The communication channel requirement and cost of communication
equipment can be reduced by considering the phase angle comparison of the positive
sequence component of line currents. This leads to an increase in sensitivity and security
of the relay or the combination of positive and negative sequence components to give
robust discrimination to all types of faults. However, these techniques cannot determine
the faulty phase [171].
Complementary to protection, self-healing schemes have been studied in distribution
networks. In [172], the authors developed a technique that used a decentralized
management and control scheme for distributed microgrids by MAS to achieve resilient
self-healing and allow microgrid agents to successfully transition from normal operations
to an emergency condition and back again, when conditions have resolved the power
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systems. The work in [173] presented a fast FLISR algorithm, which can significantly
reduce outage time at the customers’ end.
A significant disadvantage to the formal is that they are centralized approaches and
depend on a huge amount of data exchange, requiring high communication capabilities and
exhaustive computation powers to accomplish power restoration.
Accordingly, this chapter presents a distributed protection technique to locate and
determine fault types on distribution lines, which addresses the shortcomings of centralized
and resource intensive communication requirements in the surveyed literature.
The main idea behind this work is that the phase angle of the currents of each of the three
phases at both terminals of each section in the network is measured using PMU and is
communicated to Section Agents (SA) that located in the middle of each section. SAs then
calculate the phase angle differences and send trip signal to the circuit breakers (CBs) that
are connected at the two ends of the distribution line in case of abnormal operation.
It can be noted here that not all PMUs measure the vector of voltage and current. Some
types of PMUs like FNET (Frequency monitoring Network) measures only the voltage
component [174].
The FNET/Grid Eye system is currently operated by the Power Information Technology
Laboratory at the University of Tennessee (UTK) in Knoxville, TN and Oak Ridge
National Laboratory (ORNL) in Oak Ridge, TN. It is possible to design a PMU that only
measures the current signal. This means eliminating the voltage measurement which would
allow for a low cost PMU.
The advantages of the developed method are:
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• The sole dependency on current measurements thus reducing overall costs by eliminating
the use of the voltage transducers;
• Current differential protection using a pilot scheme is applied widely on distributed lines
as the main protection. Vector difference between the measured currents at the two ends
of the transmission line is used for the operation of most current differential relays [168].
The length of the line that can be protected by the pilot wire differential protection is
limited by the effect of resistance and capacitance of the pilot wire [175].
The developed technique presented the phase angle of the current signals to be exchanged
between the middle and two ends of the distributed line.
This means that the communication channels are reduced from 12 to only 6 channels,
which reflects on the cost of the protection technique. Also, transferring the data to the
middle of the transmission line would limit the effect of resistance and capacitance of the
wire;
• Minimized communication delays for fault isolation, as this technique depends on
transferring data between two ends of the distribution line and a SA located at the middle
length of the line;
• Stable phase comparison techniques by the use of numerical relays and time
synchronized measurements which are communicated to relays (synchronization needs
to be implement only on SA instead of on the two relays at both sides of each section);
• Protective devices of microgrid are not expected to trip the healthy phases during
unbalanced short-circuit. Thus, some utilities and relay manufactures have started
contemplating single and double pole tripping for distribution systems [176].
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This scheme is able to distinguish the faulty phase reliability and significantly improves
the speed of relaying without sacrificing security and enhance the stability;
• Power restoration process: As a result of isolating the fault, some DGs will disconnect
from the network and cause loss of power to some loads.
In order to maintain the reliability of the system, a power sharing operation must be
applied to feed these loads through the communications between MAS without the need
of supervision from a central point.
8.9

Microgrid Configuration and MAS Framework

The microgrid under study is shown in Figure 7.1. The system consists of two circuits, each
having 4-nodes and 2 DGs. DG1 is a 13.8 KVA, 208 V, 60 HZ, and the others are modeled
with ratings of 10 KVA, 208 V, 60 HZ. The four loads have a 14.5 Ampere current ratings.
Each circuit has one Restoration Agent (RA) and comprises three sections having one SA,
two PMUs and two circuit breakers (CBs).
CB is connected between the two circuits and is normally closed to satisfy the
synchronization conditions between the generators and enable power flow among the
circuits in case of abnormal operation at any section in the system.
A MAS is defined as a collection of autonomous computational entities (agents), which
can be effective in broad applications performing tasks based on goals in an environment
that can be difficult to define analytically [177].
Agents are high-level autonomous software abstractions. MAS are distributed and coupled
networks of intelligent software agents working in coordination for a global goal.
The focus of this chapter will be on the protection of a distributed line and the restoration
of the system using a multi-agent framework.
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Four types of agents can be used in this chapter: Load Agents (LA), Section Agents (SA),
Restoration Agents (RA) and Generator Agents (GA). A description of the communication
between the agents of the system can be shown as follow:Load Agent (LA): Determine the parameters of voltage, current, frequency, active and
reactive power of the connected loads, and transfers these values to other agents to restore
the power in case of applying fault in the network.
Section Agent (SA): This agent is located in the middle length of each section. According
to the phase angle comparison of currents between both sides of the section, it will send a
trip signal to the circuit breakers and isolate the fault section.
Restoration Agent (RA): Operates as a manager of the circuit and can communicates with
SAs in the same circuit in order to verify the connection and disconnection areas in the
circuit and communicates with other RAs in another circuits to restore the power for the
loads.
Generator Agents (GA): Communicates with the RA and determine different parameters
of the generator (active and reactive power) to verify the ability to feed the loads in case of
applying fault in the system.
Figure 7.2 shows the operation of the developed protection technique. A description of
the steps that follow for the protection scheme of the system are as follows:-
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Figure 7.1 The suggested microgrid configuration
Step-I. At normal operation, the current flows in the same direction at both nodes I and
j of the distributed line.
After the fault occurred, the current reveres its direction at one side to feed the fault.
PMUs at both ends measures the phase angle current signals and forward these values to
SA that located at the middle of the protected section.
Step-II. SA receives the data from each side and determine the difference between the
phase angles at both ends.
Step-III. If the difference exceeds the threshold value, then SA sends a trip signal to the
circuit breakers at both sides of the distributed line.
Figure 7.3 shows the operation of the restoration process. A description of the steps that
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follow for the restoration are as follows:Step-I. After isolating the fault section from the system as explained in the previous part,
LA receives the values of active and reactive power of the load and forward these values
to RA.
Step-II. GA receives the amount of capacity of the generator (𝑃𝐷𝐺 , 𝑄𝐷𝐺 ) and forwards
these values to RA.
Step-III. RA determine the required power to feed the loads of the system after isolating
the fault and send a message to the generators to supply the loads.
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Figure 7.2 Operation of the developed protection scheme
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8.9

Developed Fault localization Method

The three phase current angle signals at the sending and receiving terminals of each
section are measured using PMUs. These measurements are forwarded to SAs. The current
at each node is passed to the PMUs at each side of the protected section to obtain the current
phase angles (𝜑𝑎 , 𝜑𝑏 , 𝜑𝑐 ). At each terminal, the current phase angle (𝜑𝑎 ) is shifted by
120° from the current phase angle (𝜑𝑏 ) and 240° from the current phase angle (𝜑𝑐 ). For
both sides of the section, the phase angle of each terminal (𝜑𝑎 , 𝜑𝑏 , 𝜑𝑐 ) is compared to the
′

′

′

phase angle of the other terminal (𝜑 𝑎 , 𝜑𝑏 , 𝜑 𝑐 ), respectively.
The difference between the phases can be determined as follows:

′

′ ′

𝜑𝑎,𝑏,𝑐 = ∑[𝜑𝑎,𝑏,𝑐 (𝑗) − 𝜑 𝑎 ,𝑏 ,𝑐 (𝑗)]

(7.1)

𝑗=1

where,
𝜑𝑎,𝑏,𝑐
𝑗

phase angle difference between the starting and ending terminals
of each section;
index;
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𝜑𝑎,𝑏,𝑐 (𝑗)
′

′ ′

𝜑 𝑎 ,𝑏 ,𝑐 (𝑗)

phase angle current of phases A, B and C at the sending
terminal;
phase angle current of phases A, B and C at the receiving
terminal.

According to the difference 𝜑𝑎,𝑏,𝑐 , the location and type of the fault can be determined.
For normal operation:
𝑎,𝑏,𝑐
𝜑𝑎,𝑏,𝑐 ≈ 𝜑𝑝𝑟𝑒

For abnormal operation:
𝑎,𝑏,𝑐
𝜑𝑎,𝑏,𝑐 ≫ 𝜑𝑝𝑟𝑒

(7.2)
(7.3)

where “pre” refers to the values in the previous cycle.
The SA of the fault section sends trip signals to both circuit breakers that are located at
both sides of this section to isolate the fault from the system.
8.9

Developed Restoration Method

Power restoration is defined as the capability of a system to automatically detect and
recover functionality when faced with a single or multiple events. For a power system, this
definition is somewhat refined to include the rapid identification of problems, actions to
minimize any adverse impacts from casualties, and the prompt recovery of the system to a
stable operating state. During restoration, a series of reconfigurations may take place to
improve the overall system condition involving breaker manipulations and generation
startup or shutdown. Two factors appear to have influenced the recent research direction.
First, conglomerating communication, sensory, and control functions in a central manner
allows decisions to be made with a global perspective. While it is cumbersome to centralize
these functions, this facilitates are the most complete information for decision-making.
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The second factor that may have discouraged development of capable distributed multiagent systems is their difficulty. However, decentralizing decision-making has unique
attributes that make it attractive from a resiliency perspective; chiefly because it can avoid
the scenario where corruption or failure of the central supervisory node leads to total
system collapse [178]. For any system, this definition is somewhat refined to include some
constraints in terms of keeping the system stable following the restoration process. The
following section explains these constraints with the suggested algorithm to restore the
power for the connected loads using MAS.
Mathematically, the restoration problem is formulated as an objective function satisfying
the system constraints as indicated in the following conditions:
•

Power limit
𝑃𝐷𝐺 ≥ 𝑃𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 + 𝑃𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠

(7.4)

𝑄𝐷𝐺 ≥ 𝑄𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 + 𝑄𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠

(7.5)

where 𝑃𝐷𝐺 and 𝑄𝐷𝐺 are the generated active and reactive power of the DGs within the
microgrid, 𝑃𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 and 𝑄𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 are the load active and reactive power, and 𝑃𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 and 𝑄𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 are
the active and reactive power losses in lines. As indicated in equations 7.4 and 7.5,
generated active and reactive power must supply demand power as shown in Figure 7.4
[179].
•

For power line current limits, the maximum current capacity of lines must be lower to

prevent overloading [180].
𝐼𝑖 ≤ 𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥
where I (current) is the load current at node i
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(7.6)

•

Voltage limit

The system must always be within the allowed limits [181].
𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑉𝑖 ≤ 𝑉max
•

(7.7)

Frequency limit

The system frequency must always be within the allowed limits [182].
𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑓 ≤ 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥
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Figure 7.4 Logic Diagram of Circuit agent 2 (CA2)
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(7.8)
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Figure 7.5 Flowchart of the developed protection and restoration algorithm
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8.9

Simulation Results

8.7.3

Fault Location, Identification and Isolation Case Study

A single line to ground fault is simulated on phase A, through a 0.5 Ω fault resistance at
t = 1.5 seconds on the middle of section 13. The three phase current angle signals at the
′

′

′

starting side (𝜑𝑎 , 𝜑𝑏 , 𝜑𝑐 ) and at the ending side (𝜑 𝑎 , 𝜑𝑏 , 𝜑 𝑐 ) are measured at section 13
using PMU15 and PMU16.
The angle of phase A at each side of section 13 is shifted by 120° (2π/3 Rad) from phase
B and 240° (2π/3 Rad) from phase C as shown in Figure 7.6(a), (b) and (c). Deviation phase
angles for phases A, B and C for the distribution line at both sides of section 13 are shown
in Figure 7.6(d). It can be found that the deviation of phase angle A is greater than the
threshold value that is 20°. On the other hand, the deviation phase angle of phases B and C
is less than the threshold value. This means that the fault is a single line to ground fault and
is located at section 13.
SA13 sends a trip signal to CB15 and CB16 that are connected at each end of section 13
to isolate the fault as shown in Figure 7.6(e).
The phase angle of the three phase current signals are measured using PMU13 and
PMU14 at both ends of section 12 during the three phase to ground fault in the middle of
this section as shown in Figure 7.6(a), (b) and (c).
The deviation of phase angle for phases A, B and C is greater than the threshold value
as shown in Figure 7.6(d).This means that the fault is a three phase to ground fault and
located in section 2. SA12 sent trip signals to both CB13 and CB14 at both ends of section
12 as shown in Figure 7.6(e).
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The current signals at the sending and receiving ends of section 13 are also measured
during single line to ground fault on the middle of section 12 as shown in Fig. 4(a), (b) and
(c). The deviation signals for phases A, B, C are shown in Fig. 4(d). The deviation signals
for phases A, B, and C are less than threshold value. This means that the fault is external
to section 13. Therefore, SA 13 does not send a trip signal to the CB5 and CB6 that are
connected on both ends of section 13, as shown in Fig. 4(e).
The three phase current signals are measured at both ends of section 13 for a double line
to ground fault on phases B and C on the middle of this section. The phase angles at both
sides of section 13 are determined as shown in Fig. 5(a), (b) and (c). The deviation phase
angles of Phases B and C are greater than the threshold value while the deviation phase
angle of phase A is less than threshold value as shown in Fig. 5(d). SA13 sends a trip signal
to CB5 and CB6 at both ends of section 13, but they fail to clear the fault, as shown in Fig.
5(e). After 200 ms the backup breakers, CB4 and CBG2, are activated to isolate the fault
from the system, as shown in Fig. 5(f).
The phase angle of the three phase current signals are measured using PMU13 and
PMU14 at both ends of section 12 during the three phase to ground fault in the middle of
this section as shown in Fig. 6(a), (b) and (c).
The deviation of phase angle for phases A, B and C is greater than the threshold value
as shown in Fig. 6(d).
This means that the fault is a three phase to ground fault and located in section 2. SA12
sent trip signals to both CB13 and CB14 at both ends of section 12 as shown in Fig. 6(e).
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8.7.3

Power Restoration Case Study

To demonstrate the capability of the suggested microgrid to restore all the loads, a single
line to ground fault was applied in section 13.
Using the communication between the SA13, PMU15 and PMU16, the fault can be
detected and isolated from the system.
Thus, DG2 gets disconnected from the network scheme by opening the circuit breakers
at this section, which affects the required power supplied to loads 1 and 2 in this circuit.
The following explanation is applied to restore power for the connected loads. L1 (is
considered as current and voltage transducers connected to merging unit) communicates
with LA1 (is assumed to be physical IED communication unit) and sends the values [14.5,
60, 5200, 500] which represented [Load current 1, Frequency, Active power 1, Reactive
power 1], respectively.
Similar loading information is sent from [L2, L3, and L4] to [LA2, LA3, LA4] as shown
in messages 2, 3 and 4 in Figure 7.11. LA3 and LA4 forwarded the values of L3 and L4
which are [14.5, 14.5], respectively to RA1.
Also, RA2 received messages from LA2 and LA1 with the pre fault information of L1,
L2 as seen in messages 7 and 8. DG1 sent the value of its current which is 21 Ampere to
RA1. The same messages are sent from DG2, DG3 and DG4 to GA2, GA3 and GA4 as
indicated in messages 10, 11, and 12. RA1 communicated with GA3, GA4 to verify the
status of DG3, DG4, and receives the data from GA1, GA2 to investigate about the
available current of DG1, DG2 to supply L3 and L4 in case of disconnecting DG3 or DG4.
Similar data is passed to RA2 from different generator agents as shown in messages 17,
18, 19 and 20. RA2 is informed that DG2 is disconnected, and the output capacity of DG1,
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DG3 and DG4, which are [21-20-20], that represented [Current of Distributed Generator
1- Current of Distributed Generator 3- Current of Distributed Generator 4], is enough to
supply the connected loads 1, 2, 3 and 4. RA2 sends signals to DG1, DG2 and DG4 in
order to supply the loads as shown in messages 21, 22, 23 and 24 as seen in Figure 7.11. A
similar decision is taken from RA1 in case of a disconnected DG3 or DG4.
Figure 7.12(a), (b), (c) and (d) shows the three phase currents of all DGs in the microgrid.
It can be noted that the current signal of DG1 is increased from 16 A to 21 A. DG3, DG4
are increased from 15 A to 20 A in order to compensate the power losses of disconnecting
DG2.
Upon comparison of Figure 7.13(a), (b) with Figure 7.13(c), (d) which show the load
currents of 1, 2 and 3, 4 respectively, a higher effect and a faster restoration time can be
noted on the former.
After isolating the fault and disconnecting DG2 from the system, loads 1, 2 and 3, 4 were
restored after 1.55s and 1.75s respectively.
When a fault occurs in section 12, isolating it from the system using the communication
between the SA12, PMU13 and PMU14.
As explained in section II, for circuit one the loads 1 and 2 will be supplied by DGs 1
and 2 respectively.
Generator 3 and 4 will be able to feed the loads 3 and 4 in circuit 2. In this case, we do
not need to increase the current from generators, in such a way that the two circuits works
independent from each other.
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Figure 7.11 Trace of messages between agents for full service restoration.
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Figure 7.12 The three phase current of DGs during single line to ground fault in the
middle of section 13. (a) Current of DG1, (b) Current of DG2, (c) Current of DG3, (d)
Current of DG4.
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Figure 7.13 The three phase current of the loads during single line to ground fault in the
middle of section 13
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8.9

Summary
This chapter developed a new distribution line protection methodology utilizing

contemporary communication technologies between multi-agents. This technique studied
the variation of the phase angle current at both ends of the distribution line to accurate
identify and isolate the faulted section in the system. This method did not need voltage
transformers and improved the pilot protection scheme. Communication between multi
agents was used to restore power for different loads in the system by changing the
configuration of the system to maintain its reliability.
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Chapter 8 A Multiagent System for Overcurrent Protection of Microgrids with
Distributed Generation
The fault current level is different in grid connected and islanded microgrid fault cases for
the same relay. Also, the complex architecture of the contemporary microgrid resulting
from dynamically connecting and disconnecting DGs is representing serious problems to
protect the system. This chapter presents a co-simulation platform for a microgrid based
on MAS utilizing a supercapacitor bank to enhance the resiliency of the protection scheme.
The simulation software, embedded microcontrollers, and a real communication
architecture collectively perform the protection scheme platform. DDS middleware is used
to link the hardware and software environments. This method does not need to change the
relay settings at different configurations of the microgrid. The developed solution does not
incur additional costs to the system studied, as the supercapacitor is already used to feed a
pulsed load. The chapter also developes a coordination process between the relays with the
help of the supercapacitor. Primary and back-up protection were studied according to IEEE
Std C37.112 to isolate the fault properly. This chapter details the fault current that supplied
by any DG to any point inside the network. The results showed that the co-simulation
infrastructure introduces a high dependability design, analysis, and testing environment for
cyber and physical data flow in the system.
8.1

Introduction

Microgrids help in reducing the dependability on conventional generation, thus reducing
the emission of greenhouse gases, local energy availability, and good service quality. The
renewed interest in distributed generation has resulted in a significant penetration of DGs
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in microgrids [165]. One of the major advantages of higher DG penetration is the
possibility of operating the distribution system in an islanded mode. The configuration and
the number of DG units in a microgrid continually vary depending on the presence or
outage of DG units or the installation of new ones [166]. Also, some types of DG units
such as solar have an intermitting nature. These kinds of microgrids have a special impact
on power flow, voltage regulation, and frequency variation of the network. Microgrids
introduce a number of challenges in the protection scheme, fault level, and relay
coordination due to the dynamic change of their configuration [168].
This chapter developes a technique of protection for the microgrid to avoid changing the
relay settings when the system is connected at different modes of operation to minimize
the communication delays for fault isolation using the co-simulation platform that contains
simulation soft wares, embedded microcontrollers, and a real communication architecture.
During the islanded mode of operation, we will keep the relay at a high setting and raise
the current level using the supercapacitor.
The developed solution does not add cost to the protection scheme as the supercapacitor
was already used to feed pulsed load at the DC side. This chapter also introduces the
coordination between the primary and back-up protective elements with the help of the
supercapacitor at the islanded mode of operation.
It is also worth noting here that the design of the developed controller for the
supercapacitor’s AC/DC converter is capable of operating when the microgrid is in both
grid-connected and islanded modes. The study of how to calculate the new fault currents
and fault levels for any change occurring in the system is performed in this chapter.

164

8.9

Microgrid Application System

Figure 8.1 shows the configuration of the microgrid that is used to investigate the
developed protection scheme, and the specification of each component can be shown in
Tables 8.1, and 8.2. It can be found that the system consists of inverter-based DER to help
the other generators feed several loads, which were composed of ten levels of parallel
resistive loads from 0 to 3 kW in steps of 300 W and power factor 0.85 at nominal voltage.
[2 × 72 Ω + 4 × 144 Ω in each phase] resistance models.
Supercapacitor is connected to the system through the bidirectional converter and filter.
The construction of the supercapacitor is chemical in nature; no reaction takes place.
This enables them to respond extremely quickly to a demand, while even under heavy
current, their lifetime is virtually unaffected. Moreover, their response time in feeding the
required power would be excellent.
A MAS is defined as a collection of autonomous computational entities (agents), which
can be effective in broad applications performing tasks based on goals in an environment
that can be difficult to define analytically.
Agents are high-level autonomous software abstractions. MAS are distributed and
coupled networks of intelligent software agents working in coordination for a global goal.
The focus of this chapter will be on the protection of transmission lines in the system using
a MAS framework.
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Figure 8.1 Microgrid configuration under study.
Table 8.1 Transmission Lines Parameters
TL

Length

R (Ω/km)

L (mH/km)

Line 1

10 km

2.24

0.430

Line 2

10 km

1.41

0.357

Line 3

6 km

1.41

0.357

Line 4

8 km

2.24

0.430

Line 5

6 km

2.24

0.430
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Table 8.2 Specifications of the components
Component

Generators 1,2

Supercapacitor
Bank

Bidirectional
inverter 1

Parameter

Specification

Apparent Power

7.5 kva

Nominal Voltage

208 V

Stator Leakage Reactance (XL)

1.305 pu

d-axis Synchronous Reactance (Xd)

2.21 pu

q-axis Synchronous Reactance (Xq)

1.1 pu

d-axis Transient Time Constant (Td’)

0.014 s

Frequency (Hz)

60 Hz

Number of cells

20

Nominal voltage

320

Rated capacity

2.9 F

𝑆𝐶

2.1e-3 Ω

Leakage Current

5.2e-3 A

Surge Voltage

340 V

Operating Temperature

25 Celsius

𝑠

1e5 Ω

𝑜𝑛

1e-3 Ω

Switching Frequency

5 KHz

Pulsed Load

𝑃𝐿

1.66 KW

DER

𝑆𝑅

4.5 KVA

Load 1,2,3,4

𝐿1 , 𝐿2, , 𝐿3 , 𝐿4

900, 600, 900, 300 W
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Five agents can be used in this chapter for that application. A description of the
communication between the agents of the system can be shown as follows:Main Agent (MA): Operates as a manager of the circuit and communicates with other
agents to determine the contribution of each source to the fault current.
Utility Agent (UA): It can communicate with the utility to determine the value of the short
circuit current to the fault location. During grid connected mode, the fault will be fed by a
high short circuit current. This level of current is sent to the main agent to identify the
required current to isolate the fault.
Generator Agent (GA): This agent determines the contribution of the current from each
generator during the fault.
Distributed Energy Resource Agent (DERA): The function of this agent is to identify the
status of this source (on/off) and send the fault current value to the main agent.
Super-Capacitor Agent (SCA): This agent is located on the DC side to determine the
capability of the supercapacitor to feed the fault during the islanded mode of operation and
compensate the difference in the current between grid-connected and islanded modes of
operation.
8.9

AC/DC Bidirectional Converter Control

During grid-connected mode, the variation of the AC voltage and frequency values can
be ignored, as the ac side can be assumed as an infinite bus. Therefore, the bidirectional
ac/dc converter only needs to regulate the dc-bus voltage. Reference I𝑞 is set to be 0 to
obtain the unity power factor. Thus, the controller only needs to control the I𝑑 , which
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controls the active power flow through the converter. The control block diagram for a
bidirectional ac/dc converter in a grid-connected mode is shown in Figure 8.2. A two-loop
controller is used to regulate the dc-bus voltage. Based on the error between the dc-bus
reference voltage and measured voltage, the outer voltage control loop generates the I𝑑
reference, which is used to regulate I𝑑 in the bidirectional converter. In 𝑑𝑞 coordinates, I𝑑
is controlled to regulate the active power flow through the inverter, and I𝑞 is controlled to
regulate the reactive power flow through the inverter. On the ac side, the active and reactive
power flow will influence the frequency and voltage amplitude, respectively [188]. During
the islanded operation mode, the frequency, ac voltage and dc voltage are changed. The
bidirectional ac/dc inverter is used to regulate the active and reactive power by controlling
the I𝑑 and I𝑞 , respectively. The control scheme for the bidirectional AC/DC inverter is
shown in Figure 8.3. Two-loop controllers are applied for frequency and dc voltage. These
parameters are used to regulate the I𝑑 , which in its turn regulates the frequency and dc
voltage of the supercapacitor bank. Using the ac side frequency as a signature to the active
power flow allows the supercapacitor to supply large currents during the fault and
contribute to the fault current. To control the voltage amplitude, the error between the
measured voltage amplitude and the reference voltage amplitude is sent to a 𝑃𝐼 controller
to generate (I𝑞 ) reference. Equations (8.1) and (8.2) show the AC side voltage equations of
the bidirectional AC/DC inverter in 𝑎𝑏𝑐 and 𝑑𝑞 coordinates, respectively, where (𝑉𝑎 , 𝑉𝑏 ,
𝑉𝑐 ) are the ac-side voltages of the inverter, and (𝐸𝑎 , 𝐸𝑏 , 𝐸𝑐 ) are the voltages of the ac bus.
(Δ𝑎 , Δ𝑏 , Δ𝑐 ) are the adjusting signals after the PI controller in the current-control loop. The
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control scheme is considered in this work because of its simplicity of implementation and
fast response current loop.
𝑑 𝑖𝑎
𝐿𝑎𝑐 [𝑖𝑏 ] +
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Figure 8.2. Control block diagram for the converter in a grid connected mode.
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Figure 8.3 Control block diagram for the converter in an islanded mode.
8.9

Formulation of the Protection Coordination Problem

If the primary and back-up relay currents for a given fault are known, their operational
characteristics can be calculated by:-

𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 =

𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑢𝑝 =

𝐴
𝐼𝑓 𝑝
[(𝐼𝑟 ) − 1
𝐴
𝐼𝑓 𝑝
[(𝐼𝑟 ) − 1

+ 𝐵 × 𝑇𝐷𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦

(8.3)

]

+ 𝐵 × 𝑇𝐷𝑆𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑢𝑝
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]

(8.4)

Where A, B, and P are constants that represent the inverse, very inverse, and extremely
inverse types of over current relay (OCR), respectively. They can be selected based on the
related IEEE standard [189]. The values of these constants are shown in Table 8.3.
𝑇𝐷𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 and 𝑇𝐷𝑆𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑢𝑝 are considered for the coordination of the primary and backup relays.
CTI is defined as:𝐶𝑇𝐼 = 𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑢𝑝 − 𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦

(8.5)

To realize relay coordination, 𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑢𝑝 should be greater than 𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 . The acceptable
range for CTI is normally a value between o.2 and 0.7 s. The fault current seen by primary
and back-up relays changes in case of installation of a new DER unit or the presence of a
DER unit with an intermittent nature such as solar. Therefore, tuning the OCRs and their
coordination will be lost. For setting the relays, the fault level of the network with DG
should be calculated, as shown in the next section. The time dial setting of each relay is
designed in such a way that the upstream relay will provide a backup function for the
downstream relay. Figure 8.1 shows a microgrid, during islanded mode of operation. It is
assumed that the currents that flows in TL2 and TL3 are the currents seen by relays R2 and
R3, respectively, for a fault in the transmission line 2. R2 picks up at 50 ms (instantaneous
pickup) to clear the fault. If it fails, then R3 picks up at 150ms for the current in TL3. This
will give enough time for the instantaneous pickup setting of R2 to pick up and the
corresponding circuit breaker to open to clear the fault. If both R2 and R3 fail to pick up,
then R6 will pick up at 250 ms to clear the fault from the system. Other relays are similarly
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designed. The time dial setting and pickup current for the individual relays in Figure 8.1
are given in Table 8.3.
Table 8.3 Inverse-Time overcurrent relay parameters
Parameter

Value

Remark

TD1

0.07 s

Time Dial setting of R2

TD2

0.05 s

Time Dial setting of R3

TD3

0.06 s

Time Dial setting of R4, R5

TD4

0.03 s

Time Dial setting of R6, R7

A

3.922

Characteristic parameter

B

0.0982

Characteristic parameter

P

2

Characteristic parameter

𝐼𝑟

5.34 A

Rated Current
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The controller performance was validated through simulation on MATLAB/Simulink.
Multiple simulation cases were performed to show the validity of the developed controller.
8.7.3

Calculation of DGs Fault Current

Fault currents supplied by DGs were approximated to 5 times their rated currents whilst
fault currents from PE-interfaced DGs were approximated to about 1.5 times their rated
current. Then, for a given relay “r” in the network, the operating current is calculated, as
in (8.6). This equation considers the grid’s and all DGs’ fault contribution, including the
supercapacitor on that particular relay:I𝑟 = 𝐼𝑓_𝐺 + 𝐼𝑓_𝐷𝐺 + 𝐼𝑓_𝐷𝐸𝑅 + 𝐼𝑆𝐶

(8.6)

The contribution of the fault grid is calculated, as shown in Figure 8.4, by taking the
Thevenin equivalent of the electric network, as in traditional fault current calculations:

𝐼𝑓𝐺 =

𝑉𝑡ℎ
𝑍𝑡ℎ

(8.7)

Therefore, in the above equation. 𝑉𝑡ℎ is a constant value while 𝑍𝑡ℎ is a function of
distance, i.e., 𝑍𝑡ℎ (𝑥) . In this case, the fault grid contribution also becomes a function of
the distance and can be defined as:-

𝐼𝑓𝐺 =

𝑉𝑡ℎ
× 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒
𝑍𝑡ℎ(𝑥)
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(8.8)

Grid
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R5
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Load

DG

DG

Load

IF_G
Zth

Point X

Vth

F

Figure 8.4 Thevenin equivalent circuit taken from point X.
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If the microgrid is operating in islanded mode, then the grid’s fault contribution will be
multiplied by the “Operating Mode” bit, which will be equal to 0.
𝑛

𝐼𝑓_𝐷𝐺 = 𝐴𝑣.× (5 × ∑
𝑖=1
𝑚

𝐼𝑓_𝑥
𝐼𝐹𝑀_𝐷𝐺

(8.9)

𝐼𝑟𝐷𝐺 × 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝐷𝐺 )

𝐼𝑓_𝐷𝐸𝑅 = (1.5 × ∑ 𝐼𝑟𝐷𝐸𝑅 × 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝐷𝐸𝑅 )

(8.10)

𝑗=1

The signal Status indicates whether that source is in operation or not. Depending on the
type of the source, i.e., whether it is inverter interfaced or with rotating machines. In the
literature, the fault contribution of the Inverter interfaced DGs is reported to be between
1.2 and 2 [190]. In order to be practical and more realistic, authors selected the coefﬁcient
1.5 since the extreme conditions (where the fault contribution is 1.2 or 2) will not occur as
frequently as conditions which require the fault contribution coefﬁcient to be 1.5.
In this case, it considers a capacitor in series with a resistance. The SC model input is the
power PSC absorbed/injected from/to the SC [191]. The SC current is defined as follows:-

𝐼𝑠𝑐 =
8.9

𝑄𝑠𝑐 /𝐶𝑠𝑐 √(𝑄𝑠𝑐 /𝐶𝑠𝑐 )2 − 4 ×
−
2 × 𝑠𝑐
2 × 𝑠𝑐

𝑠𝑐

× 𝑃𝑠𝑐

(8.11)

Communication Infrastructure of Protection for the Microgrid

In this work, the DDS is a standard for data-centric communication middleware from the
OMG. The DDS is selected by SGIP and for open FMB implementation. The DDS utilizes
the RTPS mechanism without a message broker scheme, which simplifies the
communication between different nodes. The DDS is data-centric middleware, which helps
to maintain the focus on the algorithm and control development rather than being

176

concerned with the communication and data delivery issues. The utilization of RTPS as
wire transfer protocol insures the interoperability between different vendors. For flexible
integration with different applications, DDS provides standard Application Programming
Interface (API) for support C, C++, Java and .NET. DDS provides reliable peer-to-peer
communication for control agents by avoiding a message broker. The DDS reach sets
quality of service profiles, which enable full control and predictable communication
performance for each data type. Unlike other communication schemes, which applies
Quality of Service (QoS) policy on the all streams, DDS applies QoS for each individual
data type. This feature helps to achieve a predictable network behavior and meet different
communication requirements. The QoS policy defines a different set of rules that controls
how the data is sent and handled [192].
For this chapter, the simulation model needs to be created to link the components of the
co-simulation framework. Then, the measurement points and the DDS gateways should be
identified. The Interface Definition Language (IDL) file is used to organize the data
structures. In order to identify the quality of service for each application, an XML file is
created. For the cyber part, the communication protocol and communication language are
identified for the hardware devices. The data mapping table should be developed to manage
the interpretation between the data structures of the DDS gateways and the protocol of the
hardware devices. DDS domain is used to link the communication software with the
hardware devices. That domain creates different topics to link the components of the
system. The hardware devices are; Odroid C2 from Hard kernel manufacturer embedded
microcontrollers that have the ARM® Cortex®-A53 1.5GHz processor and are running on
a real-time Linux Kernel. Also, a dedicated Ethernet switch was used during the study.
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Figure 9.5 shows the block diagram that links the cyber and physical layers. It consists
of the two generators, DER, supercapacitor bank and utility. The cyber layer is composed
of a two-level hierarchy of agents. The lower cyber layer consists of 5 agents, which are
responsible for calculating the required current to trip the circuit breaker at an abnormal
condition, whereas the upper cyber layer is composed of a Main Agent (MA), which is
responsible for gathering the current from the different sources and keeping the
coordination between the relays. A communication layer links the physical and cyber layers
together through a Global Data Space, which contains four topics: current, frequency,
voltage and ON/off States. A DDS gateway is created for every source of the simulated
microgrid. On one hand, these gateways will collect and publish the necessary input for the
hardware agents.
On the other hand, they will subscribe to the commands issued by the hardware agents
and execute them on the simulated microgrid. The main agent receives the frequency signal
from the PCC (point of common coupling) access point that links the microgrid to the
utility to identify the mode of operation. During the grid connected mode of operation, the
main agent receives the required current to trip the circuit breaker from Utility Agent (UA).
For the islanded mode of operation, the different sources of the microgrid send their
contribution currents to the main agent. According to the Equations (9.9-9.11) the main
agent calculates the required current to isolate the fault from the system and asks the
Supercapacitor Agent (SCA) to compensate the difference and trip the circuit breaker.
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Figure 8.5 DDS network and microgrid logical control hierarchy.
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Cyber Layer

Data Writer Data Reader

The main agent updates the statues of each source during the operation to adjust the
required current from the supercapacitor to inject the required current. Also, the main agent
receives the voltage signals from the different sources to ensure that the system is stable
after isolating the fault. As it will be seen from the results of this study, the developed
framework was successful in providing a smooth link between a multi-agent
hardware/software infrastructure and the simulated power system. Through this link, the
effect of the control logic, which was implemented in C++, was tested, and the response of
the power system to the control logic was investigated.
8.9

Case Studies

8.7.3

Hybrid microgrid performance in a grid-connected mode.

In this case, a three-phase to ground fault (F2 in Figure 8.1) has been applied in
transmission line 2. The system performance during this fault is indicated in Figure 8.6. As
it can be noticed, the fault occurred at t = 6 seconds and isolated from the system.
In this case, the utility helped to maintain the system’s stable frequency during and after
the fault, as shown in Figure 8.6(a). Figure 8.6(b) shows the pulsed load (𝐼 𝐿 ),
supercapacitor (𝐼𝑐 ), and inverter (𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑣1 ) currents.
During the off-time pulsed load, the supercapacitor will be charging from the AC side,
whereas during the on-time pulsed load the supercapacitor will be the major feeder to the
pulsed load, as indicated in Figure 8.6(c). The AC side will still be present to feed the
pulsed load in case the supercapacitor goes out of service. The different agents that are
distributed beside the sources (GA1, GA2, DERA, and UA) sent their contribution currents
to MA.
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Figure 8.6 System performance during fault at grid connected mode of operation: (a)
frequency, (b) supercapacitor current, inverter current, and pulsed load current, (c)
supercapacitor DC voltage (d) three-phase currents in the faulted transmission line, (e)
RMS current in the faulted transmission line, (f) Source currents.

181

Figure 8.6(d) and (e) show the high fault current values of 32 Amps which is, mainly,
being contributed by the grid. It can be noted here that this setting is saved in MA for that
relay (

2 ).

As anticipated for the grid connected mode, the fault current is almost more

than 6 times the rated AC current and thus the protection devices were able to detect and
isolate the faults successfully.
This current (32 Amps) will sent to the main agent to identify the required current to
isolate the fault during the islanded mode without changing the relay settings.
8.7.3

Hybrid microgrid performance in an islanded mode.

In this case, fault F2 occurs during the islanded mode. The main agent asks DERA,
GA1and GA2 to send the value of the contribution from each source, and asks SCA to
inject current from SC to avoid changing the setting of

2.

As shown in Figure 8.7(b), the

supercapacitor can compensate the fault current with 20 A in order to reach to the high
setting of the relay (32 A), as indicated, in Figure 8.7(c). This resulted in relay

2

sensing

the fault and thus isolating it accordingly. After clearing the faulted region, the system
restored and showed stable performance, as indicated in Figure 8.7(a).
8.7.3

Islanded mode of operation during supercapacitor discharging.

In this case, the supercapacitor needs to be designed to supply both the pulse load and
the fault current requirements. The system performance during a fault F2 at these
circumstances is described in Figure 8.8. As indicated in Figure 8.8(b), the fault occurred
during the discharging of the supercapacitor phase of the pulse load period. It is noted that
the supercapacitor quickly contributed to the fault current while still covering the pulse
load. The can be observed as reflected on the pulse load current and the frequency as well
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as the DC voltage as changing within the accepted limits ( see Figure 8.8(a) and Figure
8.8(c)).The maximum current drawn from the supercapacitor in this case is 45 Amps,
which is required to feed the fault and the pulse load simultaneously. Figure 8.8(e) shows
that the fault current drastically increased from 5 Amps to 32 Amps. This resulted in relay
sensing the fault and thus isolating it.
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Figure 8.7 System performance during fault at microgrid operation (a) frequency, (b)
supercapacitor current, and (c) RMS current in the faulted transmission line
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8.9

Results and Discussion for the Coordination between Relays

The communication between MA, and other agents (GA1, GA2, SCA, DERA) at the
islanded mode of operation is used to demonstrate the capability of the suggested microgrid
to coordinate between the protective relays. The utility gets disconnected from the network
scheme by tripping R1.
GA1 communicates with MA and sends the value (I_G1), which represents the current of
generator1 during the fault. Similar loading information is sent from (GA2, SCA, DERA)
to MA as shown in messages 2, 3 and 4 in Figure 8.9. MA sends a request to SCA to inject
current from SC to reach to the settings of the different relays according to the location and
the type of the fault (e.g. F2 is the fault at transmission line 2 and R2 is the Main relay, 1st
Back up relay R3 and 2nd back up relay (R6)).
The results of the system during the islanded mode of operation for several types of faults
in the transmission lines of the system are shown in Table 8.4. The numerical figures in the
third row represent the results of different case studies discussed earlier at three phase to
ground fault (ABCG) for F2.
The contribution of the different sources is introduced and indicates the important role of
the energy storage device (supercapacitor) to help, whether the primary or back up
protection devices to reach the required setting and isolate the fault from the system.
For F2 in the transmission line 2, it can be found that the contribution of the SC is
represented (63.25%) of the total fault current (32A) to activate R2 (primary protection)
and trip the main breaker.
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In case the operation of R2 fails, and after the delay time according to the location of R2,
as shown in Table 8.2, R3 is activating to isolate the fault. In order to make another backup for R2, R6 will be activated to isolate the fault from the system. It can be found that the
CTI was checked and the selectivity was within the accepted limits. The same results can
be shown at the different types of fault (AG and BCG), and the primary and secondary
protection elements were performed and verified according to the coordination standard.

MA GA1 GA2 DERA SCA
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

R2

R3

R6

R4

R5

R7

IG1
IG2
IDER
ISC
F2 (M)

F2 (1st B)
F2 (2nd B)
F3 (M)
F3 (B)

F4 (M)
F4 (1st B)
F4 (2nd B)
F5 (M)
F5 (B)

M:- Main protection, B:- Back up, 1st B:- First back up, 2nd B:- Second back up.
Figure 8.9 Trace of messages between agents for full service coordination.
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Table 8.4 Primary and back-up protection
Contribution of sources relays
(Amps)
Primary

Fault

Protection

Type of fault

Back Up
Protection

CTI (S)

Location

AG

BCG

DER

G1

G2

1.99

4.12

2.50

2.35

4.67

3.21

SC

Relays

O.T (S)

Relays

O.T (S)

10.43

R2

0.125

R3

0.769

0.644

R6

0.775

0.650

R3

0.589

0.499

R6

0.625

0.535

R3

0.336

0.241

R6

0.490

0.395

15.39

R2

0.090

F2

ABCG

F3

2.80

5.11

3.85

20.24

R2

0.095

AG

3.87

3.12

2.88

8.89

R3

0.092

R6

0.682

0.590

BCG

2.21

6.34

3.67

13.22

R3

0.088

R6

0.491

0.403

ABCG

3.87

7.47

4.13

22.90

R3

0.071

R6

0.359

0.288

AG

1.92

1.04

4.87

7.87

R4

0.140

R5

0.658

0.518

R7

0.754

0.614

R5

0.421

0.309

R7

0.582

0.470

R5

0.351

0.258

R7

0.475

0.382

BCG

2.54

2.58

5.87

10.25

R4

0.112

F4

ABCG

F5

8.9

4.77

5.64

9.62

14.87

R4

0.093

AG

3.12

3.57

4.88

12.54

R5

0.081

R7

0.645

0.564

BCG

4.21

5.26

6.96

17.19

R5

0.073

R7

0.428

0.355

ABCG

5.62

6.73

8.89

23.74

R5

0.069

R7

0.314

0.245

Summary

This chapter presented details on the development of a hybrid hardware-software cosimulation platform capable of modeling the relation between the cyber and physical parts
to provide a protection scheme for the microgrid. The microgrid was simulated on
MATLAB/Simulink SimPowerSystems to model the physical system dynamics, whereas
all control logic was implemented on embedded microcontrollers communicating over a
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real network. The chapter suggested a protection methodology utilizing contemporary
communication technologies between multi-agents to protect the microgrid. A
supercapacitor is used for enabling the relay to isolate the fault during the islanded mode
operation without changing its grid setting. Due to the limited sources of the microgrid
during the islanded mode, the super-capacitor bank was implemented to assist the
protection elements (primary and back-up) to reach their settings and clear the fault from
the network. The contribution from the different sources in the system to feed the fault
current was studied. Several cases were conducted to investigate the developed protection
technique at different locations in the system.
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Chapter 9 Hardware Setup

9.1 Introduction
This chapter introduced the hardware setup of the developed protection schemes that were
introduced in the previous sections. One of the main contributions of this dissertation is to
create a solution of the communication outages for the protection scheme that is prevent
the relyas to trip during the islanded mode operation. To perform this method, we
developed a microgrid platform that consists of AC and DC sides and connected through
bidirectional converter to all the energy storage device to inject current at this critical case.
We used several programming loads at AC side that were fed by the grid and some
synchronous generators at normal operation. For the DC side we selected the
supercapacitor to feed pulsed and constant loads at normal operation. The controller of the
supercapacitor is adjusted to allow of moving the current from DC to AC side when the
communication is not available in the system. The sizing of the supercapacitor was
optimized and tested to ensure from the performance of the system at the selected values
of the controller.
The results showed an excellent performance to the system and the cost of the protection
system was investigated. Another test was performed in Smart Grid Test Bed is the
operation of the system when the fault occurred and the need to isolate it and restore the
power to the loads using MAS.
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9.2 Experimental Verification
The hybrid AC/DC microgrid, used for experimental verification, consists of several
types of sources that supply loads with different characteristics, including: AC load, a
normal steady-state load, and a heavy pulsed load at DC side. Figure 9.1 shows the
experimental test setups of the microgrid. The hardware setup and the control structure for
this system and the interconnected AC grid are explained in the following sections.
The two AC generators are mainly supplying different loads which composed of ten
levels of parallel resistive loads from 0 to 3 kW in steps of 300 W at nominal voltage. [2
×72 Ω + 4 × 144 Ω in each phase] resistance models, which can be controlled by PLC, to
emulate various load patterns.
This system also includes supervisory control and data acquisition system to monitor the
entire system. More details about the AC grid testbed configuration and control can be
found in [37], [38]. In addition, a supercapacitor bank was implemented as an energy buffer
in our hybrid AC/DC power system laboratory test-bed.
An analog hysteresis protection is designed to ensure that uneven charge distribution,
particularly during very fast charges, does not cause the supercapacitor to exceed its
maximum voltage limit. This protection unit also provides a backup for the energy control
system. If the voltage on any of the supercapacitor arrays exceeds the preset limit, the
analog control circuit will open the output of the insulated-gate bipolar transistor (IGBT)
switch (sw), as shown in Figure 9.1
The charging path remains open until the supercapacitor is discharged through the bypass
diode to the point that its voltage is reduced to the predefined safe threshold.
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The detailed parameters of the system are summarized in Table 9.1. For dynamic
operation and fault study, the detailed model of the microgrid shown in Figure 9.1 is
implemented in our virtual test-bed platform using the MATLAB/Simulink software and
executed with the dSPACE 1104 real-time interface to control and adjust the pulsed load
and the steady-state load. In order to obtain the optimal values of the PI controllers, the
Simulink Response Optimization toolbox was employed [193].
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Figure 9.1 General view of the experimental test setup
9.3

Experimental Test Results

The performance of the microgrid at islanded mode of operation was evaluated in three
test cases: First, utilizing the original supercapacitor size and controller parameters, then,
utilizing the values obtained from the two-level optimization process. Finally, the case in
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which the pulsed load is disconnected at fault instant was tested for the developed
protection technique.
Figure 9.2 shows the performance of the microgrid using the original supercapacitor
value and controllers parameters (C = 2.9 F, 𝑘𝑝_𝑓 =50, 𝑘𝑖_𝑓 =100, 𝑘𝑝_𝑣𝑎𝑐 =40, 𝑘𝑖_𝑣𝑎𝑐 =110,
𝑘𝑝_𝑣𝑑𝑐 =30, and 𝑘𝑖_𝑣𝑑𝑐 = 100). During the supercapacitor’s discharging period between t =
0.94 sec and t = 2.97 sec, the frequency of the system remained at 59.81 Hz and the DC
voltage dropped a little from 320 V to 311 V, as shown in Figure 9.2 (a) and (b)
respectively.
Also, during the supercapacitor charging period between t = 2.98 sec and t = 5.05 sec,
the system frequency was stable at 60 Hz and the DV voltage at 320 V. A three phase to
ground fault occurred at t = 6 seconds. This was accompanied by a drop to 59.32 Hz. Figure
9.2(c) shows that during the fault period, the supercapacitor’s current increased from 5.21
A to 9.86 A, which indicates that the fault current contribution from the supercapacitor was
4.65 A. Figure 9.2(d) and (e) show that the pulsed load and steady state currents remained
stable throughout the experiment. Figure 9.2(f) indicates that the total fault current of

3

is 7.2 A, thus reaching the high relay settings, which is assumed to be 3 times the normal
current (2.4 A). Note that current values in the hardware experimentation were scaled
down, compared to those in the simulation, to operate in safe experimental limits in a
laboratory environment and the relay settings were adjusted accordingly.
It is important to note that the system maintained it’s a stable operation in the experiment.
That is, the frequency remained between the acceptable ranges of 59.7 Hz and 60.2 Hz and
the AC and DC voltages have a maximum acceptable variation of ±5% of their rated
values.
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Table 9.1 System Component Ratings
Component

Parameter

Specification

Apparent Power

G1, G2

Nominal Voltage

13.8, 10 KVA

Stator Leakage Reactance

208, 208 V

d-axis Synchronous
Reactance

0.09 0.09 pu

q-axis Synchronous
Reactance
d-axis Transient Time
Constant

2.21, 2.248 pu
1.1, 1.1 pu
0.014, 0.012 s

Number of cells

20

Rated voltage

320

Rated capacity

2.9 F

Surge voltage

340

Leakage current

5.2 mA

Rs

1e5 Ω

R on

1e-3 Ω

Switching frequency

5 KHz

r1,

0.0015 Ω/Km,

r0

0.03 Ω/Km

l1,

0.03 mH/Km,

l0

0.1 mH/Km

c1,

3 nF/Km,

c0

2nF/Km

CL

550 W

Supercapacitor
bank

Inverter

Transmission Line

Constant Load
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Figure 9.2 Experimental test results during fault at islanded mode of opera-tion without
optimized supercapacitor size (a) frequency, (b) superca-pacitor DC voltage, (c)
supercapacitor current, (d) pulsed load current, (e) steady state load current, (f) RMS
current in the faulted transmission line.
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Figure 9.3 shows the performance of the microgrid using the optimized supercapacitor
value and controllers parameters (C = 2.5 F, 𝑘𝑝_𝑓 =65, 𝑘𝑖_𝑓 =110 , 𝑘𝑝_𝑣𝑎𝑐 =30, 𝑘𝑖_𝑣𝑎𝑐 =115,
𝑘𝑝_𝑣𝑑𝑐 =40, and 𝑘𝑖_𝑣𝑑𝑐 =110 ).
Similar to the previous case, the system operating under the optimized values was
capable to maintain its frequency within the acceptable limits.
In fact, during the fault instant at t= 18.8 sec, the frequency dropped to a minimum of
59.61 Hz as shown in Figure 9.3 (a), which is better than the drop to 59.32 Hz of the
previous case.
Figure 9.3 (b) shows that during the fault, the supecapictor’s current increased from 5.21
A to 7.8 A, which indicates that the fault current contribution of the supercapcitor in this
case is 2.59 A.
This corresponds to a 44.3% reduction in the supercapacitor’s fault current contribution
compared to the previous case.
However, Figure 9.3 (e) shows that the fault current still reached 7.2 A and the relays
were activated.
This is because the remaining fault current was supplied by the AC generators as
intended from the optimization process.
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Figure 9.3 Microgrid performance during fault at islanded mode of operation with
optimized supercapacitor size (a) frequency, (b) supercapacitor current, (c) pulsed load
current, (d) steady state load current, (e) RMS current in the faulted transmission line.
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Figure 9.3 (c) and (d) show that the pulsed load and steady state currents remained stable
during the experiment.
These results show that the optimization enhanced the operation of the system during
normal and fault operations and decreased the size of the supercapacitor (thus reducing its
cost) while maintaining enough fault current contribution to trigger the relays in the event
of communication loss as explained in the previous section.
Finally, Figure 9.4 presents the performance of the system when uncritical pulsed loads
are removed during the fault period.
As mentioned earlier, in this case, a notch in the DC voltage profile indicates a fault and
is therefore used as the trigger to disconnect the pulsed load. Figure 9.4(b) shows a notch
in the DC voltage at t = 10.2 sec.
At this instant, the pulsed load is disconnected. This is reflected in the pulsed load current
in Figure 9.4(c), which drops from 5.2 A to 0 A during the fault period. Figure 9.4(a) shows
a decrease in the supercapacitor’s current during that period from 5.21 A to 1.03 A,
corresponding to a 4.18 A drop.
It is noticeable from Figure 9.4 (b) that the variation of the DC voltage was changed to
be between 320 V and 306 V.
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Figure 9.4 Operation test result of the microgrid during fault at islanded mode (a)
supercapacitor current, (b) supercapacitor DC voltage, (c) pulsed load current.

9.4

Cyber-Physical Multi-agent Framework
This section briefly explains the hardware, software and the data information model

of the multi-agent framework. PMU are located on system buses to enable monitoring and
control. The standard IEEE Std. C37.118 includes the data transfer protocol for PMUs for
power systems [183]. PMUs using IEEE Std. C37.118 communication protocol were
deployed at the connection points. For actual implementation of decentralized control
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schemes in power systems, it is imperative to link multi-agent objects to distributed
industrial control systems such as PMUs. The required interface is established through a
combination of interoperable information data and protocols. The IEEE Std. C37.118
synchro phasor communication provides a standardized information exchange for power
systems. However, it is not sufficient to define the behavior of the agents. Therefore,
semantics of the exchanged messages should be define using common knowledge
representations. The FIPA is an organization which intends to evolve interoperable agent
communications with an Agent Communication Language (ACL) [184]-[185]. We
implemented the agent framework to run the protection algorithm in real-time using IEEE
Std. C37.118 and the FIPA standards as shown in Figure 9.5.

Agent Node
Java Agent Development Environement (JADE)
Middleware (OPC UA)

Synchrophasor Protocol (IEEE Std. C37.118)
Physical Link
Figure 9.5 Agent node architecture.
ACL messages represent a communicative act or messages (inform, request, refuse
etc.) intended to perform some action with precisely defined syntax and semantics. JADE
is a software framework to develop agents compliant with FIPA standards with flexible
agent behavior methods. OPC UA middleware is used to connect ACL messages and IEEE
Std. C37.118 measurements. OPC UA is a platform independent specification with a set of
industrial standards for system interconnectivity using publish/subscribe mechanism [186].
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In this setup, an off-the-shelf OPC UA server is implemented to acquire IEEE Std. C37.118
measurements. An OPC UA client is embedded in the Java platform to enable JADE to
access mapped IEEE Std. C37.118 measurements
9.5 Experimental Setup
The basic structure of the system includes 4 synchronous generators, and loads. The
generators are 13.8-kVA and 10-KVA, 60-Hz, 208-V, and 1800-RPM synchronous
machines. The prime mover of each of these generators is coupled to one of the available
motors which are driven by different frequency drives. All the generators are equipped with
AVR in order to maintain an output voltage magnitude. Figure 7.15 shows the overall
schematic of Generation Stations and their components. The AVR model is a half-wave
phase-controlled thyristor type automatic voltage regulator and forms part of excitation
system for brushless generators. Excitation power is derived directly from the generator
terminals. The output voltage of generators should be maintained by applying offline
parameter settings on AVR module. The frequency drive can be used with 3-phase ac
induction motors rated from 1/3 HP up to 7-HP on voltages from 120-V single-phase to
600-V three-phase.
For implementing a smart grid with control, programming via a link with real-time
software was performed to control the frequency and change the output active power of
generators. The control modes of this drive are “vector speed control” for emulating slack
generator and constant frequency-voltage, and “vector torque control” for emulating
constant active power-voltage output. Hence, by the proper real-time controller, the whole
system generation control can be achieved for wide area control usage. The generators
parameters have been presented in Table 7.1. The load module is composed of 10 levels of
200

parallel resistive loads from 0 – 3 kW in steps of 300 W t nominal voltage. [2 x 72 Ω + 4
x 144 Ω in each phase] resistance models, which can be controlled by PLC, to emulate
various load patterns.

Table 9.2 Generation station parameters
Parameter Name

G1

G2-G4

Apparent Power

13.8 KVA

10 KVA

Nominal Voltage

208 V

208 V

Stator Leakage Reactance (XL)

0.09 pu

0.09 pu

d-axis Synchronous Reactance (Xd)

2.21 pu

2.248 pu

q-axis Synchronous Reactance (Xq)

1.1 pu

1.117 pu

d-axis Transient Time Constant (Td’)

0.014 s

0.012 s
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Figure 9.6 Overall schematic of a generator station and its measurements.
9.6 Results and Discussion
This section introduces the real-time experiments to validate the developed multi-agent
framework. The developed multi-agent framework is implemented in a reconfigurable
small scale power system available at Florida International University, Smart Grid Test
Bed as shown in Figure 9.7 [187].
9.6.1

Fault Location and Isolation Operation

Figure 7.18 shows the correspondences exchanged between the agents to perform the
operations of fault location, isolation, and restoration in real-time. After applying a fault,
PMUs at both sides of each section measure the three phase current angle signals and
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forward these signals to their corresponding SA. The SA of the faulted section sends trip
signals to both circuit breakers that are located at the both sides of this section to isolate
the fault from the system. The type of fault can be identified according to the current phase
angle difference between phases A, B and C.
The location of the fault can be determined and the faulty section can be isolated from the
system for all types of faults using current phase angle comparison technique. Figure 9.8
shows the difference of the current phase angle between the phases, and it covers the
operation before and during the fault. If we applied a single phase to ground fault at section
13, it can be seen from Figure 9.8(a) that at the 131st second the phase angle deviation of
(A-A’) at both sides of this section is increased above the threshold value, which was
adjusted to be 20° and the other deviation phases (B-B’) and (C-C’) are not changed.
Additionally, for a double line to ground fault on phases B and C in the same section, the
deviation of these phases increased above the threshold value.

Figure 9.7 Agent platform and laboratory setup
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Figure 9.8 Phase angle difference of starting and ending sides at section 13 during. (a)
Single line to ground fault, (b) Double line to ground fault. (c) Three phase to ground
fault.
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Figure 9.9 Correspondence between multi-agent systems.
On the other hand, the deviation of phase A is not changed as shown in Figure 9.8(b).
Finally, a three phase to ground fault is applied to the last section in circuit one and the
deviation phase angle of the three phases are increased above the threshold value as shown
in Figure 9.8(c).
9.6.2

Restoration Operation

RA is communicating with all the generators in the system. Once the fault occurred in
section 13, which is located in circuit 1, RA2 requested from Generator 3 and Generator 4
to inject more power in order to compensate for power losses as a result of disconnecting
Generator 2 from the system due to the fault. Figure 9.10 shows the real power of each
generator that is connected in the system. From the 70th to the 140th second, all the
generators can feed the loads in the system during the normal operation. At the 131st
second, the fault occurred and generator 2 is disconnected from the system. For generator
1, the output power is in-creased from 1200w to 1500w after isolating the fault from the
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system. Generators 3 and 4 can perform the lower restoration process in order to check the
synchronization conditions are satisfied and increased their rating value from 900w to
1200w.
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Figure 9.10 The real power of each generator before and after fault at section 13.

9.7 Summary
This chapter developed two solutions for reducing the size and cost of supercapacitors that
are used to compensate for the low islanded microgrid fault currents during communication
outages in adaptive protection schemes.

206

First, for critical pulsed loads, a two-level optimization scheme is presented. In the first
level, the goal is to reduce the developed protection scheme’s cost by selecting the minimal
value of the supercapacitor that maintains the system’s stable operation. In level 2, the main
of objective is to minimize the supercapacitor’s fault current contribution and maximize
that of the distributed generators. The optimized size of the supercapacitor and the
associated controllers parameters were investigated under several types of faults in
different location in simulation and were verified experimentally. The results show the
ability of the optimized supercapacitor rating to feed different types of faults in order to
raise the fault current to the high relay settings and maintain stable system operation during
communication outages. Also, the supercapacitor proved effective for faults occurring in
distant locations in the microgrid. Finally, temporary disconnection of pulsed loads during
the transient fault period proved effective for non-critical pulsed loads as a solution to avoid
utilization of oversized supercapacitors.
Also, this chapter introduced the experimental works for fault location, isolation and
restoration method base on MAS. The simulation of the developed protection methodology
was presented, followed by experimental verification. The experimental results showed
excellent agreement with the simulated protection scheme
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Chapter 10 Enhancement of Protection Scheme for Distribution System using the
Communication Network
One of the main challenges to design a proper protection scheme is the dynamic change in
the architecture for the microgrid. The settings of the relays needs to be updated with every
configuration in the system to isolate the fault. In this chapter, a centralized control
approach is developed to monitor the modes of the microgrid and helping the relays to
define the fault location and clear it from the system. The developed technique helps to
identify the shortest path from the source to the fault location. MCU is responsible for
adjusting the relays settings based on the current topology and the shortest path to the fault
point. This technique is investigated on IEEE 14 bus microgrid system for all the possible
fault paths. The developed scheme is able to clear the fault by isolating the minimum part
of the system and certifying the endurance of the power to supply the different loads in the
system.
10.1 Introduction
DERs coupled to a microgrid and its incorporation with the main grid are the objectives in
achieving optimum operation of electric power system networks. Decreasing greenhouse
gases caused by the conventional energy resources, while increasing the reliability for
consumers are some of its foremost advantages. However, along with these benefits,
microgrids present several technical challenges for the protection schemes. First, the
continuous alterations in the configuration of the system needs observing the status of all
DG while automatically modifying their relay settings.
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Another issue relate to the protection of the microrgrid is the introduction of bidirectional
power flow. The high penetration of DERs based on an interfaced converter reduces the
capacity of the short circuit current amount during the islanded mode of operation.
The communication signals plays an important role to update the setting of the relays to
accumulate with the current topology of the system, as the microgrid changes the mode of
operation between the grid connected and islanded mode with the different connections of
the DERs during the latter mode.
This chapter aims to present the helping of the communication system to identify the
shortest path from the source location to the fault point. MCU communicates with the
different relays that are distributed in the system to adjust their settings with the current
configuration of the microgrid.
10.2 Challenges in Microgrid Protection
The following section discusses the different challenges that should be taken into our
consideration to design an adequate protection scheme for the microgrid system.
10.2.1 Selectivity and Sensitivity Issues
Two main characteristics that should be found in microgrid system protection devices are
selectivity and sensitivity features. First, selectivity refers to the ability of the protection
system to locate and classify a fault correctly. OC relays should determine whether the
fault is internal or external to its zone. The protection algorithm should be able to
distinguish between the main grid and local microgrid fault. During main grid faults, the
microgrid needs to be capable of islanding to protect equipment in the system. During
microgrid faults, the function of the protection scheme becomes more complicated as it is
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required to disconnect the smallest part of the faulty section from the system. It should be
noted that the importance of the selectivity feature of the relays is to operate under various
faults while isolating the faulty part.
Secondly, sensitivity refers to the fact that OC relays should be able to detect the fault
conditions in the system. The fault should be cleared as quickly as possible to maximize
safety while minimizing system instability and damage to equipment. The OC relay should
quickly arrive at a decision and CBs must function rapidly. The sensitivity of the relays
must be adjusted such that a high redundancy can be achieved without affecting selectivity
of the protection system [194]-[195].
10.2.2 The Direction of Power Flow
Distribution systems become active systems due to the integration of DERs in the system.
The microgrid feeds local loads and can also support power to the grid in the case of excess
generation. This operation changes the flow of the power from unidirectional to
bidirectional. Bi-directional power flow has effects on the amplitude and direction of the
fault current thereby effecting coordination of the protective relays. In this case, the
protection system in a typical distribution system is designed accordingly to a time or
current coordination principle, in which the relay closest to the fault operates first and in
the event of a failure, a backup protective relay operates after a delay time.
However, the effectiveness of this protection requires a radial grid connection, which is
no longer the case when DGs are connected to the network. This results in either changing
or completely losing coordination between protective devices [196].
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The different adverse effects of DG connections on the distribution network protection
include false tripping of feeders, blinding of protection, increase or decrease in the fault
level with the connection or disconnection of DERs affecting the reach of the OC relay
settings [197]- [199].
10.2.3 Dynamic Changes in the Microgrid Architecture
Dynamic changes of the microgrid configuration should be taken into consideration
when designing the protection scheme. Some changes include the disconnection of
generation units, shutting down some loads during peak hours, or exporting of power to
the main grid during excess generation periods for optimum and economic operations [24].
Adaptive protection is required to change the relay settings according to the current
microgrid configuration. Prior knowledge of every state in the microgrid as well as online
monitoring and calculation of the short circuit fault current is needed for proper operation.
As previously discussed, this requires the application of a fast, reliable, and robust
communication system.
10.2.4 Faults in Grid-Connected Mode.
For a fault on the main grid during normal operation, the response of the protection
devices of individual DERs should not trip before the protection device at the PCC trips,
while DERs should continue operation during sensing and switching of the PCC device.
To allow this, all DERs should have FRT capability. For a fault within the microgrid during
normal operation, the response of line and feeder protection must be to disconnect the
faulty portion from the rest of system as quickly as possible and how it is done depends on
the features and complexity of the microgrid and the protection strategy used.
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There may be some non-fault cases resulting in low voltage at the PCC such as voltage
unbalances and non-fault open phases that are difficult to detect and may potentially create
hazards for sensitive loads, micro sources, etc. Therefore, some protection mechanisms are
needed to avoid such situations.
10.2.5 Faults in Islanded Mode.
The high penetration of DERs based on power electronic inverters interfaced with the
microgrid as shown in Figure 10.1 has a great impact on the protection scheme. These
systems limit the short circuit current during islanded mode of operation, as they are
equipped with a FCL that prevents high OC levels to flow during the fault period. A
significant difference exists in the amount of short circuit current that occurs when in grid
connected and islanded modes of operation. In grid connected, fault currents of a much
higher magnitude (5-10 times the full load current) are available to help conventional OC
relays to activate under abnormal operations. However, in islanded mode, the fault current
reduces to only about 3 times the full load current. Furthermore, a large integration of
connected converter-based DERs further reduces the fault current to only 1.2-1.5 times the
full load current. Usually, conventional OC relays are set to operate at 1.2-8 times full load
current. Accordingly, the time-current coordination of OC relays and OC devices with
extremely inverse characteristics are disturbed.
10.2.6 Sympathetic Tripping
This protection issue causes disconnection of a healthy feeder due to fault on a neighboring
feeder. It occurs as a result of reverse power ﬂow from DG units, as indicated in Figure
10.1. When the DG is not connected in the system, a fault current I𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑 is detected by the
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relay at CB3. However, when a DG unit is interfaced to the MG, the current I𝐷𝐺 would also
contribute to the fault. If I𝐷𝐺 is appreciably large, then the relay at CB2 may trip and cause
the healthy feeder to isolate.

I Grid

CB2

Grid
CB1

DG

I DG

CB3

I fault
fault

Figure 10.1. Sympathetic tripping in the MG system
10.3 The Fault Current Supplied By DGs
Fault currents supplied by DGs were approximated to 5 times their rated currents whilst
fault currents from PE-interfaced DGs were approximated to about 1.5 times their rated
current. Then, for a given relay “r” in the network, the operating current is calculated as in
(10.1). This equation considers the grid’s and all DG’s fault contribution including the
supercapacitor on that particular relay:I𝑟 = 𝐼𝑓_𝐺 + 𝐼𝑓_𝐷𝐺 + 𝐼𝑓_

𝐸

+ 𝐼𝑓_𝐷𝐸𝑅

(10.1)

During the grid connected mode, the current can be calculated using the Thevenin’s
equivalent circuit [10] as shown in the following equation (10.2).

𝐼𝑓𝐺 =

𝑉𝑡ℎ
𝑍𝑡ℎ
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(10.2)

To be more accurate, the V_th is the voltage of the Thevines circuit and Z_th is the total
impedance that is changed according to the location of the fault. For this case, the fault
current by the grid can be represented as a function of the distance and can be shown in the
following equation (10.3):𝑉𝑡ℎ
(10.3)
× 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒
𝑍𝑡ℎ(𝑥)
During the islanded mode of operation, the fault current that is supplied by the grid is
𝐼𝑓𝐺 =

multiplied by the operation Mode, and will be equal to 0.
It can be noted that the contribution to the fault current that is supplied by DGs is
approximated 5 times the rated current, while the DGs interfaced inverted is contributed
by 1.5 times the rated current.
𝑛

𝐼𝑓_𝐷𝐺 = 𝐴𝑣.× (5 × ∑
𝑖=1

𝐼𝑓_𝑥
𝐼𝐹𝑀_𝐷𝐺

𝐼𝑟𝐷𝐺 × 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝐷𝐺 )

(10.4)

𝑚

𝐼𝑓_

𝐸

= (1.5 × ∑ 𝐼𝑟𝑃𝐸 × 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 𝐸 )

(10.5)

𝑗=1
𝑚

𝐼𝑓_𝐷𝐸𝑅 = (1.5 × ∑ 𝐼𝑟𝐷𝐸𝑅 × 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝐷𝐸𝑅 )

(10.6)

𝑗=1

The signal Status indicates whether that source is in operation or not. Depending on the
type of the source, i.e., whether it is inverter interfaced or with rotating machines. In
literature, the fault contributions of the Inverter interfaced DGs is reported to range
between 1.2 and 2. In order to be practical and more realistic, authors selected the
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coefﬁcient 1.5 since the extreme conditions (where the fault contribution is 1.2 or 2) will
not occur as frequent as conditions which require fault contribution coefﬁcient to be 1.5.
In this case, it considers a capacitor in series with a resistance. The SC model input is the
power PSC absorbed/injected from/to the SC. The SC current is defined as follow:

𝑄𝑠𝑐 /𝐶𝑠𝑐 √(𝑄𝑠𝑐 /𝐶𝑠𝑐 )2 − 4 × 𝑠𝑐 × 𝑃𝑠𝑐
(10.7)
−
2 × 𝑠𝑐
2 × 𝑠𝑐
The BT model considers a voltage source in series with a resistance. The BT model input
𝐼𝑠𝑐 =

is the power P_BT absorbed/injected from/to the BT, being this the output from power
splitter control. The BT current is calculated using (10.8):

𝐼𝐵𝑇

=(

𝑉𝑂𝐶 (𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐵𝑇 )
√(𝑉𝑂𝐶 )2 (𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐵𝑇 ) − 4 . 𝐵𝑇 (𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐵𝑇 ). 𝑃𝐵𝑇
−
) (10.8)
2 . 𝐵𝑇 (𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐵𝑇 )
2 . 𝐵𝑇 (𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐵𝑇 )

being 𝑉𝑂𝐶 the open circuit voltage and

𝐵𝑇

the internal resistance. Both are function of the

state of charge 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐵𝑇 which is defined as the ratio of the charge present in the battery
𝑄 and the nominal charge 𝑄𝑂 .
The 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐵𝑇 is subject to a maximum and minimum level constraint. For BT, this is an
important constraint since the lifetime strongly depends on the 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐵𝑇 -range used. When
the 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐵𝑇 is lower than 20% both charge-discharge resistances increase rapidly. This is a
reason why the minimum 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐵𝑇 should be kept above 20% [46].
10.4 Developed Protection Technique
The following section presents the developed technique that used to protect the system
for several fault paths from the source to the fault point.
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10.4.1 Identification the direction of the fault
Two directional relays are installed in each branch to send the value and the direction of
the fault current to MCU. Each relay looks into the value and the direction of the current.
If two relays of a branch sense the fault in the same direction, then the fault is outside this
branch, but if the relays the direction of the current at two different directions, then the
fault identified in this branch. In Figure 10.2, B2 and B3 identified the fault from the right
and left sides, then the fault was occurred at this zone.
10.4.2 Identify the shortest path
Figure 10.3 shows the developed protection idea on IEEE 14- bus network. As, it was
explained the fault location is identified based on the amplitude and the direction of the
fault current. The impedance and the lengths of the different transmission lines of the
system are identified, a pre calculation study of this network was prepared in terms of the
different values of the impedance and lengths of the transmission lines to identify the
shortest path from the grid to the fault location.
Assume that the fault occurred between buses 3 and 4, the possible paths can be
illustrated as shown in Figure 10.4 and explained as follows:1- B6-B12-B13-B14-B9-B7-B4-B3
2- B6-B13-B14-B9-B7-B4-B3.
3- B6-B11-B10-B9-B7-B4-B3.
4- B6-B5-B4-B3.
5- B6-B2-B4-B3.
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Based on these paths, it can be noticed here that the least number of paths is found at
paths 4 and 5. However, the best path that may be achieve the minimum time to isolate the
fault is path 1 or path 2. The final decision to determine the elected path will be determined
according to the length and the impedance of each path as shown in Table 10.1. that should
be saved into MCU before the occurrence of the fault. After define the candidate path,
MCU send a GOOSE message to the directional relays at both sides of buses 3 and 4 to
adjust their settings based on the selected path.
Table 10.1 The length and impedance of the transmission lines
Buses
Length (m)
Impedance (Ω)
1-2

10

2.24 + J*0.43

2-4

15

8.34+ J*0.87

1-5

12

6.56+ J*0.56

2-5

18

7.54+ J*0.12

4-5

16

5.66+ J*0.54

3-4

13

8.11+ J*0.44

4-7

11

11.84+ J*0.46

5-6

19

7.82+ J*0.13

7-9

25

4.32+ J*0.52

7-8

17

3.56+ J*0.16

9-10

23

2.58+ J*0.43

10-11

14

12.54+ J*0.56

6-11

15

16.14+ J*0.55

9-14

24

18.32+ J*0.87

13-14

19

11.24+ J*0.43

6-13

22

10.40+ J*0.17
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Figure 10.2 Identify the location of the fault
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Figure 10.3 Modified IEEE 14 bus system.
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Figure 10.4 Define the possible paths to the fault location.
10.5 Simulation Case Studies
Figure 10.6(a) shows the system performance for the first candidate path, it can be shown
that the fault current was tripped at t=3s which represented the longest time period to detect
the fault and isolate it from the system. On the other hand, another path was selected to
investigate the period time to trip the circuit breaker and that time was improved to be
t=2.967s as the number of paths reduced to be 7 buses instead of 8 buses. For the case of 4
buses, the tripped time was reached to t=2.933s, it can be concluded here that the time
required to trip the circuit breaker reduced by decreasing the number of buses. The case of

219

four buses, was studied and the time reduced and reached to t=2.917s as shown in Figure
10.6(d). Finally, the same number of four buses was shown at Figure 10.6 (e) and the trip
time became t=2.833s as the total length from the grid to the faulty location is less than the
latter case. It can be noted that the required time to trip the circuit breaker was improved
between the first and last case study and reduced from t=3s to t=2.833s that helped the
system to isolate the system faster and keep the system stable without more disturbance
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Figure 10.5. System performance during the fault (a) 1st path, (b) 2nd path, (c) 3rd path,
(d) 4th path, and (e) 5th path.
10.6 Summary
The protection of microgrid is represented a challenge due to the continuously change in
the architecture of the system. The need to the communication network is necessary to
adjust the settings of the relay to be updated with the current topology of the microgrid
system. MCU is implemented to monitor the statues of the different sources in the system
and identify the location of the fault and isolate it. The developed technique was
investigated several paths from the source location to the fault point and selected the
shortest path to clear the fault.
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Chapter 11 Conclusions and Recommendation for Future Works

11.1 Conclusions
This dissertation presented new techniques for the control, energy management,
and protection of wide-area power systems and active distribution networks to improve the
performance of the smart grid in terms of efficiency, reliability, communication,
aggregation and human/agent participation. Four laboratory-scale hardware/softwarebased test platforms were developed to experimentally evaluate the contributions of this
dissertation.
First of all, a communication-assisted fault localization, isolation and restoration
method for microgrids based on MAS was developed. The three phase current angle signals
at the sending and receiving terminals of each section of the transmission line were
measured using PMUs. These measurements are forwarded to SAs that located at the
middle of the protected section. The SA of the fault section send trip signals to both circuit
breakers that are located at both sides of this section to isolate the fault from the system
when the deviation of the phase angles increases above the threshold limit.
To perform the developed technique, the hardware, software and the data
information model of the multi-agent framework was developed. The IEEE Std. C37.118
synchro phasor communication provides a standardized information exchange for power
systems. However, it is not sufficient to define the behavior of the agents. Therefore,
semantics of the exchanged messages should be define using common knowledge
representations. The FIPA is an organization which intends to evolve inter-operable agent
communications with an ACL.
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We implemented the agent framework to run the protection algorithm in real-time
using IEEE Std. C37.118 and the FIPA standards. JADE is a software frame-work to
develop agents compliant with FIPA standards with flexible agent behavior methods. OPC
UA middleware is used to connect ACL messages and IEEE Std. C37.118 measurements.
In this setup, OPC UA server is implemented to acquire IEEE Std. C37.118 measurements.
An OPC UA client is embedded in the Java platform to enable JADE to access mapped
IEEE Std. C37.118 measurements. We have two main contributions:-: first, it eliminates
the use of voltage transformers and thus reduces costs. Second, it does not require transfer
of data along long distances which decreases the delay time for fault isolation.
Power restoration processes following the fault clearance considering voltage,
frequency and power flow constraints in the microgrid under study was also performed.
Simulation of the developed protection methodology was presented followed by
experimental verification. The experimental results showed excellent agreement with the
simulated protection scheme.
Secondly, cyber-attacks representing a main challenge to design a suitable
protection scheme. Here are the main contribution to overcome this problem:• Use of energy storages to enhance the resiliency of adaptive microgrid protection
schemes against communication failures.
• Design of an autonomous control for a supercapacitor’s AC/DC converter capable
of operating when the microgrid is in both grid-connected and islanded mode using a single
mode of operation. This autonomous control strategy eliminates the need of a
communicated control command to shift the controller from grid-connected to islanded
modes of operation.
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• The ability of the overall system to keep the values of frequency, AC voltage and
DC voltage stable during extreme cases such as the occurrence of a fault during a peak
pulse load period.
• The developed method was investigated under different fault types. Excellent
results were observed using the developed protection scheme.
Another contribution was developed two solutions for reducing the size and cost of
supercapacitors that are used to compensate for the low-islanded microgrid fault currents
during communication outages in adaptive protection schemes. First, for critical pulsed
loads, a two-level optimization scheme is presented. In the first level, the goal is to reduce
the developed protection scheme’s cost by selecting the minimal value of the
supercapacitor that maintains the system’s stable operation. In level 2, the main of objective
is to minimize the supercapacitor’s fault current contribution and maximize that of the
distributed generators. The optimized size of the supercapacitor and the associated
controllers parameters were investigated under several types of faults in different location
in simulation and were verified experimentally. Second, temporary disconnection of pulsed
loads during the transient fault period proved effective for non-critical pulsed loads as a
solution to avoid utilization of oversized supercapacitors.
Final contribution was presented a hybrid hardware-software co-simulation
platform that can be used to model the relation between the cyber and physical parts the
microgrid. The microgrid was simulated on MATLAB/Simulink SimPowerSystems to
model the physical system dynamics, whereas all control logic was implemented on
embedded microcontrollers communicating over a real network. The simulation software,
embedded microcontrollers, and a real communication architecture were collected to
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perform the protection scheme platform. The Data Distribution Services (DDS)
middleware is used to link the hardware and software environments. This method does not
need to change the relay settings at different configurations of the microgrid. The
developed solution does not incur additional costs to the system studied, as the
supercapacitor is already used to feed a pulsed load. The paper also developes a
coordination process between the relays with the help of the supercapacitor. Primary and
back-up protection were studied according to IEEE Std C37.112 to isolate the fault
properly. We also provided details of the fault current that supplied by any DG to any point
inside the network. The results showed that the co-simulation infrastructure introduces a
high dependability design, analysis, and testing environment for cyber and physical data
flow in the system.
As we presented in the previous chapters that the developed protection techniques
were verified in Smart Grid Test Bed at FIU and the experimental works were matched
with the simulation results. We developed several protection techniques based on energy
storage devices and MAS to mitigate the cyber-attacks such as Denial of Service type.
For the experimental part, we tested MAS to isolate and restore the power to the
different loads in the system. Also, we developed a non-software method using the energy
storage device to inject current and helping the relays to reach the required settings and
isolate the fault when the communication is not available in the system.
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11.2 Recommendations for Future Work
In this subsection, the new trends on smart grid were highlighted and open research
areas were discussed. Comparing the earlier and the current research works, we identified
the following trends:
Stability and reliability problems occurred due to integration of renewable energy
resources will solve with the FACTs devices like static synchronous compensator
(STATCOM), static VAR compensator (SVC), static series synchronous compensator
(SSSC) and unified power flow controller (UPFC). Additionally, the harmonics resulting
from power circuits will be mitigated by filters integrated these devices. The stability
classifications and analysis methods for microgrid. Also researchers compiled available
methodologies to improve the micro-grid stability.
Fast static switch, fault current limiter and energy storage devices can be used as
external protection devices. Fast static switch provides high-speed isolation for loads when
transition from grid-connected to islanded mode.
Different cyber-attacks need to study and investigate the operation of the protective
elements to ensure from the cleaning of the faulty part in the system.
Several energy storage devices such as lead acid can be used to be a candidate
solution for injection current when the microgrid is not served by the communication
networks. The controller of another energy storage devices can be compared with the
controller of the supercapacitor bank, also the comparison can be done in terms of the total
cost, volume and weight, as well as internal losses and complexity of the control system.
In this dissertation, a new design of the controller for the AC/DC converter is
developed to test the capability of the energy storage device to feed the fault at the AC side
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when the communication is not available. This technique could be further advanced by
using some other artificial and intelligent methods such as Fourier transform to improve
the performance of the protection scheme.
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